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The Choice Between Adjudicating and
Rulemaking for Formulating and
Implementing Energy Policy
By RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.*
Introduction
The government has increased its degree of involvement in super-
vising the activities of energy suppliers as the magnitude of the energy
problem confronting the United States has increased over the last dec-
ade. Established regulatory agencies, such as the former Federal
Power Commission' (FPC), have experienced a substantial increase in
the number of disputes they are asked to resolve, as corporations at-
tempt to conform their past practices, price levels, and facilities to cur-
rent economic, social, and physical circumstances. Relatively new
regulatory agencies, like the former Federal Energy Administration
(FEA),2 were created virtually overnight to regulate major segments of
the energy industry in a manner never before attempted.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas. B.S. 1965, Lehigh University;
J.D. 1972, University of Virginia. This investigation was supported by University of Kansas
General Research allocation number XO-0038. The research efforts of John Bowman, Uni-
versity of Kansas, class of 1980, contributed substantially to this Article. His assistance is
gratefully acknowledged. In addition, Ronald L. Winkler, a member of the District of Co-
lumbia bar, rendered considerable assistance in providing access to the records of many of
the regulatory proceedings studied during this investigation, and Professor Tom McGarity
provided a great deal of constructive criticism, counsel, and encouragement throughout the
writing process.
1. The FPC ceased to exist, and most of its powers were transferred to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), in 1977. Department of Energy Organization Act,
Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977). This Article uses "FPC" to denote both the former
Commission and its successor, the FERC.
2. The FEA was created in 1974. Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-275, 88 Stat. 96 (1974). Its genesis is described in REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
TASK FORCE, FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION REGULATION 5-14 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as FEA REGULATION]. The FEA was abolished, and most of its functions were trans-
ferred to the Economic Regulatory Administration (ERA), in 1977, through the Department
of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977).
This expansion of government regulation of the energy industry in
turn has provoked a mushrooming of the decisionmaking functions of
energy regulatory agencies. Over a recent ten year period, the FPC's
caseload increased over one hundred-fold in one major category of
proceedings alone.3 The FEA, which did not even exist before 1974,
was asked to decide approximately 30,000 cases a year during 1975 and
1976.4 Moreover, the increase in the number of cases brought before
energy regulatory agencies does not fully reflect the greater burden on
these agencies created by more complex and vigorously contested cases,
a result of the higher stakes involved and the higher visibility of the
issues.5 Proceedings previously contested between a natural gas pipe-
line, the agency staff, and one or two major customers now attract the
attention of scores of intervenors, including direct customers, suppliers,
environmental groups, state utility commissions, and even senators and
representatives. Cases which previously turned on the resolution of a
few disputed accounting practices have become forums for considering
a plethora of new rate setting methods. In short, to borrow Professor
Boyer's terminology, 6 the traditional bipolar case in energy regulation
has been replaced by the polycentric dispute.
The quantitative and qualitative increases in the workload of
energy regulatory agencies not surprisingly have been accompanied by
an increase in complaints that the agencies are not performing their
assigned duties efficiently and effectively. Participants and observers
3. In 1966, two applications for rate increases were filed by natural gas pipelines.
[19711 F.P.C. ANN. REP. 49. Two hundred fifteen such applications were filed in 1976.
[1976] F.P.C. ANN. REP. 24. Of course, pipeline rate cases are only one of many categories
of proceedings formerly under FPC jurisdiction. FPC's successor, the FERC, also must act
upon wholesale electricity rate increases, gas producer rate filings, gas pipeline certificate
applications, gas producer certificate applications, requests to abandon service or facilities,
and a variety of miscellaneous disputes. In many of these categories, the level of activity is
much higher than it is in the pipeline rate category. For instance, 15,657 applications for
rate increases were filed by natural gas producers in 1976. Id. at 21. Slightly different bases
of reporting categories of cases in the FPC's annual reports render a systematic summary of
the aggregate increase in the FPC's workload difficult, but the number of disputes of virtu-
ally all types brought before the Commission appears to have increased dramatically over
the past decade. During fiscal year 1978, FERC was asked to process 47,582 cases including
800 involving contested issues. Letter from Kenneth F. Plumb, FERC Secretary, to John
Miller (Apr. 26, 1978).
4. See FEA REGULATION, supra note 2, at 143.
5. For instance, the natural gas pipeline rate increase applications filed with the FPC
in 1975 requested an aggregate increase in revenues of over three and one-half billion dol-
lars, an increase in total rates in excess of 30%. [1976] F.P.C. ANN. REP. 68.
6. See Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearingsfor Resolving Complex
Scientqfc, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REv. 111 (1972).
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decry what they perceive to be inordinate delays in the decisionmaking
process7 or criticize the quality of substantive decisionmaking. 8 Both
criticisms appear well-founded. As of January 1978, the Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Commission (FERC) had an "unpenetrable backlog"
of 6,000 undecided cases,9 the near paralysis which now afflicts the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission had been documented thoroughly,' 0 and
the inability of the Economic Regulatory Administration (ERA) to
make any sense of the crude oil entitlements program was notorious."I
Predictably, the initial response of government was the reorganiza-
tion of all major federal agencies charged with decisionmaking in the
energy area into one cabinet department via the Department of Energy
Organization Act' 2 (DOE Act). However, the limited potential for
meaningful improvement of regulatory processes through reorganiza-
tion,' 3 and, in particular, the fragmented and confused decisionmaking
structure resulting from the reorganization of energy agencies through
the DOE Act,' 4 make it difficult to put a great deal of faith in reorgani-
zation as a strong palliative for the maladies involved in regulating the
7. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REG-
ULATION VOL. IV, DELAY IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS, S. Doc. No. 95-72, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as REGULATORY DELAY].
8. See, e.g., FEA REGULATION, supra note 2, at 139-46.
9. Speech of FERC Chairman Charles B. Curtis to the Federal Energy Bar Associa-
tion (Jan. 26, 1978). FERC's backlog appears to be increasing. In 1978, FERC received
27,000 new cases and resolved only 3,000 old cases. Speech of FERC Chairman Charles B.
Curtis to Public Utility Report's Utility Regulatory Conference (Oct. 4, 1978).
10. See, e.g., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES, REDUCING NUCLEAR POWER PLANT LEADTIMES: MANY OBSTACLES RE-
MAIN (1977).
11. See, e.g., FEA REGULATION, supra note 2, at 60-89 (noting problems FEA, prede-
cessor to ERA, had with program).
12. Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977).
13. See, e.g., Symposium, Federal Regulatory Agencies: A Response to the Ash Report,
57 VA. L. REV. 923 (1971).
14. The Department of Energy Organization Act established both a cabinet-level de-
partment within the administrative branch of government and an independent regulatory
agency within that department. In several critical areas of regulatory policy, the jurisdic-
tions of these two entities overlap in a manner that makes impasses resulting from conflicts
between the two inevitable. For instance, the Department of Energy now has the authority
to establish natural gas curtailment priorities, while FERC has the authority to determine
the manner in which curtailment priorities are implemented. Department of Energy Organ-
ization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 402(a)(1)(E), 91 Stat. 565, 583-84 (1977). Similarly, the
Department of Energy has total authority over natural gas imports, but FERC must deter-
mine the manner in which imported gas is transported, priced, and sold by interstate pipe-
lines. Id. at §§ 402(a)(I)(C) and 402(f).
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energy industry. 15
This Article describes and evaluates the procedures used, or sug-
gested for use, in making regulatory decisions affecting the production,
sale, consumption, and pricing of various forms of energy. The au-
thor's intention is to suggest to legislators, agency administrators, and
reviewing courts some broad criteria for selecting efficient and effective
procedures for formulating and implementing regulatory policy. The
emphasis throughout will be on regulation of the energy industry, but
many of the broad parameters for selecting appropriate procedures
should carry over to other areas of regulation and even to other areas of
dispute resolution.
The Article approaches the task in several discrete steps. First, the
results of a quantitative analysis of one area of energy regulation-
development and implementation of natural gas curtailment (alloca-
tion) policy by the FPC-are described in some detail to illustrate the
results of the FPC's choice of procedures. This descriptive section is
followed by an assessment of the costs and disadvantages associated
with the adjudicatory procedures used by the FPC to establish its poli-
cies on natural gas curtailment. Next, the costs and disadvantages asso-
15. Informed commentators have concluded that the problems of regulation are rooted
in factors far more fundamental and impervious to remedy than mere choice of regulatory
procedures. In particular, I have no intention to quarrel with Roger Noll's hypothesis that
many flaws in regulation are a function of a political structure which selects, by design,
inefficient and ineffective solutions to economic problems, see Noll, The Economics and
Politics of Regulation, 57 VA. L. REV. 1016 (1971), nor with the theory shared by many that a
large portion of regulation could be eliminated with a net positive impact on the welfare of
all. See, e.g., D. MARTIN & W. SCHWARTZ, DEREGULATING AMERICAN INDUSTRY (1977);
Peacock & Rowley, Welfare Economics and the Public Regulation of Natural Monopoly, I J.
PUB. ECON. 227 (1972); Posner, Natural Monopoly and its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548
(1969). Nevertheless, there is a continuing need to focus upon the procedural side of the
regulatory process. First, indulging in the assumption that consensus is possible and that
substantial amounts of regulation are undesirable and counterproductive and should be
eliminated, there still would remain some government regulation that would be considered
by most either necessary or at least beneficial. Regulatory agencies therefore still would be
faced with the task of formulating policies efficiently and effectively in those areas in which
regulation was retained. Second, viewed realistically, the deregulation suggestion can never
achieve anything close to its full potential. Efforts toward reducing the extent of government
regulation in some areas invariably seem to be offset by increased regulation of other seg-
ments of the economy. In either event, therefore, the continued presence of government
regulation of important sectors of the economy appears inevitable; thus, the choice of the
most efficient and effective decisionmaking procedures to formulate and implement regula-
tory policies remains a pertinent area of study. This assumes, of course, that the parties
involved in selecting those procedures-Congress, agencies, and reviewing courts-are moti-
vated in part by a desire to adopt and effectuate good policies in an efficient manner. Dr.
Noll has hypothesized that errors in regulation are intentional. If carried to its extreme, this
suggestion implies that the study of agency procedures will always be counterproductive; if
[Vol. 31
ciated with the use of decisionmaking procedures at the opposite pole
from pure adjudication-informal notice and comment rulemaking-
are discussed in the context of recent efforts to regulate the energy in-
dustry. Here, the thesis is developed that pure notice and comment
rulemaking, even for decisions which the Supreme Court recently has
characterized as "rulemaking . . .in [its] most pristine sense,' 6 has
significant disadvantages and inherent potential for abuse. Current
proposals for improving both adjudicative and informal rulemaking
are evaluated with regard to their probable impact upon energy policy
formulation and implementation. The potential efficacy of several
types of hybrid procedures also is explored.
The Article then outlines the broad contextual framework gov-
erning selection of administrative procedures, including both the con-
stitutional and statutory constraints limiting the discretion of energy
regulatory agencies in making such choices. In particular, the Supreme
Court's decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council'7 is suggested as a touchstone for the overhaul
of ineffective and inefficient adjudicatory procedures. Finally, criteria
for selecting appropriate regulatory procedures that previously have
been suggested elsewhere will be evaluated, and a new set of such crite-
ria proposed.
The Costs of Using Adjudication
The Results of Attempts to Implement Natural Gas Curtailment Policy
Through Adjudication
In April of 1971, the FPC recognized the need to establish and
implement policies for allocating among competing claimants an ag-
gregate supply of natural gas transported in interstate commerce that
was substantially less than the demand for such gas, as indicated by
sales contracts and certificates of public convenience and necessity rep-
resenting the ostensible delivery obligations of interstate pipelines to
the responsible parties in fact do select procedures with the undisclosed intention of creating
a regulatory scheme that produces irrational results favorable to their constituencies, such a
study will permit selection of those procedures found to be least efficient and least effective.
This Article, however, obviously is predicated on the assumption that Congress, regulatory
agencies, and reviewing courts are motivated, at least in part, by a good faith desire to regu-
late efficiently and effectively.
16. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 524 n.1 (1978).
17. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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their distributor and consumer customers.' 8 Nonetheless, today, some
eight years later, only the rare distributor or consumer has any better
indication of the policies that will determine the amount of gas it will
receive in the future than it had in April 1971. Eight years of efforts to
establish curtailment policies have produced hundreds of thousands of
pages of record evidence and scores of inconsistent agency and court
opinions,' 9 as well as many enriched energy lawyers and expert wit-
nesses. Unfortunately, little meaningful progress has been made
toward final effectuation of policies for allocating scarce supplies of
natural gas.
With the exception of a series of nonbinding statements of general
policy,20 the sole procedural vehicle relied upon by the Commission in
its efforts to establish curtailment policy has been a separate adjudica-
tory proceeding for every interstate pipeline. The following table dis-
plays the progress to date and the present status of the eight major
curtailment proceedings.
18. On April 1, 1971, the FPC issued Order No. 431, in which it recognized that the gas
shortage had reached the point at which many interstate pipelines were no longer able to
meet the supply commitments contained in their outstanding contracts and certificates. That
Order required all pipelines to submit a report to the FPC describing their present and
anticipated future ability to meet their supply obligations and to file a revised tariffcontain-
ing a proposed plan for curtailing deliveries under § 4 of the Natural Gas Act, if the report
indicated a present or future need for curtailment. 36 Fed. Reg. 7,505 (1971).
19. See notes 22-28 infra.
20. In 1973, the FPC issued a series of orders announcing the curtailment priorities
which it preferred as a matter of policy, and the preferred definitions of the terms used in the
priorities. See 38 Fed. Reg. 30,432 (1973); 38 Fed. Reg. 27,351 (1973); 38 Fed. Reg. 6,384
(1973); 38 Fed. Reg. 1,503 (1973). The Commission's authority to issue these statements of
general policy was affirmed in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
The priorities and definitions are codified at 18 C.F.R. § 2.78 (1978).
Even though the priorities and definitions contained in these policy statements could
have no binding effect upon the outcome of curtailment proceedings because the FPC did
not even purport to follow rulemaking procedures, they undoubtedly have served the dual
functions of permitting parties to focus their evidence on the issues considered most signifi-
cant by the FPC and of pressuring pipelines to file tariff provisions conforming to the Com-
mission's policy preferences. The latter, in turn, produced many interim curtailment plans
closely resembling the plan described in the FPC's policy statements, since the tariffs filed by
pipelines under § 4 of the Natural Gas Act can go into effect pending the outcome of pro-
ceedings to determine the legality of the tariff provisions.
Recently, FERC and DOE have proposed to use rulemaking procedures to resolve sev-
eral aspects of curtailment policy, see, e.g., Proposal by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission Relating to the Incorporation of Compensation Provisions in Curtailment
Plans, 42 Fed. Reg. 62,496 (1977).
[Vol. 31!
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Despite many thousands of pages of testimony and multiple visits to
the appellate courts, many of the most important proceedings seem
barely underway. Furthermore, the tabular indication that a few pro-
ceedings have reached final decision is misleading because those few
were decided with reference to agency policies, the validity of which
has been called into question by subsequent agency or court actions in
other proceedings still officially pending.29 If similar individual adjudi-
21. There are 29 interstate pipelines whose curtailment plans must come before the
FPC or FERC for approval. However, many of those pipelines are small or have only a few
customers, and the proceedings to determine a curtailment plan on those systems were rela-
tively simple. In the case of a few major pipelines, most notably Texas Gas Transmission
Corporation and Northwest Pipeline Company, curtailment plans were established which
apparently were sufficiently acceptable to all affected parties to avoid protracted litigation.
In any event, the proceedings listed in this table encompass the bulk of the United States
interstate gas supply.
The information contained in these tables was obtained from the records of the follow-
ing FPC and FERC proceedings: United Gas Pipe Line Co., Nos. RP 71-29, RP 71-120;
Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., No. RP 71-119; Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., No. RP
72-99; El Paso Natural Gas Co., No. RP 72-6; Southern Natural Gas Co., Nos. RP 71-3, RP
72-74, RP 74-6; Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., No. RP 72-89; Texas Eastern Transmis-
sion Corp., Nos. RP 71-130, RP 72-58; Cities Serv. Gas Co., No. RP 75-62.
22. FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621 (1972); Louisiana Power &
Light Co. v. FPC, 557 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1977); Southern Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, 565
F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1977); Southern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 547 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1977);
Southern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 543 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1976); Mississippi Pub. Serv.
Comm'n v. FPC, 522 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976); Louisiana
v. FPC, 503 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1974); Texas Gulf, Inc. v. FPC, 494 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1974);
Louisiana Gas Serv. Co. v. FPC, 480 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1973); Louisiana Power & Light Co.
v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 456 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1972).
23. Hercules, Inc. v. FPC, 559 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir. 1977); Hercules, Inc. v. FPC, 552 F.2d
74 (3d Cir. 1977); Consolidated Edison Co. v. FPC, 512 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. FPC, 511 F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
24. FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 423 U.S. 326 (1976); North Carolina
v. FERC, 584 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Philadelphia Gas Works v. FPC, 557 F.2d 840
(D.C. Cir. 1977); Consolidated Edison Co. v. FPC, 512 F.2d 1332 (D.C Cir. 1975); Consoli-
dated Edison Co. v. FPC, 511 F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
25. City of Wilcox v. FPC, 567 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Southern Cal. Edison Co. v.
FPC, 524 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1975); American Smelting & Refining Co. v. FPC, 494 F.2d
925 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
26. Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. FPC, 559 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1977); Consolidated
Edison Co. v. FPC, 512 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Consolidated Edison Co. v. FPC, 511
F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. FPC, 476 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1973).
27. Elizabethtown Gas Co. v. FERC, 575 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
28. United States Steel Corp. v. FPC, 533 F.2d 1217 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States
Steel Corp. v. FPC, 510 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
29. A previously approved "permanent" curtailment plan, like any other aspect of a
pipeline's tariff, is subject to the initiation of a new proceeding at any time in response to the
filing of a complaint alleging that the tariff provisions are unlawful. 15 U.S.C. § 717d
(1976). Because the curtailment policy which ultimately evolves through the agency adjudi-
[Vol. 31
catory proceedings continue to be the principal procedural vehicle for
implementing curtailment policies, another decade or more is likely to
pass before definitive federal gas curtailment policies are known and
actually in effect.
Formulation of natural gas curtailment policy provides a valuable
exemplar for evaluating the current benefits and detriments of using
separate adjudicatory procedures to establish federal energy policy.
While only one of many areas in which reliance upon individual adju-
dicatory proceedings has stymied federal regulatory policymaking,30
the characteristics of natural gas curtailment policy formation render
this area particularly appropriate as a basis for extrapolating the proba-
ble effect of using adjudicatory proceedings in the many other poli-
cymaking areas in which such use is likely to be given consideration.
First, issues analogous to those inherent in allocating scarce natural gas
already have arisen or are likely to arise with regard to other forms of
energy, e.g., petroleum products, coal, and electricity, and to nonenergy
natural resources as well, such as water and minerals. Second, the na-
ture of the dispute and the types of issues to be resolved in natural gas
curtailment controversies resemble many other energy policy contro-
versies involving rates, facilities design, siting, and the like.31 Third,
the FPC's experience in attempting to implement natural gas curtail-
ment policies through adjudication is typical of other federal regulatory
efforts to establish and implement through adjudicatory procedures
complex policies with variable impact on large segments of the pub-
lic, 32 thus dispelling the notion that only in extraordinary situations do
cation/appellate review process almost certainly will differ significantly from the policies
implicit in the few "permanent" plans now contained in pipeline tariffs, the agency will be
required to consider complaints alleging inconsistencies in the application of its curtailment
policies. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Wichita Board of Trade, 412 U.S.
800, 807-08 (1973) (Interstate Commerce Commission); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
Federal Communications Comm'n, 454 F.2d 1018, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
30. For discussions of other examples of situations in which energy policymaking has
been virtually paralyzed through the use of adjudication, see S. BREYER & P. MACAVOY,
ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION 7-10, 66-71 (1974) (natural
gas producer prices); REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES, THE NEW NATIONAL LIQUIFIED NATURAL GAS IMPORT POLICY REQUIRES
FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS 14-15 (1977); REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REDUCING NUCLEAR POWER PLANT LEADTIMES: MANY
OBSTACLES REMAIN (1977). For discussion of examples of delay resulting from the use of
adjudication in a variety of other areas of regulation, see REGULATORY DELAY, Supra note
7. See also Hamilton, Proceduresfor the Adofption of Rules of General Applicabili y: The
Needfor Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1276
(1972).
31. See text accompanying notes 369-98 infra.
32. See note 30 supra.
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adjudicatory procedures break down as an effective regulatory tool.33
In a subsequent section of this Article, the characteristics of cur-
tailment proceedings are compared with those of several other types of
major energy policy disputes to determine the extent to which extrapo-
lation from the FPC's experience in this area is productive. 34 For the
present, however, a brief description of the issues and procedures of a
typical curtailment proceeding will suffice to provide a basis for esti-
mating the costs of employing adjudicatory procedures to formulate
curtailment policy.
The Commission's Role
The Commission has the authority and obligation to determine the
tariffs under which interstate pipelines provide natural gas to their
wholesale customers-both intrastate distributors and direct industrial
customers.35 Although state regulatory agencies control the intrastate
distribution of gas received from interstate pipelines, 36 the terms of de-
livery established at the wholesale level by the FPC can have a substan-
tial, if not dispositive, effect upon the curtailment plans adopted by
state agencies. In determining curtailment rules for the wholesale level,
the Commission is not bound by the provisions of previously issued
certificates; 37 it need approve only those rules it finds to be just, reason-
able, and not unduly discriminatory. 38
The Nature of the Contested Issues
The issues in a curtailment proceeding can be divided conven-
iently into four categories: (1) determining the basis on which curtail-
ments will be imposed; (2) determining specific curtailment priorities;
(3) selecting the method of implementing priorities; and (4) finding the
facts necessary for actual implementation of the curtailment plan.
The first group of issues normally is raised by proposals presented
by the parties to the proceeding and involves disputes over whether the
basic curtailment scheme should distinguish, for example, between cus-
33. See, e.g., Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy. Another Look at
Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485,
523-25 (1970).
34. See text accompanying notes 369-98 infra.
35. FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621 (1972).
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 717(c) (1976). See also M. WILLRICH, ADMINISTRATION OF EN-
ERGY SHORTAGES 44-47 (1976).
37. FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 646-47 (1972).
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c, 717d (1976). See also FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406
U.S. 621, 643-46 (1972).
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tomers based upon contractual provisions, historical consumption
levels, the relative ability of specific users to substitute other fuels for
natural gas, or the end products manufactured through the use of gas.
Each such proposal may combine two or more of these factors and nor-
mally is supported by the testimony of expert economists and engi-
neers. This expert testimony is used to outline the comparative
aggregate costs and benefits of various ways of allocating the natural
gas supply shortfall and often emphasizing the adverse impact of gas
curtailment on some particular industry described as essential to the
overall economic health of the nation, e.g., refractory brick, automotive
manufacturing, fertilizer, health care, or home-building. To date, the
Commission has chosen end use as the principal criterion for allocating
gas,39 although even this basic decision has not been followed consis-
tently by the agency4 ° in the face of political4' and judicial pressure.42
Once one or more principal criteria for curtailment are selected,
they must be applied to determine actual curtailment priorities. Specif-
ically, the Commission must classify the various end uses for curtail-
ment purposes and accord each classification a degree of preferential
access to gas. For example, some parties may contend that once ex-
isting residential uses are accommodated all commercial uses of gas
should fall in the next priority, while others may contend that some
commercial uses should be placed below some industrial uses because
of differences in the relative ease and cost of substituting another fuel.
Accommodating these competing interests typically generates much
discussion and considerable confficting expert testimony. The FPC has
established a set of end use curtailment priorities as a matter of general
39. In its policy statements on curtailment, the Commission has stated: "As a matter of
policy, we have determined that end use must be controlling." 38 Fed. Reg. 1,503 (1973).
40. Notwithstanding its stated dedication to end use as the controlling factor in curtail-
ment policy, the original priorities adopted by the Commission relied heavily upon contrac-
tual language, specifically, whether service was contractually "firm" or "interruptible." The
Commission's reliance upon such contractual distinctions was reversed in two of the earliest
appellate decisions and has disappeared in most subsequent Commission decisions. See
Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 517 F.2d 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Louisiana v. FPC, 503
F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1974).
41. The end use basis for curtailment adopted by the FPC already has been legisla-
tively modified. Section 401 of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 requires that gas be
made available to some types of "agricultural consumers" before it is made available to
other types of consumers with comparable or even identical end uses. Pub. L. No. 95-621,
92 Stat. 3350 (1978).
42. In North Carolina v. FERC, 584 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the court held that the
Commission's decision to base curtailments upon end use constitutes undue discrimination
violating the Natural Gas Act unless the Commission modifies its end use data base or its
methods of implementing curtailment plans.
September 1979] ENERGY POLICY
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policy, 4 3 but rarely has adopted those priorities in a particular proceed-
ing without substantial modification. 44 Furthermore, its opinions es-
tablishing curtailment priorities have been reversed frequently by
reviewing courts, 45 and the Commission continues to equivocate on
several important priority-related issues. 46
The third set of issues relates to the method of implementing cur-
tailment priorities on the wholesale level. Typical questions arising
here concern the past, present, or future base period of consumer use to
be used in determining distributor's allocation. Also relevant are
whether full requirements and partial requirements customers should
be subject to the same or different implementation methods; whether
customer size should be a factor; the role of stored gas supplies in im-
plementing a curtailment plan; which implementation methods will en-
courage or discourage conservation and development of new gas
supplies; the time span over which allocations should be made; and
whether there should be compensation for those upon whom curtail-
ment has disparate economic impacts. Every party has an individual
interest and position on these difficult issues and the expert testimony
addressed to the implementation issues is often complex, attempting to
interrelate broad principles of equity, incentive, and disincentive to the
characteristics of particular distribution systems and gas consumers.
The Commission has attempted to resolve many implementation is-
sues, but its pattern of decisions has not been entirely consistent.47
Moreover, recent court opinions cast doubt on the continued viability
of many of the implementation policies adopted to date by the Com-
43. See 18 C.F.R. § 2.78 (1978).
44. See, e.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., [1976] UTIL. L. REP. (CCH)
11,865; Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., [19761 UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 11,779.
45. See, e.g., Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 517 F.2d 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Louisiana v. FPC, 503 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1974); American Smelting & Refining Co. v. FPC,
494 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
46. Compare Michigan Wisconsin Pipeline Co., [1977] UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 11,965
(stating that new residential customers should not be added to a pipeline system which is
curtailing service to existing customers) with Cities Serv. Gas Co., No. RP 75-62 (1977)
(Order Clarifying Prior Order) (permitting unlimited attachment of new residential custom-
ers on a pipeline system curtailing service to existing customers). The Commission's order is
now on review in General Motors Corp. v. FPC, No. 78-1101 (10th Cir., filed Feb. 10, 1978).
The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 statutorily resolves a few of the priority of service
issues. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (1978). Moreover, DOE now has jurisdiction to
determine priorities of service, but it has not yet exercised that authority. See Department
of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 402(a)(1)(E), 91 Stat. 565, 583-84 (1977).
47. Compare Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., [1976] UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 11,779 (re-
quiring adoption of a fixed historical base period) with Cities Serv. Gas Co., [1977] UTIL. L.
REP. (CCH) 11,957 (rejecting use of a fixed historical base period).
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mission.48
The final category of curtailment issues involves the compilation
and testing of the data required to implement a particular curtailment
plan. For instance, once the Commission has decided to distinguish
between industrial users of gas who can convert to a nongaseous fuel
from those that must have gas, this theoretical distinction must be ap-
plied to numerous combustion units supplied with gas obtained directly
or indirectly from the pipeline. Once again, a plethora of engineering
and economic evidence must be evaluated to resolve questions much
more subtle in practice than in theory.
The Procedural Sequence
A curtailment proceeding is initiated in one of two ways: by a
pipeline filing a proposed new tariff containing a curtailment plan,49 or
by the filing of a complaint alleging that the curtailment plan contained
in a pipeline's existing tariff is unlawful.50 In the case of a tariff filing
by a pipeline, the filing is the subject of a public notice providing a time
by which all interested parties must protest or comment upon the filing.
After receiving protests, the Commission can suspend the operation of
the proposed new tariff provisions for between one day and five
months, and set the issues raised by the filing and protests for hearing
before an administrative law judge (ALJ).51 At the end of the suspen-
sion period, the pipeline has the unilateral power to place in effect the
curtailment plan contained in its tariff filing pending the outcome of
the proceedings to determine the lawfulness of the plan.52 The pipe-
line, however, frequently chooses not to exercise this option out of fear
of possible damage actions should its curtailment plan ultimately be
held unlawful.53 As a consequence, interim curtailment plans usually
must be imposed during the pendency of the proceeding. The interim
plans are typically short-term--one year is a common duration. They
may go into effect as a result of a settlement agreement approved by the
48. See, e.g., North Carolina v. FERC, 584 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1978); City of Wilcox
v. FPC, 567 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 717c(d) (1976).
50. See 15 U.S.C. § 717d (1976).
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1976).
52. Id.
53. The issue of whether, and under what circumstances, an interstate pipeline can be
held liable for damages resulting from its failure to deliver volumes of gas committed under
a contract is unsettled, notwithstanding the clear power of the Commission to require cur-
tailments to be implemented in a manner inconsistent with contractual provisions. See In-
ternational Paper Co. v. FPC, 476 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1973); Monsanto Co. v. FPC, 463 F.2d
799 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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Commission 54 or as a result of expedited hearings conducted specifi-
cally to determine interim curtailment priorities.5 5 The inability to de-
velop a record sufficient to support even an interim plan, bargaining
impasses between the parties, or Commission disapprovals of a pro-
posed settlement, all have led to the increasing imposition of interim
curtailment plans directly by appellate courts.56
In the case of proceedings initiated by a complaint against an ex-
isting curtailment plan, the existing plan remains in effect until the pro-
ceeding reaches its conclusion, a stage that has not yet been reached in
most curtailment proceedings initiated by filing a complaint.57
Whether the proceeding is initiated by complaint or by a protested
tariff filing, once a hearing has been ordered and interested persons
have been provided an opportunity to intervene, all parties are given an
opportunity to submit direct testimony and exhibits, usually in several
rounds, and all evidence tendered is subjected to cross-examination.5 8
At the close of cross-examination, which may be several years later, at
least two sets of briefs are filed before the ALJ,59 and he or she issues
an initial decision.60 The AL's decision itself may be the subject of
briefs filed with the Commission opposing and supporting the deci-
sion.6' The Commission then issues its decision, which is not final until
it issues a subsequent decision responsive to the inevitable applications
for rehearing.62
The Commission's order on rehearing is then subject to appellate
review,63 which usually requires another one to three years. Rarely
does the proceeding end at this point, for one or both of two reasons.
In many cases, even several years of hearings have proven inadequate
to permit the Commission to address all issues, thereby forcing the
agency to implement yet another interim plan until additional evidence
has been adduced.64 In addition, the reviewing court frequently
reverses the Commission's decision with respect to one or more issues
54. See, e.g., Philadelphia Gas Works v. FPC, 557 F.2d 840 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
55. See, e.g., American Smelting & Refining Co. v. FPC, 494 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
56. See, e.g., Southern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 543 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1976).
57. See notes 21-29 & accompanying text supra.
58. 18 C.F.R. §§ 1.8, 1.20 (1978).
59. Id. § 1.29(a).
60. Id. § 1.30(a).
61. Id. § 1.31.
62. Id. § 1.30(d).
63. 15 U.S.C. §717r(b) (1976).
64. E.g., Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., [19761 UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 11,779 (adopting
an interim plan, rather than a permanent plan, because an environmental impact statement
had not yet been offered in evidence and cross-examined).
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and remands for further proceedings. When those further proceedings
are concluded, another appeal may be taken, often resulting in a sec-
ond reversal and remand on new grounds. 65 This brief outline demon-
strates how an agency can make virtually no progress in an important
area of policymaking despite an expenditure of enormous public and
private resources.
Direct Costs
Costs of Full Participation by a Private Party
The direct costs incurred by private party participants in major
curtailment proceedings cannot be derived directly from any available
source. Many participants do not account for their litigation costs on
an individual case basis, and those that do consider such data confiden-
tial. Reasonably accurate estimates of the private party costs incurred
to date by full participation in the eight major curtailment proceedings
under investigation may be made, however, by estimating the standard
costs for certain units of measurement and multiplying those costs by
the number of units attributable to each proceeding. The three most
important units on which data is available are the number of hearing
days, the number of interim curtailment plans placed in effect, and the
number of appellate opinions issued. These three units of measure-
ment can be used to approximate the costs of full participation in each
of the three major phases of any curtailment proceeding: hearings
leading to agency approval of a permanent curtailment plan; settlement
negotiations or other procedures leading to agency approval of interim
curtailment plans; and appellate litigation arising from agency orders
issued during the course of curtailment proceedings. Two caveats are
necessary. First, the cost estimates cannot be complete, because most,
if not all, major curtailment proceedings are still far from complete.66
The future level of activity and concomitant costs are too speculative
for any reasonable estimate. Second, this should not be construed as an
empirical effort to obtain pinpoint accuracy. 67 For present purposes,
65. Compare American Smelting & Refining Co. v. FPC, 494 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(reversing the first interim curtailment plan imposed on the El Paso system) with City of
Wilcox v. FPC, 567 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (reversing on a variety of different grounds a
second interim curtailment plan imposed on the El Paso system).
66. See text accompanying notes 21-29 supra.
67. Much of the following analysis on costs is predicated upon the author's personal
experience. This experience suggests that all estimates are conservative average figures, al-
though certainly individual differences may be found. Nonetheless, the lack of any readily,
or even reasonably, available alternate source underscores the need for this type of estima-
tion.
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the magnitude of expense and not the precise figures are of concern.
Hearing Days
The cost of full participation in the hearings leading to agency ap-
proval of a permanent curtailment plan can be estimated using the
number of actual hearing days. The standard cost per hearing day is
calculated by estimating the resources expended per hearing day and
assigning costs to those resources.
The major item of cost is, not surprisingly, lawyer time. The au-
thor's experience indicates that the average hearing day consumes ap-
proximately 16 hours of lawyer time, including the five to six hours of
actual hearing time, working recesses, and travel time, as well as office
time expended in hearing-related tasks, such as preparing direct testi-
mony and cross-examination, and drafting pleadings and briefs for
submission to the ALJ or agency. Experienced practitioners will recog-
nize as conservative an estimated billing fee of sixty dollars per hour as
the unit cost of lawyer time to be used in all calculations.
There is also a significant cost of nonlawyer time devoted to the
hearing process, including expert witnesses, private party employee-
witnesses, and other consultants. The demands placed upon the time of
nonlegal personnel vary considerably during the hearing process, but,
on the average, full participation in the proceeding requires approxi-
mately four hours of nonlawyer time per hearing day. Most of this
time is devoted to activities outside the hearing room, such as preparing
testimony and exhibits and assisting in preparing cross-examination.
Sixty dollars per hour is used here throughout as the cost of nonlawyer
time. Again, the estimate is conservative; both the energy consultants
and the private party employees who participate, typically corporate
officers, are highly-paid professionals.
Finally, an approximation of the out-of-pocket costs must be
added to the personnel costs. A figure of $300 per hearing day is used
to account primarily for hearing-related travel costs, purchase of tran-
scripts, and reproduction and service of direct testimony, exhibits,
pleadings, and briefs. On the basis of these estimated expenses, the
approximate direct standard cost of full private party participation in
the hearing process totals $1,500 per hearing day.68
68. (16 hours of lawyer time x $60 per hour) plus (4 hours of nonlawyer time X $60 per
hour) plus ($300 per day out-of-pocket costs) = $1,500 per day.
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Interim Curtailment Plans
Every time the need for an interim curtailment plan arises, private
parties must incur additional costs uniquely attributable to obtaining
agency approval of an interim plan. Typically, a settlement conference
is convened outside of the formal hearing process, and all active parties
spend somewhere between one week and several months attempting to
negotiate an interim plan. Both legal and nonlegal personnel are in-
volved intensively in the negotiation process. After the negotiations
have been concluded--either successfully or unsuccessfully-addi-
tional lawyer time is required for the formal process of obtaining
agency approval of an interim plan.69 Combining the efforts of lawyers
and nonlawyers, each private party actively participating in the process
of devising and obtaining approval for an interim curtailment plan thus
incurs estimated costs equivalent to 150 work hours, yielding a stan-
dard cost per interim settlement of $9,000 for each active party. 70
Appellate Review
The final major category of private cost involves the appellate re-
view process. Multiple appeals of both final and interlocutory agency
orders are the norm in curtailment proceedings.7 ' While there is con-
siderable variation in the costs of each appellate proceeding depending
upon the number and complexity of the issues raised, on average each
private party actively participating in an appeal again will incur esti-
mated costs equivalent to 150 hours of lawyer time, plus $3,000 in out-
of-pocket costs for reproduction and service of briefs and joint appen-
dices. Thus, the estimated standard cost assigned to each appellate re-
69. If a settlement agreement is reached, agency approval of the settlement must be
obtained through a process of submitting the proposed settlement and filing comments ei-
ther in support of or in opposition to the proposed settlement. 18 C.F.R. §§ 1.5, 1.8 (1978).
Because most proposed interim settlements are not unanimous, two rounds of comments
usually are required to permit opposing parties to respond to initial comments. If no settle-
ment agreement is reached as a result of negotiations, the pipeline often will attempt to place
an interim plan in effect unilaterally through a tariff filing under § 4 of the Natural Gas Act.
See notes 51-56 & accompanying text supra. The tariff filing is then the subject of protests
filed by all parties who oppose the plan selected by the pipeline. Alternatively, the Commis-
sion may attempt to place an interim plan in effect based upon the evidence contained in the
partially completed hearing record. If it takes this action, it almost invariably calls for briefs
on the interim plan. Through any of these methods, a significant amount of lawyer time is
devoted to the process of obtaining approval of an interim plan.
70. $60 per hour X 150 hours = $9,000.
71. For instance, the United curtailment proceeding has been the subject of 11 appel-
late court opinions to date, and the proceeding is far from conclusion. See table accompany-
ing notes 21-22 supra.
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view proceeding is $12,000 per active private party. 72
Applying these standard cost estimates to the eight major curtail-
ment cases investigated yields the following estimates of total cost to
date per active private party: United, $468,000;73 Panhandle Eastern,
$26 1,000;74 Transcontinental, $258,000;75 El Paso, $288,000;76 Southern
Natural, $199,500; 77 Columbia, $201,000;78 Texas Eastern, $123,000; 79
Cities Service, $106,500.80 Based on these estimates, the average pri-
vate party cost to date in the eight proceedings is $238,125. Moreover,
because most of the proceedings are far from complete, the final aver-
age cost of active participation is likely to swell to $300,000 or more per
party.
Total Private Party Costs
In aggregating the total cost of private party participation in cur-
tailment proceedings, consideration must be given to the costs of those
parties who do not participate actively in each stage of the proceeding.
Most intervening parties participate actively in only some phases or
with respect to only certain issues. The average participation rate can
be estimated at approximately thirty-five percent. 8' Therefore, the total
private party cost to date of a curtailment proceeding can be estimated
by multiplying the cost per active party times the average participation
rate, times the number of parties.8 2 The results for each of the eight
72. (150 hours x $60 per hour) plus $3,000 out-of-pocket costs = $12,000.
73. (194 days of hearing X $1,500 per day) plus (5 interim plans x $9,000 per plan) plus
(11 appellate opinions X $12,000 per opinion) = $468,000.
74. (124 days of hearing X $1,500 per day) plus (3 interim plans x $9,000 per plan) plus
(4 appellate opinions X $12,000 per opinion) = $261,000.
75. (94 days of hearing X $1,500 per day) plus (5 interim plans x $9,000 per plan) plus
(6 appellate opinions X $12,000 per opinion) = $258,000.
76. (144 days of hearing x $1,500 per day) plus (4 interim plans x $9,000 per plan) plus
(3 appellate opinions x $12,000 per opinion) = $288,000.
77. (77 days of hearing x $1,500 per day) plus (4 interim plans x $9,000 per plan) plus
(4 appellate opinions x $12,000 per opinion) = $199,500.
78. (96 days of hearing x $1,500 per day) plus (5 interim plans x $9,000 per plan) plus
(I appellate opinion X $12,000 per opinion) = $201,000.
79. (48 days of hearing x $1,500 per day) plus (3 interim plans x $9,000 per plan) plus
(2 appellate opinions x $12,000 per opinion) = $123,000.
80. (59 days of hearing X $1,500 per day) plus (2 interim plans x $9,000 per plan) -
$106,500.
81. This figure is an estimate based upon the author's experience in curtailment cases
and discussions with other participants.
82. The calculation of total private party costs excludes what may be an important
component. Detailed data concerning the nature of the uses of gas by thousands of commer-
cial and industrial consumers must be gathered as a basis for implementing curtailment
plans based upon end use. This necessitates completion of an extensive questionnaire on gas
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curtailment proceedings investigated are: United, $22,768,200;83 Pan-
handle Eastern, $7,673,400;84 Transcontinental, $6,230,700;85 El Paso,
$9,576,000;86 Southern Natural, $2,932,650;87 Columbia, $5,909,400;88
Texas Eastern, $3,444,000;89 Cities Service, $1,602,825.90 These esti-
mates show that the total private party costs to date for the eight pro-
ceedings approximates $60,137,175, and the average cost $7,517,147 per
proceeding. Again, the total costs and average costs can be expected to
swell substantially before the proceedings are concluded.
Costs to the Government
At least a portion of the direct governmental costs of adjudicating
the eight cases can be estimated using the same methodology. This es-
timate involves only government personnel costs directly attributable to
each proceeding, and does not include costs attributable to government
printing and mailing of notices, orders, and the like, or to use of gov-
ernment facilities.
The direct personnel costs incurred by the government in a curtail-
ment hearing include the salaries of the ALJ,9' staff counsel, 92 and staff
technical adviser.93 All three of these individuals are present continu-
ously while the hearing is in progress. Assuming that each of the gov-
ernment participants in the hearing process spends one day in hearing-
related activities outside the hearing room for every day of actual hear-
ing, the direct government personnel costs associated with the hearing
usage by each of the multitude of large commercial and industrial consumers receiving gas
directly or indirectly from the pipeline whose curtailment plan is at issue. The cost of this
data gathering effort is probably very high, but the author knows of no reliable method of
estimating that cost, as there is wide variation in the amount of time and attention which
customers are likely to devote to completing a questionnaire of this nature.
83. $468,000 x 139 x 0.35 = $22,768,200.
84. $261,000 x 84 X 0.35 = $7,673,400.
85. $258,000 x 69 x 0.35 = $6,230,700.
86. $288,000 X 95 X 0.35 = $9,576,000.
87. $199,500 x 42 × 0.35 = $2,932,650.
88.. $201,000 x 84 x 0.35 = $5,909,400.
89. $123,000 x 80 × 0.35 = $3,444,000.
90. $106,500 x 43 x 0.35 = $1,602,825.
91. As of October 1977, the annual salary of an administrative law judge was $47,500.
Civil Service Commission, General Salary Schedule (Oct. 4, 1977). See also 5 U.S.C. § 5308
(1976); 42 Fed. Reg. 10,297 (1977).
92. As of October 1977, the annual salary of a GS-12, Step 5 was $24,799. Civil Service
Commission, General Salary Schedule (Oct. 4, 1977).
93. As of October 1977, the annual salary of a GS-1 1, Step 5 was $20,694. Civil Service
Commission, General Salary Schedule (Oct. 4, 1977).
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phase are approximately $795 per hearing day.94 Accordingly, the di-
rect government personnel costs of each interim curtailment plan
placed in effect are approximately $3,645, 95 and the comparable costs
for each appellate review proceeding are $2,363.96 These approxima-
tions almost certainly are low when the expense of support personnel is
considered.
Using these standard cost estimates, the direct government person-
nel costs to date for each of the eight curtailment proceedings investi-
gated total:97  United, $198,448;98 Panhandle Eastern, $118,967; 99
Transcontinental, $107,133;100 El Paso, $136,149; 101 Southern Natural,
$85,247; 102 Columbia, $96,908; 103 Texas Eastern, $53,821; 104 Cities
94. Assuming that there are 234 working days in a year, the calculation is: ($47,500 +
$24,799 + $20,694) x 2/234 = $794.81.
95. The ALJ has very little involvement in the process of negotiating and obtaining
approval of an interim plan, but the staff counsel and technical advisor must put in at least
as much time as their private party counterparts, a total of about 150 working hours. Thus,
the costs are estimated as follows: ($24,799 + $20,694 (annual salary of staff counsel and
technical advisor, see notes 92-93 supra)) x 150/8 (average number of working hours put in
by staff counsel and technical advisor, divided by number of working hours per day) x
1/234 (one working day a year, see note 86 supra) = $3,645.27.
96. The government personnel cost of an appellate proceeding is estimated using the
same procedures as were used for estimating private party appellate litigation costs, except
that the salary of a GS- 13, Step 5 is substituted for the hourly rate of the private attorney.
$29,490 x 150/8 x 1/234 = $2,362.98.
97. At least one potentially significant component of government personnel costs is not
included in these estimates. No factor is included for the Commission's decisionmaking
time. The Commission issues scores of orders in the course of a curtailment proceeding,
varying from routine orders granting intervention to lengthy and complex orders approving
interim curtailment plans. Someone in the agency must devote a great deal of time to the
decisionmaking and drafting underlying the issuance of these orders. However, the author
does not know how to estimate the cost of this process because there is no adequate method
of estimating how much of whose time is involved. Assuming the Commissioners actually
read the evidentiary record before making decisions, as they theoretically are required to do
by Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936), the governmental cost of curtailment cases
would be astronomical. However, this method of estimating decisionmaking costs while
theoretically valid, is totally unrealistic. Unfortunately, given the agency's very heavy
caseload, its modest budget, and the size of the evidentiary records in curtailment proceed-
ings, it is likely that the total resources devoted to the actual decisionmaking process are not
great. See text accompanying notes 97-107 infra.
98. (194 days of hearing x $795 per day) + (5 interim plans x $3,645 per plan) + (I I
appellate opinions X $2,363 per opinion) = $198,448.
99. (124 days of hearing x $795 per day) + (3 interim plans x $3,645 per plan) + (4
appellate opinions x $2,363 per opinion) = $118,967.
100. (94 days of hearing x $795 per day) + (5 interim plans x $3,645 per plan) + (6
appellate opinions X $2,363 per opinion) = $107,133.
101. (144 days of hearing x $795 per day) + (4 interim plans x $3,645 per plan) + (3
appellate opinions X $2,363 per opinion) = $136,149.
102. (77 days of hearing X $795 per day) + (4 interim plans x $3,645 per plan) + (4
appellate opinions X $2,363 per opinion) = $85,247.
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Service, $54,195.105 The total government direct personnel cost to date
is $850,868, and the average cost is $106,358 per proceeding-modest
figures relative to the much greater direct private party costs, but still a
very substantial commitment of resources to eight cases by an agency
whose appropriation of $42,785,000106 was spread among 47,582 cases
in the 1978 fiscal year. 10 7
Indirect Costs to the Economy
In addition to the direct costs of private and public parties associ-
ated with the use of adjudicatory procedures to formulate and imple-
ment policies, there are costs incurred indirectly by a wide variety of
entities. The causal relationship between choice of procedures and in-
direct costs to the general economy is more difficult to perceive, and
precise quantification of these costs is impossible. Yet, in all
probability, these indirect economic costs are of much greater magni-
tude than the direct costs of implementing policy through adjudication.
In broad introductory outline, the relationship between adjudica-
tory procedures and indirect economic costs can be described as fol-
lows. First, adjudicatory procedures produce an environment of
uncertainty for a protracted period of time. In turn, such uncertainty
has been related directly to the performance of the economy in two
respects: a low level of business investment and a high proportion of
economically wasteful investment decisions. A low level of business
investment produces a low level of economic growth and a high level of
unemployment, both of which are inconsistent with the principal goals
of macroeconomic policy.'08 Economic waste resulting from retrospec-
tively imprudent investment decisions frustrates achievement of the
microeconomic goal of efficiency. When the subject of adjudication,
such as energy policy, is critical to a substantial portion of aggregate
business investment, the uncertainty created by use of adjudicatory
103. (96 days of hearing x $795 per day) + (5 interim plans x $3,645 per plan) + (1
appellate opinion x $2,363 per opinion) = $96,908.
104. (48 days of hearing x $795 per day) + (3 interim plans x $3,645 per plan) + (2
appellate opinions x $2,363 per opinion) = $53,821.
105. (59 days of hearing X $795 per day) + (2 interim plans x $3,645 per plan) =
$54,195.
106. Public Works for Water and Power Development and Energy Research Appropria-
tion Act, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-96, 91 Stat. 797, 807 (1978).
107. See Letter from Kenneth Plumb, FERC Secretary, to John Miller (Apr. 26, 1978).
108. Reduced economic growth and increased unemployment are the immediate ad-
verse results of reduced business investment. In a subsequent period, prior reduced business
investment can also contribute to inflationary pressure as a result of capacity constraints
which are reached rapidly when demand increases.
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procedures can have substantial adverse effects upon the overall per-
formance of the economy.
As the description of the progress to date in the major curtailment
cases illustrates, use of adjudicatory procedures to formulate and im-
plement curtailment policy produces an environment of pervasive un-
certainty for a protracted period of time. 10 9 A prospective investor
considering future use of natural gas at a particular location or for a
particular use must anticipate decisions in a curtailment proceeding
with respect to each of several contested issues, when each of those
decisions will be made, whether the agency voluntarily will defer im-
plementation of its order"10 or will be subject to court stay of the or-
der,"' and the many possible results of appellate review." 2 A similar
panoply of factors, each potentially critical to investment decisions, are
present in the case of an interim curtailment plan'13 Where voluntary
agreement on an interim plan cannot be achieved or is overturned on
review, the pipeline simply may file its own interim plan, to go into
effect after the suspension period under section 4 of the Natural Gas
Act;" l4 the agency may coerce the pipeline into filing an interim plan
reflecting the agency's policy preferences;" 15 or a court may impose an
interim plan intended to ameliorate the potential for immediate irrepa-
rable harm. 1 6 With the large number of actors in this drama-both
109. Empirical evidence strongly suggests that rulemaking produces results at least twice
as fast as adjudication, and rulemaking by the FPC has in some instances produced policy
decisions more than four times as rapidly as adjudication. REGULATORY DELAY, supra note
7, at 26-32.
110. E.g., Cities Serv. Gas Co., [1977] UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 11,995 (deferring indefi-
nitely implementation of a critical provision of a previously imposed curtailment plan).
I11. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. FPC, 511 F.2d 372, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (referring
to earlier orders in which two interim curtailment plans were stayed by the court and one of
those stays was modified).
112. Compare American Smelting & Refining Co. v. FPC, 494 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(permitting an interim plan established by the FPC, which had found the original curtail-
ment plan to be discriminatory, to remain in effect pending the conclusion of proceedings on
remand) with Louisiana v. FPC, 503 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1974) (requiring immediate reinstate-
ment of a prior interim curtailment plan after reversing the Commission order imposing a
new curtailment plan).
113. See, e.g., Philadelphia Gas Works v. FPC, 557 F.2d 840 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
114. Section 4 of the NGA (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 717c(e) (1976)), provides that the
Commission may suspend plans for five months only.
115. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. FPC, 512 F.2d 1332, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Con-
solidated Edison affirmed Commission orders which had the effect of pressuring several
pipelines into filing interim curtailment plans consistent with the Commission's policies,
while noting that several other pipelines had resisted Commission pressures and placed into
effect interim curtailment plans of their own choosing.
116. See, e.g., Southern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 543 F.2d 530, 532-33 (5th Cir. 1976);
Consolidated Edison v. FPC, 511 F.2d 372, 378 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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parties and decisionmakers-and the large number of issues involved
in the litigation, prediction is virtually impossible. The only real con-
clusions that the potential investor can reach are that gas may or may
not be available at the location under consideration in the future de-
pending upon the momentary outcome of an unpredictable game, that
there probably will be periods in which gas is available and periods in
which it is not, and that this environment of uncertainty with respect to
gas availability could continue for decades or could stabilize abruptly
as a result of a definitive agency or court decision.
The next logical step in the analysis is to explore the general rela-
tionship between uncertainty and the quantity and quality of business
investments, leaving for last the relationship beween uncertainty in this
particular area and specific types of investments. Economists and stu-
dents of finance long have observed a strong negative correlation be-
tween uncertainty and the level of business investment.11 7 The Council
of Economic Advisors (CEA), in its 1978 Annual Report, describes the
level of business capital outlay during the prior four years as "singu-
larly disappointing" and "sluggish."' 18 It credits much of the decline in
the rate of growth of real gross national product during that period to
lagging levels of business investment.' 19
The CEA expresses some difficulty in isolating the cause of lagging
business investment, noting:
[T]otal investment outlays during the expansion have fallen some-
what short of those implied by historical relationships of investment
to its determinants....
The investment level for structures during the past few years
... has fallen consistently and substantially below what would have
been expected on the basis of all of the econometric projec-
tions .... 120
However, the CEA goes on to list uncertainty generally, and uncer-
tainty concerning future energy prices in particular, as the most likely
cause of the disappointing level of business investment.' 21
There are a variety of ways in which regulatory uncertainty can
117. See generaly H. LEVY & M. SARNAT, CAPITAL INVESTMENT AND FINANCIAL DE-
CISIONS (1978) [hereinafter cited as CAPITAL INVESTMENT]; H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS:
INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1970) (hereinafter cited as
DECISION ANALYSIS]; J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE (1975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as MANAGERIAL FINANCE].
118. (19781 COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS ANN. REP. 37, in ECONOMIC REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENT (1978).
119. Id. at 66.
120. Id. at 70-71.
121. Id. at71-72, 113-14.
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affect adversely the level of business investment. The most obvious and
direct relationship is between the licensing process and investments in
facilities subject to that process. There are, however, more important
but less direct relationships as well. To the extent that uncertainty in
the regulatory process produces uncertainty over the future price at
which various forms of energy can be obtained, investment in a wide
variety of industries will be retarded. To assess this impact accurately,
the role of general uncertainty over energy price levels, as distinguished
from the role of any particular expected future price trend, must be
isolated and identified. An expectation that the future price of a partic-
ular form of energy will be low encourages investment in facilities
designed to consume that type of energy, and expectation that the fu-
ture price of a form of energy will be high encourages investment in
alternative forms of energy as well as more fuel-efficient facilities. But
uncertainty concerning future price levels of various forms of energy
tends to discourage all of these types of investments by increasing the
risk assqciated with each.
While the business investor has available a wide variety of tools
for making decisions in conditions of uncertainty, 122 each of these
methods of decisionmaking shares the common characteristic of aver-
sion to risk.' 23 Risk is simply the degree of variation in an asset's ex-
pected future return. 124 For example, investors place a higher value on
an investment that is certain to produce a twelve percent rate of return
than they do on an asset that will produce a rate of return somewhere
between ten and fourteen percent. 25 As the degree of variation in ex-
pected return increases, the risk increases, and the investment looks less
and less attractive to the investor. 126
122. See CAPITAL INVESTMENT, supra note 117, at 188-203; DECISION ANALYSIS, supra
note 117, at 86-94; MANAGERIAL FINANCE, supra note 117, at 314-17, 323-36, 354-61.
123. CAPITAL INVESTMENT, supra note 117, at 123-29; DECISION ANALYSIS, supra note
117, at 51-53; MANAGERIAL FINANCE, supra note 117, at 309, 317-21.
124. MANAGERIAL FINANCE, supra note 117, at 309.
125. Of course, productive assets are never risk-free. Thus, the critical factor is the de-
gree of risk. See CAPITAL INVESTMENT, supra note 117, at 117-18.
126. Most firms apparently still rely principally upon subjective processes for evaluating
risk and for discounting the value of assets depending upon their degree of risk, but the
proportion which employ explicit methods of quantifying and considering varying degrees
of risk has increased dramatically in recent years. CAPITAL INVESTMENT, supra note 117, at
187-88; MANAGERIAL FINANCE, supra note 117, at 323-24.
In illustrating the way in which uncertainty concerning future energy prices and availa-
bility of various forms of energy reduces the level of business investment, the variable dis-
count rate is one of the simplest methods of quantifying risk aversion in investment
decisions. For a detailed discussion of the variable discount rate method of quantification,
see MANAGERIAL FINANCE, supra note 117, at 324-26. Under this approach to making in-
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Obviously, the extent to which investments will be retarded by un-
certainty concerning the future availability and price of various forms
of energy will depend upon a number of factors that vary significantly
from investment to investment. Uncertainty will not stop all invest-
ments from going forward. Once the risk-averse characteristic of inves-
tors is accepted, however, it necessarily follows that uncertainty
concerning future energy prices and availability will cause a substantial
number of investments not to be made. Such uncertainty also has the
effect of increasing the proportion of investments which turn out in ret-
rospect to have been imprudent. Even with the most risky investments
precluded by uncertainty, a higher percentage of those investments that
are made will prove to be "bad" investments. The facilities may have
no economic value for a number of reasons, most especially if the en-
ergy form they are designed to use becomes unavailable. Of course,
imprudent investments are an integral part of a market-oriented econ-
omy, and some level of bad investments is entirely consistent with a
properly functioning market. Nonetheless, increases in the proportion
of imprudent investments attributable to uncertainty which could have
been avoided must be viewed as pure economic waste. Such waste is
inconsistent with the principal microeconomic goal of maximizing ag-
gregate consumer welfare with the least use of scarce resources.
Returning to the particular problem of natural gas supply, the the-
vestment decisions, the firm calculates two measures of the value of the investment, its ex-
pected monetary value (EMV) and its expected utility value (EUV). The terms "expected
monetary value" and "expected utility value" are borrowed from DECISION ANALYSIS, supra
note 117. The decision to invest or not is based upon EUV, and EUV is derived in part from
EMV. EMV is the flow of dollars, discounted to present value, which can be expected from
the investment on a probabilistic basis. For instance, if the firm believes that an investment
has a 50% probability of producing revenues of $1,000 annually for five years and a 50%
probability of producing revenues of $500 annually for five years, the EMV of the invest-
ment would be obtained simply by multiplying $750 by 5 and applying the appropriate
discount rate. Typically, the discount rate used will be based in part upon the return avail-
able from alternate investments and in part upon the firm's cost of capital.
Calculation of EUV requires introduction of the investor's aversion to risk into the
decisionmaking process. The variation in return from $500 to $1,000 per year in the exam-
ple used above will cause the firm to consider the investment riskier, and therefore less
attractive, than an investment which is certain to yield a cash flow of $750 per year. To
reflect this negative taste for risk, the firm can calculate the range of EMVs an investment is
likely to yield based upon the range of future conditions in which the asset must function. If
this range of EMVs exceeds a predetermined criterion for riskiness, the investment is placed
in a higher risk category. Under the variable discount rate approach to reflecting risk aver-
sion, a different rate is used to discount to present value the expected cash flow of invest-
ments falling in each risk classification, with a higher discount rate assigned to the higher
risk investments. The EUV is also calculated on a probabilistic basis, but using the discount
rate determined by measuring riskiness with reference to the range and distribution of
EMVs.
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oretical link between gas supply availability and investment level can
be tested by considering the types of investments likely to be affected
by the ultimate resolution of one of the major curtailment policy is-
sues-the question whether existing industrial process uses or new resi-
dential uses will be preferred in curtailment plans. If the resolution of
this issue were known to be favorable to new residential consumers,
many existing industrial consumers would be faced with strong incen-
tives to invest in combustion equipment conversion or in new facilities
designed to use alternative forms of energy. Distributors, anticipating
a more severe load-balancing problem as the proportion of low load
factor residential customers increases, would face similar incentives to
invest in additional storage and peak-shaving facilities. If, on the other
hand, investors knew that this issue would be resolved in favor of ex-
isting industrial consumers, an entirely different pattern of investments
could be expected. The industrial consumers whose facilities thereby
were protected from economic obsolesence could safely improve and
expand their existing gas-burning facilities. Moreover, investments in
feeder plants and customer plants could be made with greater certainty
of economic feasibility. As a corollary, suppliers of those forms of en-
ergy, such as electricity and fuel oil, likely to become predominant in
the new residential market would be led to invest in necessary new fa-
cilities. The same may be said for those firms that manufacture resi-
dential combustion equipment designed to burn fuels other than gas.
The point of this discussion is not to suggest that regulatory policy
should be designed to maximize investment. Indeed, given a choice
between achieving an economic goal with high investment or low in-
vestment, economic theory almost invariably supports the choice of the
low investment means to an end. However, when investors have no
rational means of forecasting future conditions, no investment will oc-
cur and no economic goal will be pursued. The inevitable result is eco-
nomic stagnation. Even a policy that induces less than optimally
efficient actions may be preferable to failing to adopt any policy for a
protracted period of time.
Some crucial caveats are in order. This argument is not intended
to suggest that the recent stagnation of the United States economy is
attributable entirely, or even in large measure, to the FPC's decision to
use adjudicatory procedures to formulate and implement its natural gas
curtailment policy. Even to the extent that uncertainty regarding en-
ergy availability and cost is responsible, domestic governmental activ-
ity cannot be cited as the only source of uncertainty that could reduce
the level of energy-related investment. Other factors, such as the un-
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certain size of the resource base and even the weather, could have sig-
nificant adverse effects on the level of business investment. In addition,
regulatory activity is only one source of uncertainty originating from
government actions. Difficulty in predicting the actions of Congress
may be a far more significant factor. Given the wide range of energy
policy options under serious consideration by Congress today, a good
case can be made that Congress is the single most significant source of
investment-retarding uncertainty. And even if the focus is restricted to
regulatory actions, there is no one-to-one relationship between adjudi-
catory procedures and uncertainty concerning future policies. If all en-
ergy regulatory policy decisions were made and implemented through
informal procedures, the very existence of the awesome powers of the
regulatory agencies and the effect upon them of conflicting political
forces would still be significant sources of uncertainty.
What is suggested is only that some modest portion of that stagna-
tion may be attributable to the FPC's choice of decisionmaking proce-
dures, and that the cumulative effect on investors of using adjudication
to resolve policy disputes of this nature is substantial. The theoretical
support for the existence of such a relationship is strong, and the au-
thor's experience with business firms corroborates the existence of such
a relationship. Investors frequently approach their energy lawyers with
a proposal to build a new facility and request that the lawyers assess
the likelihood that changes in regulatory policy will impinge upon the
future economic viability of the facility. Such plans for new facilities
may be abandoned or deferred indefinitely after receipt of a lengthy
opinion letter detailing the potential regulatory decisions which could
materially affect the facility and describing the difficulty inherent in
predicting either the outcome or the timing of those decisions.
Costs in Reduced Effectiveness of Regulation
The use of adjudicatory procedures in polycentric energy proceed-
ings actually may detract from the effectiveness of regulatory programs.
These costs to regulatory effectiveness flow inevitably from the charac-
teristics inherent in polycentric adjudication.
At the threshold, the extraordinary costs incurred to participate
meaningfully in polycentric adjudications can be analogized to barriers
to entry in an industry. Large groups of individuals whose aggregate
interest in the outcome of a proceeding is great but whose individual
interest is insufficient to justify separate representation in general are
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incapable of effective input into regulatory decisions. 27 Rarely do the
names of groups or individuals representing environmental interests,
residential consumers, small commercial or industrial consumers, or
even medium-sized business consumers of natural gas appear on the
service list in any natural gas curtailment proceeding. When such
groups do intervene in polycentric adjudicatory proceedings, their par-
ticipation typically is limited to cameo appearances when an extraordi-
narily important witness is scheduled to appear. In addition, they
suffer from unfamiliarity with the vast bulk of the evidence amassed in
the record. While the elimination of adjudicatory proceedings to re-
solve complex, multifaceted regulatory disputes alone will not provide
all significantly affected groups with meaningful input into agency de-
cisions, the continued heavy reliance upon adjudication will render the
task of finding acceptable solutions to this problem nearly impossible.
A second related reduction in effectiveness is attributable to the
massive, unwieldy record created in a proceeding of this type. A record
of 20,000 or more pages renders a good overview of the issues and the
significant testimony almost unobtainable. Furthermore, parties may
attempt on brief to focus the decisionmaker's attention on discrete
items of evidence which tend to support that party's position, if taken
alone, but which are of little probative value when considered in the
context of the entire record.' 2 8 Such "sandbagging" can be an effective
tactic in polycentric adjudication, especially given that one judge rarely
presides over the entire proceeding and the presiding judge's input to
the ultimate decision is in any event slight. 29 Applying the "substan-
tial evidence on the record as a whole" standard of Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB 130 in cases of this type is a nearly hopeless task.
The viability of such tactics points to the extremely significant role
the tactical skills of the advocate play in shaping the outcome of
127. Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Particiation in the Admin-
istrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525 (1972); Gellhorn, Public Particpation in Administrative
Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359 (1972).
128. An effective tactic is to get into the record, preferably on a relatively quiet hearing
day, a few statements that support your client's position when taken out of context, rely
heavily upon those statements on brief, and leave your opponents the incredibly difficult job
of searching the massive record for evidence that erodes the impact of the isolated support-
ing statements. Of course, even better is to cite favorable evidence out of context for the first
time in a reply brief, thereby cutting off all opportunity for opponents to place the statement
in context. This choice of tactics is based upon the realistic expectation that the deci-
sionmaker rarely will have the time necessary to make an independent perusal of the record
to find contradictory or contextual evidence.
129. See text accompanying notes 173-75 infra.
130. 340 U.S. 474, 476 (1951).
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polycentric adjudication. The size of the evidentiary record, the
number of issues in dispute, and the wide variety of ways in which the
issues can be framed combine to produce a situation in which the rela-
tive skills of the advocates may dominate all other factors in determin-
ing the outcome of the proceeding, particularly at the appellate level.
The resulting decisions will constitute effective regulation only in those
fortuitous circumstances in which the most effective advocates happen
to be retained by the parties whose views are most consistent with the
overall public interest.
The compilation of a massive record also impairs the deci-
sionmaker's ability to focus on the overriding policy issues raised by
the proceeding. The bulk of the evidence consists of descriptions of
factual situations which, even if accurate at the time asserted, almost
certainly will have changed by the time the record becomes the basis
for a final decision.131 These stale specifics tend to bury the critical
long term issue of how a set of rules established today will modify fu-
ture conduct.
An often overlooked cost of using adjudication to resolve hun-
dreds of thousands of disputed issues in a single case originates with
the misleading doctrine that the resolution of each factual issue is con-
sidered a final determination because each issue was subjected to cross-
examination and impeachment. Even parties with sufficient interest in
the outcome to justify well-financed participation must be very selec-
tive in the issues on which they adequately prepare cross-examination.
No party can afford to conduct independent research on each of the
factual contentions recited by opposing witnesses, yet all the myriad
facts that theoretically are at issue and subject to cross may be deemed
resolved for res judicata and collateral estoppel purposes. 32 Thus, the
131. For instance, in a curtailment proceeding the Commission receives evidence from
hundreds of industrial consumers contending that one or more of their uses of gas is a "use
for which alternate fuels are not technically feasible" to determine whether uses qualify as
high priority process gas. See 18 C.F.R. § 2.78(c)(8) (1978). Yet the ability to convert a
combustion unit to a nongaseous fuel and the cost of such conversion depends critically
upon the state of combustion equipment conversion technology at any given point in time,
and tremendous advances in the technology required to convert from a gaseous fuel have
been made in recent years as a result of curtailment and rapidly escalating gas prices. Thus,
a credible contention that a use qualifies for the process gas classification made in testimony
introduced in evidence in the early 1970s may be baseless when a decision is rendered by the
agency in the late 1970s.
132. See United States v. Utah Const. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966). See a/so
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., No. RP 72-99 (1978) (Order Requiring Additional
Information) (recognizing that resjudicata may preclude changing an end use classification
but expressing frustration at apparent major conflicts in testimony).
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agency has little power to correct errors based upon incorrectly found
facts when those errors subsequently are detected and brought to the
agency's attention.
Another danger lies in the well documented potential for agency
reliance upon adjudication in complex regulatory proceedings to lead
to a general paralysis of efforts to formulate or implement policy. 133
When an agency has been assigned the task of establishing and apply-
ing a policy, but its realistic assessment of the situation indicates that
the task can be accomplished only through a decade or more of multi-
ple adjudicatory proceedings requiring an extensive commitment of
scarce agency resources, there is an understandable temptation to abdi-
cate in whole or in part its regulatory responsibilities in that area. Al-
though this has not yet become a serious problem in the area of gas
curtailment policy, such an occurrence is not unheard of elsewhere. 134
In addition, there are strong indications that the costs of implementing
curtailment policy through adjudication may cause an agency to be sat-
isfied with something well short of full implementation of its policy.' 35
Moreover, the perceived need to commit an enormous proportion
of total agency resources to a single area of policymaking undoubtedly
deters positive policymaking, i e., attempts to avoid future problems
through establishment of new policies. Agencies can develop a fire-
man's reaction in responding only to existing, acute problems when
they recognize that any effort to act affirmatively will require years of
costly hearings and will produce uncertainty harmful to all affected in-
terests.
133. Hamilton, Proceduresfor the Adoption ofRules of General Applicabiity" The Need
for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1276, 1283-1313
(1972).
134. Id.
135. For instance, in one recent proceeding, when confronted with a complaint request-
ing a hearing to determine whether a curtailment plan inconsistent with all major elements of
the Commission's curtailmentpolicy should be modified, the agency refused to order hearings
and dismissed the complaint. It explained that it was unwilling to initiate a hearing to deter-
mine whether a plan inconsistent with its policies was unlawful unless the party requesting
the hearing could prove in advance of hearing that the nonconforming plan was causing
direct and immediate harm. General Motors Corp. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., No. RP 76-
86 (1977), appealdocketed, D.C. Cir. No. 77-1859 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Order Granting Motion
to Dismiss Complaint and Request for Order to Show Cause and Permitting Interventions).
See also United Gas Pipe Line Co., [1978] UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 12,138 (admitting that
eight years of hearings had failed to support adoption of a curtailment plan in a court review
proceeding and ordering a conference of all parties to determine what, if any, further proce-
dures should be pursued).
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Methods of Reducing the Costs of Adjudication
Although many participants and observers have recognized the
flaws of adjudication, some have suggested that the problem lies in the
way in which adjudication is used, rather than in the adjudicatory
process per se.136 Suggestions abound on modifications to the adjudi-
catory process designed to reduce its costs and enhance its efficiency,
while retaining its perceived value as a method of finding truth, testing
opinions, and the like. 137 Most suggestions entail changes in the trial
process itself, e.g., greater use of discovery, more precise notice of is-
sues, limiting cross-examination in various ways, and relaxing require-
ments for admission of evidence. 138 However, before discussing each
of these potential mechanisms, it is useful to explore one popular
method of resolving costs of adjudication by changing the scope of pro-
ceedings.
Generic Adudicatory Proceedings
In recent years, several of the relatively "new" agencies, most no-
tably the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), have placed great reliance upon the
use of "generic" adjudicatory proceedings to resolve issues of fact or
mixed fact and policy that are common to more than one dispute. De-
spite strong support for increased use of generic hearings in licensing
and rate cases from the Administrative Conference, 39 the FPC has es-
chewed this method of proceeding.
Use of generic hearings in an area such as establishment of natural
gas curtailment priorities offers a few advantages so obvious that it is
difficult to understand why the Commission has ignored this option.
Issues such as whether the use of natural gas under boilers should be in
a priority below other industrial uses and whether process and feed-
stock uses should be above other industrial uses, to which scores of
days of hearing have been devoted in each pipeline curtailment pro-
ceeding, could have been resolved in a single generic proceeding with-
136. Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and
Adjudication andAdministrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1970). See also
Testimony of Seymour Wenner before the Senate Committee on Government Operations,
reprinted in REGULATORY DELAY, supra note 7, at 175-200.
137. See, e.g., Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at
Rulemaking andAdjudiation andAdministrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485,
513-39 (1970).
138. See notes 147-75 & accompanying text infra.
139. See Administrative Conference Recommendation No. 78-1, 1 C.F.R. § 305.78-1
(1979).
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out any loss of decisionmaking quality. The evidence on which these
decisions were based in individual proceedings was virtually identi-
cal, 140 as was the cross-examination. While arguably unique circum-
stances might require a curtailment priority classification for a
particular facility different from that of similar facilities, the pipeline-
by-pipeline approach to adjudicating curtailment priorities does not
avoid this problem, because each pipeline itself serves thousands of dif-
ferent and geographically scattered facilities. Thus, generic hearings
could provide for some method of reclassification based upon ex-
traordinary circumstances as easily as more traditional proceedings.'
4
'
The advantages of the generic hearing as a method of resolving
questions concerning the appropriate mechanism for implementing a
curtailment plan are less clear. In this area the circumstances of indi-
vidual customers of the pipeline typically become the focal point.
Fairly compelling arguments thus can be made that the implementa-
tion mechanism appropriate for a pipeline whose customers are all
large multisupply source distributors differs from that appropriate for a
pipeline whose customers include some small sole requirements distrib-
utors. Of course, adjudication costs would not be reduced if a generic
hearing on mechanisms for implementing curtailment plans were to be-
come a forum for determining the characteristics of every gas distribu-
tor in the country; however, a generic hearing that would provide a
forum suitably tailored to implementation issues appears quite plausi-
ble if focused upon the appropriate types of characteristics by which
pipeline systems and classes of pipeline customers can be differentiated.
The factors relevant to implementation issues142 are sufficiently suscep-
tible to generalization that they appear well-suited to the generic hear-
ing approach. Indeed, the agency has come to similar conclusions on
these issues in the pipeline-by-pipeline adjudications that have taken
place to date. To the extent that the issues have been resolved differ-
ently in particular proceedings, such results appear to reflect happen-
stance far more than any real difference in circumstances. 143 Moreover,
140. The principal item of evidence supporting a low curtailment priority for boiler fuel
uses relied upon in almost all curtailment proceedings was a 1971 report to the General
Counsel of General Motors Corporation. J. Jensen & T. Stauffer, Implications of Natural
Gas Consumption Patterns for the Implementation of End-Use Priority Programs (1971).
This report was introduced as an exhibit and sponsored by its authors in almost all curtail-
ment proceedings.
141. See, e.g., Cities Serv. Gas Co., [1977] UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 1 11,957, at 12,284-86.
142. See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
143. For instance, almost all curtailment plans approved by the Commission have a
special exemption from curtailment for small distributors meeting certain conditions, but the
volumetric cutoff for qualifying as a small distributor varies from plan to plan without any
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the generic hearing approach probably would improve the quality of
decisionmaking on these issues by focusing more attention on the
broad policy implications inherent in a one time decision with national
impact than would a series of ad hoc resolutions of specific narrow dis-
putes.
Nonetheless, more detailed scrutiny is warranted to determine the
types of costs of case-by-case adjudication which can be avoided or
reduced by adopting the generic hearing approach. Use of generic
hearings almost certainly would reduce the direct transactions cost of
adjudication substantially. To try in a single proceeding the issue of
whether boilers are uniquely capable of inexpensive conversion to oil
cannot possibly take as much agency and private party resources as are
required to try the same issue in more than twenty proceedings. Substi-
tuting generic hearings for case-by-case adjudication, however, may in-
crease the indirect economic costs of adjudication. If, as postulated
earlier,'" the indirect economic costs of using adjudication are greater
than the direct costs, the incremental benefits of a transition to generic
hearings may be slight or even negative.
Two different uses of generic hearings can be envisioned: a sepa-
rate hearing for each major curtailment issue (or group of issues); or a
single generic curtailment proceeding to resolve all issues that are sus-
ceptible to standardized resolution. Although separate issue-oriented
proceedings theoretically could expedite the implementation of a com-
plete curtailment policy by conducting hearings concurrently, in prac-
tice this segmented approach probably would not prove very effective.
First, all curtailment issues are closely related, and segregating them
into neat compartments would be both difficult and conducive to the
adoption of a policy whose component parts, though individually well-
conceived, do not form a coherent whole. Second, the theoretical abil-
ity to conduct the issue-oriented proceedings concurrently would be
limited greatly by the fact that many of the same parties and lawyers
are likely to be active participants in all of the proceedings. Third, if a
problem developed in just one generic proceeding, with a consequent
delay in its completion, quite likely the entire curtailment policy would
be delayed.
Accordingly, the second approach-a single all-encompassing ge-
explanation of the reasons for the variations. Compare Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., [1976]
UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 11,779, at 13,691 (establishing small distributor cutoff at 6,000 Mcf
per day) with Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., [1976] UTIL. L. REv. (CCH) 11,865,
at 14,157 (establishing cutoff at 7,500 Mcf per day).
144. See text accompanying notes 108-26 supra.
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neric curtailment proceeding-is the more realistic option. Because
such a proceeding would raise all of the problems of polycentric adju-
dication characteristic of individual pipeline curtailment proceedings,
with additional complications arising both from variations in impact
from one pipeline system to another and from a much larger number of
parties, there is little doubt that the generic adjudicatory hearing actu-
ally would take a longer time to run its course than any individual
pipeline proceeding. Hence, investor uncertainty concerning future gas
availability would increase in duration, and with it the indirect eco-
nomic costs of using adjudication for making energy policy decisions.
Moreover, if one believes, as the Commission and some courts appar-
ently do, 145 that the unique characteristics of each pipeline system are
important factors in devising an appropriate curtailment plan, generic
hearings may be viewed as substantively counterproductive.
Shortcuts in the Adjudicatory Process
Other proposals would enhance the efficiency of adjudication
through the use of various devices to contract the hearing process itself,
and could be used in conjunction with either case-by-case adjudication
or generic hearings. The most significant of these suggestions actually
have been implemented in one or more curtailment proceedings, 146 and
all have been given serious consideration by at least one or more ad-
ministrative law judges. For the sake of simplicity, the suggestions are
treated under the following categories: precise notice of issues and
phasing of proceedings according to issue; use of experts to cross-ex-
amine expert witnesses; imposition of limits on cross-examination; re-
laxation of rules of evidence; greater use of discovery; and imposition
of limits on duration of proceedings.
Precise Notice of Issues and Phasing
The protracted nature of administrative adjudication has been de-
scribed by one school of thought as largely a function of an agency's
failure to specify clearly the issues to be resolved and the kind of evi-
dence the agency wishes to receive on those issues. 147 Too many
145. See FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 645 (1972); 38 Fed. Reg.
1,503 (1973).
146. See notes 147-49, 157-58 & accompanying text infra.
147. See Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking
and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 524-45
(1970). See also Hamilton, Rulemaking on a Record by the Food& Drug Administration, 50
TEX. L. REV. 1132, 1163-66 (1972).
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agency orders initiating an adjudicatory proceeding state merely that
someone has identified a problem (e.g., the existence of a gas shortage
on an interstate pipeline system) and has proposed one solution to that
problem (by filing a proposed tariff revision or a complaint concerning
an existing tariff provision) and then invite all parties with an interest
in the resolution of this problem to intervene and participate in a hear-
ing. The parties are left the task of defining the issues and determining
the evidence to offer on those issues, and the ALJ is given no standards
to determine the relevancy or probative value of proffered evidence.
Consequently, a mass of unstructured evidence is tendered, accepted,
and cross-examined at length, often with both the participants and the
ALJ uncertain about its significance. Commentators have suggested
that this problem can be eliminated if the agency makes explicit the
issues it considers to be raised in the proceeding and the kind of evi-
dence it would find probative. 48 Phasing-or dividing a proceeding
into several discrete segments in which particular issues are ad-
dressed-is a logical extension of the issue specification process.
Unfortunately, in practice this prescription has had no beneficial
effect on the underlying malady. The FPC tried both more precise is-
sue identification and phasing in several proceedings, most especially in
the United curtailment proceeding. 149 The results to date hardly are
encouraging; as the prior description of the proceeding indicates,
United is one of the two or three curtailment proceedings in which the
least progress has been made over the greatest period of time. 50
The shortcomings of precise notice and phasing appear to lie in
several areas. First, the agency cannot anticipate accurately at an early
stage of the proceeding those issues likely to be controverted or even
the kinds of evidence likely to be valuable to the agency when the pro-
ceeding ultimately reaches it for decision. Second, a reviewing court is
unlikely to agree with the agency's assessment in any event. Third-
and this factor explains in large part the failure of phasing-the issues
are not readily susceptible to isolation. For instance, considering prior-
ity issues separate from implementation issues may distort the end re-
sult because the effect of any set of priorities in protecting particular
end uses from curtailment will depend to a large extent upon the way
148. See note 147 supra.
149. United Gas Pipe Line Co., Nos. RP 71-29, RP 71-120.
150. The ill-fated United proceeding has been the subject of 11 separate appellate court
decisions in eight years. Despite the amassing of 25,104 pages of testimony and at least an
equal number of pages of exhibits, the proceeding is far from being concluded. See table
accompanying note 21 supra.
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in which those priorities are implemented.' 15
As a result of these factors, attempts to define issues more precisely
in advance of hearings have produced frequent interlocutory appeals
from evidentiary decisions of ALJs and motions for clarification of the
scope of the proceedings. These appeals have been sufficiently success-
ful with the agency and reviewing courts that delays resulting from re-
mands based upon failure to accept evidence tendered at the hearing
have far exceeded the amount of time saved. Moreover, in the case of
phased proceedings, the interrelationship between the issues under con-
sideration in each theoretically discrete phase has forced parties to of-
fer, and ALJs to accept, overlapping evidence in several phases, with
the obvious effect of retarding progress toward an ultimate decision in
the proceeding.
Use of Experts to Cross-Examine Experts
Another suggested method of enhancing the efficiency of the adju-
dicatory process is the use of experts to cross-examine expert wit-
nesses. 152 This device is believed by its advocates to have a
considerable time saving potential by permitting the experts to identify
their areas of agreement and disagreement rapidly through direct in-
terchange without the cumbersome process of filtration through attor-
ney intermediaries. While appealing in theory, such a result is
questionable in practice. Three major factors form the basis for skepti-
cism. First, when an attorney has a specific purpose in cross-examining
an expert witness, the questions proposed by his or her client's expert
must be "filtered" to cull out lengthy and complex questions designed
only to elicit the existence of subtle and esoteric differences of opinion.
From the point of view of the scientist, such differences of opinion may
be important and intriguing, but from a legal standpoint the question's
relationship to the outcome of the case too often is tenuous or even
nonexistent. Second, channelling questions through the lawyer fre-
quently is necessary to keep the discourse between experts on a level
that can be understood by the ALJ, the Commissioners, and reviewing
151. A recent appellate court decision indicates that the legality of a particular set of
curtailment priorities may depend critically upon the method chosen by the Commission to
implement those priorities. North Carolina v. FERC, 584 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1978). But
see Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 402(a)(l)(E), 91 Stat. 565,
583-84 (1977) (dividing the priority and implementation decisions between FERC and
DOE).
152. See Miller, Regulators and Experts.- .4 Modest Proposal, REGULATION Nov./Dec.
1977, at 36; Wald, Reflections on Administrative Hearings, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 8, 1978, at
20.
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courts. The effective lawyer acts largely as a translator in presenting
and cross-examining experts, a role that many experts either are unable
or unwilling to fill and that many decisionmakers desperately need.
Third, the professional expert witness is as capable as any lawyer of
mastering the skills necessary to confuse, obscure, and protract consid-
eration of a technical issue on cross-examination when such is in the
client's interest.
Discrete Limits on Cross-Examination
Another suggestion frequently made is to adopt rules strictly limit-
ing cross-examination, either by forcing all parties opposed to the wit-
ness' point of view to consolidate their cross through one attorney or by
prohibiting all re-cross.153 If combined with consistent denial of mo-
tions to defer cross of a witness until counsel have had further opportu-
nity to agree on cross, forced pooling of cross almost certainly would
save hearing time. Suggestions for greater use of this mechanism, how-
ever, underestimate its cost in terms of sacrifices to the truth-seeking
function.
Essentially, forced pooling of cross is merely an attempt to trans-
form a polycentric proceeding into the more easily accommodated clas-
sic bipolar confrontation, but the proceeding remains polycentric in the
sense that many more than two positions on the issues addressed by the
witness exist. As a result, the position of many of the parties who op-
pose one or more aspects of the witness' testimony simply are not re-
flected in singular cross-examination of that witness, leaving the
decisionmaker with an impression of the witness' testimony after cross
that is both misleading and incomplete. 154 In short, a curtailment pro-
153. See, e.g., Hamilton, Rulemaking on a Record by the Food & DrugAdministration, 50
TEx. L. REv. 1132, 1167-70 (1972).
154. The inherent weaknesses in forcing pooled cross-examination can be seen by ana-
lyzing two aspects of curtailment proceedings: the basis for the wide variety of positions
taken in the case and the natural incentives for voluntary pooling of cross-examination.
Nearly every party to a curtailment proceeding takes a different position. The position
taken by a distributor-customer will depend upon such pertinent characteristics as its mix of
consumer end uses, the products manufactured by its major customers, the distributor's size,
the amount of storage facilities to which it has access, whether it is solely a gas distributor or
serves the same area with electricity as well, whether it is a partial or full requirements
customer, its corporate philosophy on load growth, the positions it has taken in other pro-
ceedings, the impact of various curtailment plans upon its corporate affiliates, the weather
patterns that prevail in the distributor's operating area, and like factors. A consumer party's
position is shaped by a similar wide range of factors, including its end use of gas, the prod-
ucts it manufacturers, the expected short- and long-term impacts of various plans on its
distributor supplies, the sensitivity of its operations to the price of energy, its overall corpo-
rate philosophy and positions taken on related issues, the anticipated effect of an FPC-or-
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ceeding is not a bipolar controversy; it is a proceeding in which, for
complex reasons, a hundred or more very different positions are taken.
There is no apparent difference between forcing pooled cross of the
typical multi-issue witness in this circumstance and reversing twenty
years of precedent on standing to intervene. The latter would also sim-
plify polycentric proceedings by recasting them in their old bipolar
mold, but it is an efficiency-enhancing option considered and consist-
ently rejected by courts and commentators for excellent reasons. 55
In addition, there is good reason to believe that pooled cross (and
even pooled sponsoring of witnesses) already occurs voluntarily in cur-
tailment cases to the maximum extent feasible consistent with any no-
tion of permitting effective participation by parties with differing
interests. The incentive for parties to pool their efforts in cases of this
type is enormous. A client facing the prospect of spending over a quar-
ter of a million dollars for separate representation at a curtailment
hearing has a very strong incentive to cut costs by pooling efforts with
other parties from time to time or even by instructing its lawyers to
participate actively only on a few issues. Thus, if several different par-
ties request an opportunity to cross-examine a witness through separate
counsel, a fair inference may be drawn that each party has concluded
that its interests in cross-examining the witness and the points it desires
to bring out on cross-examination differ materially from those of the
other parties requesting cross. In this situation, the analogy between
denying a right to separate cross and outright denial of intervention
appears very close indeed.
The effect of prohibiting re-cross is less clear, in terms of both its
advantages and its disadvantages. A witness is cross-examined initially
by a dozen lawyers, each of whom asks a few questions. As a result of
responses elicited by the first round of cross, however, several lawyers
may request further cross that may be considerably more extensive
than their initial cross. This process can continue through several
rounds of cross, with the result that a witness who was expected by all
participants to be off the stand in a few hours sometimes requires sev-
eral days of hearing time. While this undoubtedly can be a substantial
problem, it is not clear that prohibiting re-cross will save a substantial
dered curtailment plan on the future actions of the state commissions that directly control
deliveries of gas to its plants, and like factors. Of course, the basis for the position taken by
a state utility commission party is even more complex, taking into account the disparite
interests of all consumers and distributors in the state.
155. See generally Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1667, 1723-56 (1975).
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amount of hearing time without simultaneously impairing the effective-
ness of the hearing process as a mechanism for seeking truth.
Like multiparty cross, re-cross is an inevitable characteristic of the
polycentric proceeding. It occurs most often in one of two situations:
when the testimony of the witness taken as a whole is garbled after the
initial round of cross-examination, or when a cross-examination suc-
cessfully has transformed another party's witness into a forceful advo-
cate of the cross-examiner's position. In the first situation, the witness
probably has become confused in the course of interrogation and has
made one or more statements that are either untrue or do not reflect his
or her opinion. Alternatively, the witness' statements may be internally
consistent but based upon unarticulated premises. In either case, re-
cross can make a substantial contribution toward clarification. In the
second situation, denial of re-cross is functionally equivalent to deny-
ing cross-examination of a witness' direct testimony. 5 6 Thus, whatever
promise rigid restrictions on cross might offer in other types of regula-
tory proceedings, their value as a means of shortening polycentric en-
ergy policy litigation must be balanced against a very high cost in
reduced effectiveness of the hearing process.
Relaxing the Rules of Evidence
One method of reducing the length of hearings is to relax some of
the rules of evidence, particularly the hearsay rule.157 The FPC already
has relied upon some hearsay evidence in curtailment cases; its succes-
sor, the FERC, will be tempted to do so even more if it ever wants to
clear its docket of a growing backlog of curtailment proceedings and
other types of complex litigation. 58
156. One of the most effective tactics available in polycentric cases is to take a witness
who is appearing principally to support a position of a client on one issue, but who tangen-
tialy mentions another issue, and turn the witness into a strong advocate of your client's
position on the second issue through cross-examination. The tactical advantages of this type
of successful co-opting are enormous. The opposition on the second issue (which typically
does not include the client on whose behalf the witness is testifying) is often caught off
guard, and the testimony of the witness on the second issue has enhanced credibility by
virtue of the fact that the witness has no relationship with the party whose position on the
issue he or she has chosen to advocate on cross. There is no effective way of avoiding the co-
opting of witnesses on cross and, once it occurs, prohibiting other parties from attempting to
erode the witness' testimony through further cross could impose a serious handicap on the
decisionmaker.
157. To some extent, at least, hearsay is admissible in administrative adjudications and
can form the basis for an agency finding of fact. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389
(1971).
158. The Commission's rules do not exclude hearsay evidence per se but do exclude
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When the FPC initially decided to rely upon end use as a major
criterion for allocating scarce gas supplies, most interstate pipelines im-
mediately began gathering end use data. Each distributor customer
was instructed to send its customers a questionnaire to obtain the nec-
essary data on end use. 159 When the curtailment hearing took place,
the data obtained through this process was introduced into evidence
either through a witness for the pipeline or through witnesses for each
distributor. Of course, in either form the data was hearsay, and re-
quests to cross-examine a witness with firsthand knowledge of the basis
for classifying gas requirements usually were denied. 60 As a result,
many years undoubtedly were eliminated from the hearing process.
Moreover, such heavy reliance upon hearsay evidence in the early stage
of gathering end use data may not have interfered with the effectiveness
of the decisionmaking process to an intolerable extent. To be sure,
many end uses could have been misclassified as a result of misinterpre-
tation of FPC's definitions or the instructions accompanying the ques-
tionnaires. At the time the original end use data was collected, the vast
majority of people involved in the data collection process did not un-
derstand the implications of the data they were collecting and submit-
ting. Thus, while a great many errors of inadvertence were committed
in this process and were never corrected because of the introduction of
the data in hearsay form, the data rarely was distorted by intentional
misreporting. In those circumstances, admission of the hearsay end use
data in evidence and its use as the basis for implementing curtailment
plans probably was defensible based upon acceptable hearsay policy
analysis. 6 1
The Commission will be under even greater pressure to rely upon
hearsay in future curtailment cases, notwithstanding that future hear-
say offered in evidence may not be accompanied by the indicia of relia-
bility associated with the original end use data.' 62 Under current
"such evidence as is not of the kind which would affect reasonable and fair-minded men in
the conduct of their daily affairs," 18 C.F.R. § 1.26(a) (1978).
159. See City of Wilcox v. FPC, 567 F.2d 394, 420 (1977).
160. See Texas E. Transmission Corp., No. RP 71-130 (1978) (Initial Decision on Re-
manded Issues). See also City of Wilcox v. FPC, 567 F.2d 394, 420-21 (1977).
161. See generally Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957 (1974).
162. In North Carolina v. FERC, 584 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the court held unlaw-
ful a curtailment plan ordered into effect by the Commission on the Transcontinental Gas
Pipe Line Corporation system. The Commission was ordered to conduct further proceed-
ings, but was permitted to retain the original plan in effect "for a reasonable period of time"
while conducting the further proceedings. Id. at 1017. The proceedings required by the
court include the compilation of new end use data reflecting the current conditions in the
markets served by the pipeline and the actual present and future impact on those markets of
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circumstances parties involved in the process of gathering and submit-
ting end use data will have a strong incentive to deceive by selecting the
basis for reporting most favorable to them, exaggerating the conse-
quences of curtailment plans they oppose, and even asserting outright
falsehoods. Moreover, the highly favorable treatment received by the
few who were less than candid in reporting their end use data ini-
tially 63 has had an indelible effect upon the many who have suffered
for years as a result of their initial candor. Consequently, the agency
will find itself on the horns of a dilemma. One option is to accept the
impact data in hearsay form from witnesses whose knowledge of the
basis on which data was reported by consumers is too limited to un-
cover instances of false reporting through cross-examination, thereby
allowing the biggest liar to win by default. The other option is for the
agency to force witnesses from each of the thousands of facilities in
twelve states which, for example, receive gas from Transcontinental
Pipeline, to appear and be cross-examined concerning the basis for the
end use and impact data provided by each. The latter choice is obvi-
ously out of the question.
Furthermore, the Commission may be forced to accept the current
impact data on a double hearsay basis, that is, through a witness from
the pipeline whose knowledge will be limited to the data as compiled
by the distributors. This would open another major avenue for distor-
tion of the data, as there are many ways in which distributors can mis-
report or skew end use and impact data in their favor, and each would
have every incentive to do so.
In sum, further relaxation of the hearsay rule has considerable po-
tential for saving hearing time, but it also creates enormous potential
for mischief. In addition to the direct costs to the effectiveness and
accuracy of the decisionmaking process, increased reliance upon hear-
say in circumstances in which the declarant has a clear incentive to
falsify or mislead at the expense of another party may have societal
costs of much greater proportion.
any curtailment plan adopted. Id. at 1010-15. Thus, the Commission must begin by compil-
ing all new end use data, but under circumstances dramatically different from those that
prevailed when the original data was gathered.
163. Even if an error in priority classification based upon false reporting of end use data
is detected in the hearing process, it usually is not corrected until the Commission issues its
decision on the merits in the proceeding. In the intervening years, the party who submitted
false end use data receives the benefits of an undeserved high-priority curtailment classifica-
tion. See generally S. HERMAN, R. PIERCE, M. TROPIN & B. TYREE, NATURAL GAS USERS'
HANDBOOK 20-23 (1976).
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Greater Use of Discovery
One group of critics contends that the unavailability of discovery
is at the root of the problem of delay in regulatory adjudication.164 The
theory is that much of the cross-examination that takes place at any
agency hearing is of the broad probing type which normally would oc-
cur during pretrial depositions, and allowing and encouraging pretrial
discovery devices would reduce the amount of hearing time required by
permitting counsel to narrow the issues in advance.
The Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure make avail-
able some discovery devices, including depositions, 65 but formal dis-
covery rarely takes place. Informal discovery mechanisms, however,
are used extensively. First, and perhaps most important, all direct testi-
mony and exhibits must be filed and copies served upon all parties in
advance of the date on which cross-examination takes place. 166 This
advance service of canned direct testimony fills the most important role
typically performed by discovery in court litigation. Second, informal
data requests, both written and oral, commonly are employed as dis-
covery devices in Commission proceedings. Despite their availability
the benefits offered by depositions are limited severely by the practical
problems inherent in conducting a deposition session with 100 or more
parties participating. Perhaps greater use of discovery could assist in
expediting regulatory adjudication, but there is little reason to expect
that any appreciable shortening of proceedings would result.
Imposing Limits on the Duration of the Proceeding
One approach to the problem of delay in agency adjudication is
simply to limit the amount of time an agency or judge can take to issue
a decision in a proceeding. Much of the legislation passed by Congress
in recent years establishing new agencies or modifying the statutory
authority of existing agencies contains provisions mandating certain
agency decisions within a specific time period. t 67
When imposed by a body as remote from the administrative proc-
ess as Congress, and when cast in the permanent structure of a statute,
rigid time limits on adjudicatory decisions are certain to cause more
164. See, e.g., Hamilton, Rulemaking on a Record by the Food& Drug Administration, 50
TEX. L. REV. 1132, 1170-75 (1972); Testimony of Seymour Wenner before the Senate Com-
mittee on Government Operations, reprinted in REGULATORY DELAY, supra note 7, at 175-
220.
165. 18 C.F.R. § 1.24 (1978).
166. See 18 C.F.R. § 1.26, at 35 (1978).
167. See 43 Fed. Reg. 27,509 (1978).
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problems than they solve. Tasks such as an impact evaluation could be
accomplished in arbitrarily short periods only through total sacrifice of
the truth-seeking goal of adjudication.16 8 Moreover, decisional dead-
lines necessarily force agencies to place priorities on those cases subject
to decisional deadlines at the expense of progress in other cases. Fi-
nally, the circumstances'justifying a priority effort in one class of cases
at the time Congress acts are likely to change to such an extent over the
years that the priority system becomes totally irrational. For instance,
the Natural Gas Act contains a provision requiring the agency to give
priority to pipeline rate cases over all other types of cases. 169 This pri-
ority system undoubtedly seemed appropriate when the Act was passed
in 1938, but few support it today. Even the pipeline companies proba-
bly would agree that certificate cases involving proposed new gas sup-
plies should be given priority.
Decisional deadlines can be imposed by authorities other than
Congress. Occasionally, appellate courts have imposed decisional
deadlines on agencies under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA),170 but, for good reason, have taken this type of action only
when faced with the most egregious examples of dilatory agency proce-
dure. 17 1 Likewise, few agencies have imposed blanket time limits, or
even time limits on certain types of cases on ALJs. 172 Others, including
the FPC, have imposed deadlines on ALJ decisionmaking in specific
cases. A good case can be made for this means of encouraging an expe-
dited adjudicatory process. The agency is close enough to the problems
involved in adjudicating the various types of cases before it to tailor its
deadlines to the realities of the process. Unlike Congress, the agency
can change its priorities rapidly to reflect changing needs in the regula-
tory situation. The agency also has the flexibility to extend a deadline
when, due to unforeseen problems, meeting the original deadline is
likely to diminish the effectiveness of the process.
Perhaps the most significant time-shortening tools are those pecu-
liarly within the reach of the administrative law judge. Examples are
the imposition of time limits on a party's presentation of its direct case
and on its cross-examination. Most of these tools would be useless in
the hands of anyone but the ALJ because they are subject to potential
168. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
169. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1976).
170. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1976).
171. See, e.g., Buckeye Cablevision, Inc. v. United States, 438 F.2d 948, 949-53 (6th Cir.
1971).
172. See generally REGULATORY DELAY, supra note 7, at 132-42.
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abuse unless wielded by a person who can observe their impact impar-
tially and directly. The judge can impose such a limit and avoid abuses
by extending the time for cross when it appears that the witness or the
witness' counsel have been the cause of delay or when it is evident that
important facts remain to be covered in spite of due diligence on the
part of counsel.
Undoubtedly, the most effective device uniquely available to the
ALJ is plain old hard-nosed treatment of counsel. Setting strict time
tables, refusing to admit cumulative evidence, refusing to grant exten-
sions of time, lengthening hearing hours, and just plain bullying coun-
sel into being more selective in their interrogation of witnesses can
expedite proceedings quite effectively. When the FPC discovered that
several of the major curtailment proceedings were languishing in a
state of almost total dormancy, it imposed decisional limits on the ALJs
responsible for the cases, with good results. The deadlines were met
with no detectable sacrifice of the effectiveness of the adjudicatory
process.
Without decisional deadlines, ALJs have no incentive to expedite
hearings and considerable incentive to permit counsel to set the pace of
the proceeding. An ALJ rarely will be reversed for accepting cumula-
tive evidence or for granting a motion for extension of time, but he or
she is exposed to a real risk of reversal for refusing to accept evidence
or for denying a motion for extension of time.
Imposing decisional deadlines on ALJs cannot be considered en-
tirely cost and risk free. The risk of error by all participants undoubt-
edly is increased when severe time pressures are imposed, and the tools
the ALJ must use to expedite the case can become machines for doing
real harm to the adjudicatory process if wielded by a judge who is lack-
ing in judicial temperament or wisdom. Moreover, there are broader
costs which cannot be ignored. Other cases for which the ALJ is re-
sponsible necessarily are neglected and there is a dramatic increase in
stress for all participants. This higher stress level will be reflected in
higher fees for the privately retained participants and either higher sal-
aries for participants employed by the government or an inability to
attract and retain high quality personnel. Still, of all the devices avail-
able to contract regulatory proceedings, imposing decisional deadlines
on ALJs seems to offer the greatest promise for significant reductions in
hearing time without corresponding reductions in accuracy and effec-
tiveness.
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Putting Procedural Expedition of Regulatory Adjudication in Context
The foregoing analysis suggests that only one proposed method of
reducing the length of time required to adjudicate polycentric energy
cases has any real potential to further that goal without simultaneously
sacrificing the effectiveness of the adjudicatory process, and that
method-agency imposition of decisional deadlines on ALJs--can be
expected to produce only limited progress. Although greater use of ge-
neric hearings would decrease the direct costs of adjudication, it would
be likely to increase the indirect costs associated with delay and uncer-
tainty. Moreover, its utility is limited to issues on which generalization
and standardization of rules is more important than tailoring rules to
specific factual situations. Two other proposals, cross-examination of
experts by experts and more precise notice of issues combined with is-
sue-oriented phasing of proceedings, offer little hope for contracting the
adjudicatory process; indeed, the latter has proven in practice to
lengthen the process substantially. Finally, imposing rigid limits on
cross and further relaxing the hearsay rule would result in detriments
far outweighing the possible benefits.
One ultimate consideration is whether the "adjudicatory" process
resulting from adoption of these proposed solutions would so distort
the paradigm of judicial adjudication of bipolar disputes on which it is
based that continued reference to the paradigm ceases to be of value.
Even without the interjection of significant efficiency-enhancing com-
promises to the adjudicatory process, the nature of polycentric cases
and the incredible workload confronting agencies with regulatory re-
sponsibility over the energy industry have caused marked departures
from the judicial paradigm.
The first departure from the judicial paradigm is found in the role
of the presiding judge. The ALJ who issues the initial decision in a
polycentric case is unlikely to have heard all the evidence in the case.
The proceedings last so long that retirements, transfers, resignations,
illnesses, and reassignments of cases take a significant toll of ALJs.
Most curtailment cases have been presided over by at least two ALJs,
and often the ALJ who writes the decision has presided over only a
small portion of the hearings.' 73 Moreover, the ALJs' findings and
conclusions are not binding upon the Commission and in fact appear to
receive little deference from the Commission. Thus, the concept of the
173. For instance, five AL's have presided over the hearings conducted to date in one
curtailment proceeding. See Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., [1976] UTIL. L. REP. (CCH)
11,779, at 13,681.
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judge being uniquely qualified to make many substantive decisions be-
cause of his or her knowledge of the record and opportunity to observe
the witnesses does not fit the realities of polycentric agency adjudica-
tion.
Second, the assumption that the decisionmaker is fully familiar
with the evidence, 174 however much alive it may be in theory, died long
ago in regulatory practice. It stretches credibility beyond all reasonable
bounds to assume that five Commissioners, whose activities and re-
sponsibilities extend well beyond issuing decisions in adjudicatory pro-
ceedings, 75 read the scores of thousands of pages of transcript and
hundreds of voluminous exhibits accepted in evidence in any one cur-
tailment proceeding. Indeed, with 50 to 200 briefs filed at each stage of
each major proceeding, totaling in excess of 1,000 pages, it is highly
unlikely that the Commissioners can even fully read the briefs submit-
ted in a complex adjudicatory proceeding.
As a practical matter, there are only two basic ways in which an
agency placed in this type of situation can make decisions in adjudica-
tory proceedings. The Commissioners can delegate most or all of the
decisionmaking function to unidentified agency employees who also
are unlikely to read the record of the proceeding, but probably could
read the briefs and refer to the record on some issues, or they can retain
the theoretical decisionmaking function but delegate to agency employ-
ees the task of reading and summarizing the briefs and whatever part of
the record the employees can manage to digest in the time available.
The differences between these two options probably are less practical
than theoretical, as the employees who are assigned the job of reading
and summarizing the briefs and record can influence the outcome of
the proceeding significantly by selectivity and emphasis in the summa-
rizing process. The most likely candidates for either assignment are the
legal assistants to the Commissioners, typically recent law school grad-
uates with little knowledge of the industry regulated by the agency.
Consequently, even without further compromises, regulatory adju-
174. In Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1935), the Court held that agency find-
ings of fact can only be made by agency decisionmakers who have at least read the eviden-
tiary record compiled through required hearings.
175. Among the more important obligations of regulatory agency decisionmakers is tes-
tifying before congressional committees. Realistically, agency decisionmakers probably
spend more time preparing for, and appearing at, oversight and legislative hearings than
they spend on any aspect of agency decisionmaking. For instance, in one 15-month period,
the Chairman of the FPC or one of his key aides was required to testify before congressional
committees on 77 separate occasions-an average of one appearance every six calendar
days. See [1976] F.P.C. ANN REP. 55-56.
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dication of polycentric controversies has few of the positive attributes
of the bipolar judicial proceeding on which it is modeled. If one ac-
cepts the need for further compromises that inevitably will impair the
effectiveness of the truth-seeking function of adjudication, the question
must be raised whether there is enough value remaining in this distor-
tion of the judicial paradigm to justify its retention in this context. At
the very least, the consequent reduction in the truth-finding effective-
ness of adjudication establishes the need to explore the potential inher-
ent in other procedures for formulating and implementing energy
policy.
Use of Informal Rulemaking
At the other end of the procedural spectrum from adjudication lies
informal rulemaking. Under section 4 of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 176 an agency can adopt a "rule" without conducting any adjudica-
tory procedures; the agency need only provide notice of the proposed
rule or the subjects and issues to be addressed by the rule, along with
an opportunity to present data and comments concerning the proposed
rule. Then the agency need only include, in conjunction with the rule
ultimately adopted, a concise general statement of its nature and ba-
sis. 177
The extent to which energy regulatory agencies have discretion to
use informal rulemaking is discussed at length below.178 For purposes
of analyzing the drawbacks of informal rulemaking for the formulation
and implementation of energy policy, however, informal rulemaking
can be assumed to be an available option in all polycentric disputes,
specifically including proceedings involving decisions on curtailment or
allocations, rate level, rate design, and licensing or certification.
Substituting informal rulemaking for adjudication obviously
would reduce both the direct transactions costs inherent in the decision-
making process and the time required to formulate and implement pol-
icies.' 79 The latter, in turn, would reduce the indirect costs associated
with the decisionmaking process by reducing investor uncertainty con-
cerning future policies. 80 These effects are illustrated by FEA regula-
176. The Administrative Procedure Act was first enacted by Act of June 11, 1946, ch.
324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). This Act was later repealed as part of a general revision and its
provisions reenacted by Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 381 (1966).
177. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
178. See text accompanying notes 245-407 infra.
179. See REGULATORY DELAY, supra note 7, at 26-32.
180. See text accompanying notes 108-26 supra.
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tion of the pricing and allocation of petroleum products. The FEA
acted almost exclusively through informal rulemaking. Typically, the
agency issued a notice of proposed rulemaking, outlining its reasons for
proposing the rules;181 allowed a brief period for submission of com-
ments; and then issued the final rules, accompanied by a synopsis of its
reasons for adopting the final rules, all within a few months. 82 Imple-
mentation of the rules was immediate because at least in theory they
were self-effectuating. Fact findings necessary for proper implementa-
tion were made through one of two mechanisms. Either the party sub-
ject to the rules made its own findings in the process of applying the
rules to its situation, subject to error detection by an FEA auditor, or
the agency itself conducted fact finding in acting upon a request for
relief based upon those facts already available to the agency. At no
point was an adjudicatory proceeding provided.
The Effectiveness of Informal Rulemaking
The principal disadvantage inherent in informal rulemaking is, of
course, the practical inability to determine the factual predicates for the
agency's action. Classic informal rulemaking may never reveal the as-
sumed pattern of facts upon which a policy decision is based. Even the
source of many of the facts relied upon in applying a rule to a particu-
lar situation may remain hidden. Failure to disclose the factual basis
for an agency decision precludes many checks upon agency action use-
ful in assuring that the agency acts on the basis of reliable data, does
not discriminate among the members of regulated groups, and acts
within substantive statutory and constitutional limits.
Potential For Agency Decisions to be Based Upon Poor Data or Methodology
The agency's own personnel, sometimes supplemented by consul-
tants, and the information submitted in the comments of interested
members of the public are two principal sources of information avail-
able to an agency in informal rulemaking. Neither source is very relia-
ble in the context of informal rulemaking. A third source often relied
upon by regulatory agencies, data obtained ex parte from affected
members of the public, has unique dangers of unreliability which war-
rant consideration after the other two sources are analyzed. 83
With no opportunity for outside parties to test the data and meth-
181. 38 Fed. Reg. 34,414 (1974) (proposed by Federal Energy Office).
182. 39 Fed. Reg. 1,924 (1974).
183. See text accompanying note 190 infra.
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odology relied upon by the agency's staff, there is a greater likelihood
of agency action based upon erroneous data. A few examples of the
potential for poorly informed decisionmaking in such circumstances,
many of which, ironically, are extracted from the records of adjudica-
tory proceedings, will illustrate the point.184
In a proceeding in which the Commission was required to decide
on the appropriateness of a particular site for a liquified natural gas
terminal, 8 5 the staff opposed the site proposed by the applicant in part
because of a staff member's contention that there was an active seismic
fault at the site. Cross-examination of that staff member, whose infor-
mation formed the sole basis for the staff concern over seismic safety,
revealed that the witness had a bachelor's degree in geology and had
taken only one or two courses that touched upon seismology. His opin-
ion was formed solely on the basis of an airplane ffight over the site on
a cloudy day. The applicant's witness, who had inspected the site on
the ground, had a doctorate in seismology and twenty years of field
experience. Although the agency still had to resolve a question of fact,
the information on professional qualifications elicited through cross-
examination provided both the agency and reviewing courts with a bet-
ter basis for deciding the issue. A proceeding handled through infor-
mal rulemaking would have been unlikely to disclose this information
to the agency decisionnmaker, and even less so to the reviewing courts.
Another example was a proceeding in which the agency was re-
quired to determine the proper metallurgical specifications for steel to
be used in constructing a chilled gas pipeline. 86 The agency's staff
maintained that the industry-proposed standards were totally inade-
quate and likely to result in the pipeline shattering like glass. At a
hearing, the staff consultant, a distinguished professor of metallurgical
engineering, testified that the type of steel proposed by the industry was
too brittle to be suitable under the proposed conditions of use. On
cross-examination, however, counsel representing industry members
184. The reason for the use of adjudicatory proceedings to illustrate the potential dan-
gers of relying upon informal decisionmaking procedures is inherent in the nature of infor-
mal rulemaking: the data relied upon by the agency, and its source, usually make it
impossible to determine the reliability of such data even after the fact. It is also necessary to
depart from curtailment proceedings in order to illustrate the dangers of relying upon data
provided by sources within the agency, since the FPC staff declined to offer evidence in most
curtailment cases.
185. This example was obtained from the transcript of El Paso Alaska Co., No. CP 75-
96.
186. This example was obtained from the transcript of El Paso Alaska Co., No. CP 75-
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were able to demonstrate that the witness misunderstood the conditions
in which the pipe was proposed to be used, and that the consultant had
little familiarity with the cold-rolled steel used in cryogenic pipeline
applications. The industry members then offered the testimony of three
experienced cryogenic steel metallurgists and letters from the major
steel manufacturers of four countries explaining that the brittle fracture
problem alluded to by the staff witness had been solved definitively
over a decade ago. Other flaws in the staff witness' testimony were re-
vealed as well. This testimony effectively resolved the issue, yet the use
of informal rulemaking likely would have left undetected the funda-
mentally incorrect basis for the staff proposal.
Adjudicatory proceedings greatly increase the potential to expose
at least a fair proportion of those agency staff proposals based upon
demonstrably fragile or even false factual predicates. One can only
speculate on the number of agency proposals with similarly weak or
nonexistent factual and theoretical foundations that find their way into
the Code of Federal Regulations through the informal rulemaking
process. While this potential could be reduced by increased funding
and more careful scrutiny of the qualifications of agency staff person-
nel, to expect regulatory agencies to have access as required to equip-
ment, materials, and personnel whose qualifications are well-suited to
every issue that comes before the agency is highly unrealistic. To the
extent they do not, informal rulemaking maximizes the risk of poor
policy decisions.
A particular problem exists in the increasing agency reliance upon
mathematical models using various methodologies, including regres-
sion analysis, econometrics, cost benefit analysis, and discounted cash
flow. An agency engaged in informal rulemaking often does not dis-
close even the nature of the model used or the results of the calcula-
tions, and the specific methodology, statistical validity and reliability of
the results, and sources of the input data rarely are revealed. This
growing trend therefore opens still more avenues for errors by agency
staff personnel.
Although other instances of significant flaws in mathematical
models prepared by staff personnel exist,187 one example should suffice
187. A second example was obtained from Professor Thomas McGarity, formerly a Staff
Attorney at the Environmental Protection Agency. The problem arose in the context of a
nonadjudicatory proceeding to permit the marketing of a new pesticide. On the issue of
safety, an agency staff scientist submitted a report recommending approval of the pesticide
and stating that his calculations showed that the carcinogenic potential of the pesticide was
very low, with only twenty-four people predicted to contract cancer over a seventy year
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to demonstrate the potential impact of the problem. In a recent pro-
ceeding, 88 the FPC staff proposed that one of three alternative pipeline
projects be approved, based in part upon the calculations of a staff
economist who concluded that the project would yield net economic
benefits to the United States several billion dollars greater than those
an alternative could provide. Cross-examination brought out several
significant facts. First, the witness was forced to raise by several hun-
dred dollars the economic benefits attributed to the allegedly low-bene-
fit project, due to mathematical errors detected by the witness during
his preparation for cross-examination. Second, the witness acknowl-
edged his calculations were predicated upon the completion of the
competing projects on the same timetable, although, in fact, one of the
applicants contended that its project could be completed two years ear-
lier than the others. The witness acknowledged that just a one-year
shorter completion time would increase the economic benefits attrib-
uted to that project by approximately one billion dollars. Third, the
comparative economic benefits of the three projects had been calcu-
lated on the assumption that the allegedly low benefit project would
transport approximately two-thirds the volume of gas transported by
the other two, a conclusion based upon the witness' confusion over the
nature of the disputes between the competing applicants. This mistake
accounted for somewhere between one and two billion dollars of the
difference in the economic benefits attributed to the projects. Finally,
the witness made available the capital costs and operating costs on
which the calculations of comparative economic benefits were predi-
cated, thereby revealing that the costs assumed in the staff model dif-
period. However, an agency lawyer with scientific training refused to forward the memoran-
dum to the agency decisionmaker unless it was accompanied by a description of the method-
ology used and indications of the statistical validity and reliability of the estimate. Upon
resubmission of the memorandum, the accompanying description of methodology and relia-
bility showed the original estimate to have been derived through the use of regression analy-
sis and that, using one standard form of measuring the reliability of such an estimate, there
was a 95% probability that the actual incidence of cancer resulting from use of the pesticide
would be between zero and 660,000 cases. At the time this Article was written, the applica-
tion to use the pesticide was still pending, but there is no reason to doubt that the informa-
tion concerning the methodology and reliability of the original estimate of the pesticide's
carcinogenic potential will play a major role in the agency's decision. In this case, a poorly-
informed agency decision was averted by unusually alert staff work. The operative word,
however, is "unusual." Given that informal rulemaking provides no procedures to assist the
decisionmaker in understanding staff calculations, this situation only would be acceptable if
such actions by agency staff personnel were the result of normal procedures rather than
exceptional conduct.
188. This example was obtained from the transcript of El Paso Alaska Co., No. CP 75-
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fered from all other cost estimates previously provided by staff or the
applicants. The ultimate result was an agency decision that the project
identified as inferior to the other two projects by several billion dollars
was actually the economically preferable project. If informal rulemak-
ing had been employed, the probability is high that the significant infir-
mities in the mathematical data provided to the agency by its staff
would have gone undetected, and the agency would have acted con-
trary to its final determination.
Of course, the agency that uses informal rulemaking is not limited
to information originating within its staff. It can and must allow inter-
ested members of the public to provide data and comments concerning
the agency's proposal. Such comments theoretically can perform at
least three functions. First, they can assist the agency in shaping its
rules by pointing out problems in the implementation of the proposal
the agency previously had not considered. Second, comments provide
outside parties an opportunity to criticize the stated basis for the agency
proposal. Third, outside parties themselves can submit factual, opin-
ion, and analytical data supporting an alternative to the agency's pro-
posal or demonstrating that the agency's proposal would have
unexpected results.
In practice, comments usually are effective only at fulfilling the
first function. Comments in an informal rulemaking rarely provide a
meaningful opportunity to point out flaws in the basis for the proposal
as a result of the ordinarily skimpy and generalized agency statement
of basis and the insufficient time for discovery and analysis of the de-
tailed basis for the proposal. Comments are also of very limited value
as an independent source of information. As with comparable infor-
mation originating from internal sources, there is no way to test the
accuracy of the data, to determine the qualifications of the individual
who provided or prepared the data, or to probe the methodology used.
Moreover, in the typical thirty day comment period, often less in the
case of FEA proposals, 89 outside parties reasonably cannot be ex-
pected to assemble a fully qualified team to read and understand a
complex agency proposal, determine (largely by inference) its scientific
basis, and then demonstrate the flaws in that proposal or support -an
alternative action proposed by the outside party. Usually, comments in
informal rulemakings are written under considerable time pressure, by
lawyers unqualified to prepare detailed comments demonstrating the
infirmities of the proposal by applying reliable scientific methodology
189. See notes 347-49 & accompanying text infra.
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to the appropriate facts. Comments in informal rulemakings are noto-
rious for mistatements of fact, legal hyperbole, and unsupported asser-
tions, and do not comprise a reliable source of data upon which an
agency can, or should, rely.
The final source of data an agency can call upon in informal
rulemaking is information obtained from outside parties through chan-
nels other than comments. This is undoubtedly a useful major source
for many agencies, including the old FEA and the new ERA. With the
extreme time pressures and legal trappings of official comments re-
moved, outside parties are more likely to be able to provide informa-
tion, opinions, and projections that are accurate and based upon
reliable methodology. There is, however, the very real possibility that
such information will be distorted in favor of the private party's inter-
ests, and there is little chance such distortions will become known to
agency decisionmakers. The possibility of revelation is further mini-
mized when private parties with interests contrary to those of the party
consulted by the agency are unaware of the consultation.' 90
In sum, the use of informal rulemaking procedures maximizes the
potential for poorly informed decisionmaking by eliminating virtually
all opportunities to discover the inevitable flaws, critical omissions, and
limitations hidden within the data upon which agency decisions rely.
Beyond this "passive" interference with decisionmaking, however, in-
formal rulemaking possesses a substantial capacity for more active mis-
chief.
Potentialfor Discrimination in Decis'onmaking Based Upon Personal or
Political Motivation
Because the factual and analytical predicates relied upon in infor-
mal rulemaking are often unclear and difficult to test or verify, agencies
may act with relative ease for covert reasons quite different from those
stated to be the official bases for the agency action. A particular prob-
lem is the potential to hide favors to those individuals and corporations
politically aligned with the incumbent administration or with legisla-
tors able to exercise unique leverage over the agency. Energy regula-
tory actions obviously have a substantial economic and financial
impact. When an agency decides to give a company access to a large
quantity of natural gas or propane at prices well below market value, in
190. The ability of agencies to obtain information from exparte sources in informal
rulemaking has been partially eroded by Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). However, agencies apparently can continue to ob-
tain information exparte before initiating a rulemaking proceeding.
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effect it tenders the company a bank draft for a large sum of money.
The same is true of decisions on rate level, rate design, and even many
licensing decisions. Consequently, the pressure for de facto decisions
based upon pure political considerations becomes enormous. Some
have suggested that politicizing of the administrative process follows
inevitably from the demise of the delegation doctrine;' 9' but surely
there are sufficient political, moral, and equitable values at stake to jus-
tify efforts to limit such politicization. Yet extensive reliance upon in-
formal procedures in the pervasive regulation of an industry, the value
of whose product has a broad national impact, is a certain prescription
for maximizing politicization, and consequent corruption, of the ad-
ministrative process.
In this regard, however, a caveat is in order. Adjudicatory proce-
dures also can mask political or personal favoritism. Adjudication does
render such bias in substantive decisionmaking more difficult because
of the requirement that the agency support each element of its decision
with reference to the evidence in the record and the greater opportunity
during proceedings to test that evidence. But political favoritism can
be expressed easily enough by an agency relying upon adjudicatory
procedures through its procedural decisions. For example, the agency
can preserve the status quo almost indefinitely by finding issues on
which it needs more evidence every time the case comes before it for
decision.' 92 Although a politically desirable, rapid change from the
status quo is more difficult to effect, the agency nonetheless can order
the proceeding expedited and thereby assure that it receives undeserved
priority over other proceedings.
Potential Deviations from Constitutional or Statutory Decisionmaking Criteria
The practical inability to test the factual and analytical basis for an
agency action taken by informal rulemaking also makes it much more
difficult for reviewing courts to insure that the agency is employing the
decisional criteria mandated by the Constitution and Congress. These
criteria will receive greater discussion below;193 however, criticizing on
these grounds the use of informal rulemaking in most areas of energy
regulation is questionable because, with a few notable exceptions, the
191. Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 771,
778 (1975).
192. See, e.g., Cities Serv. Gas Co., [1977] UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 11,995, at 12,590-91
(requiring further hearings to obtain "updated information" before imposing a new curtail-
ment plan).
193. See notes 245-352 & accompanying text infra.
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nebulous constitutional and statutory standards for substantive deci-
sionmaking provide little meaningful check on the agency's discretion.
The substantive constitutional standard most often invoked in en-
ergy regulation proceedings is the Fifth Amendment's prohibition
against the taking of private property for public use without just com-
pensation. 94 The taking clause has been narrowed so severely over the
last few decades, however, that a colorable claim of its violation
through regulatory action is extremely rare. Consistent with the taking
clause, a regulatory agency can impose price constraints that substan-
tially reduce the value of private property, 9 5 eliminate provisions of
contracts and leases, 196 prohibit the most valuable uses of private prop-
erty,197 and require that property be transferred to a specified third
party on terms mandated by the agency. 9  Not surprisingly, efforts to
invoke the taking provision in appealing actions by federal energy reg-
ulatory agencies have met with uniform failure in recent years, without
any serious inquiry into the factual or analytical basis for the agency
action challenged. 199
Nor do relevant statutory provisions establish meaningful stan-
dards to evaluate underlying facts and analysis. For example,2z° the
194. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
195. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944); Western States Meat
Packers Ass'n v. Dunlop, 482 F.2d 1401 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974).
196. California v. Southland Royalty Co., 436 U.S. 519 (1978).
197. United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
198. Condor Operating Co. v. Sawhill, 514 F.2d 351 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975).
199. See, e.g., Cities Serv. Co. v. FEA, 529 F.2d 1016 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 947 (1976); Condor Operating Co. v. Sawhill, 514 F.2d 351 (Temp. Emer.
Ct. App. 1975).
200. Another example is found in the statutory standards applicable to most decisions
regulating petroleum products. The ERA must make most pricing and allocation decisions
with reference to a list of nine decisional criteria, 15 U.S.C. § 753(b)(1) (1976), varying from
terms with an easily ascertainable specific content, such as "shall provide for. . . mainte-
nance of. . .fishing activities," 15 U.S.C. § 753(b)(1)(C) (1976), to virtually meaningless
phrases, like "shall provide for . . . equitable distribution ...at equitable prices," 15
U.S.C. § 753(b)(l)(F) (1976). The agency is instructed to follow each decisional criterion "to
the maximum extent practicable." 15 U.S.C. §§ 753(b)(1) (1976). Furthermore, since many
of the nine separately stated criteria are conjunctive, ERA in fact must decide cases applying
some thirty to forty decisional factors contained within the nine statutory provisions. Fi-
nally, the legislative history of the Petroleum Allocation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat.
629 (1973), indicates express congressional recognition that the decisional criteria are mutu-
ally inconsistent but expresses a clear congressional intent to leave the balancing of inconsis-
tent criteria to the agency in every case. CONF. REP. No. 93-628, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 14
(1973), reprintedin [19731 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2688-89. As a result, almost every
agency action must further some criteria at the expense of others, thereby granting the
agency almost total de facto discretion in its substantive decisionmaking in most areas, quite
independent of the factual or analytical underpinnings of its decisions. See, e.g., Consumers
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FERC must act under three basic standards established by the Natural
Gas Act (NGA) and Federal Power Act (FPA): rates, terms, and con-
ditions of service must be "just and reasonable" and not "unduly dis-
criminatory," 20' and actions proposed by companies regulated by the
Commission can be approved only if they would serve "the present or
future public convenience or necessity." 202 These benchmarks have lit-
tle intrinsic meaning beyond ordering the FERC to make good deci-
sions and avoid bad decisions. The legislative history of the NGA and
FPA are of little assistance in the majority of cases because most cur-
rent issues were not anticipated by the legislature when the NGA and
FPA were passed in 1938 and 1935, respectively. Past agency and court
decisions have given these terms some meaning, but here again the con-
text in which the terms must be applied today differs so greatly from
the historical context of these interpretations that they provide little in-
sight into the modem application of the standards.
Thus, unless Congress amends the organic acts governing federal
agencies to provide meaningful decisional standards,20 3 there is no
room to argue that informal rulemaking impairs the ability of review-
ing courts to conform agency action to constitutional and statutory
standards. Therefore, attempts to strengthen informal procedures must
focus upon the desire to insure a higher quality of decisionmaking and
to reduce the potential for politically or personally based discrimina-
tion.
Methods of Increasing the Effectiveness of Informal Rulemaking
Having concluded that informal rulemaking avoids most of the
high costs of using adjudication to resolve complex disputes in formu-
lating and implementing energy policy, but only at a great sacrifice to
the quality of regulatory decisionmaking, the next logical inquiry is
whether informal rulemaking procedures may be modified to enhance
the quality of decisionmaking while retaining the efficiency associated
with informal procedures. Because the principal weakness of informal
rulemaking lies in its inability to assure that agency decisionmakers
Union v. Sawhill, 525 F.2d 1068 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975); Cities Serv. Co. v. FEA, 529
F.2d- 1016 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975). As might be expected, appellate courts rarely have
reversed the ERA or its predecessor, the FEA, for failure to follow statutory decisional crite-
ria.
201. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c, 717d (1976); 16 U.S.C. §§ 105, 106 (1976).
202. 15 U.S.C.A. § 717f(e) (West Supp. 1979).
203. In at least a few areas of decisionmaking, recent legislation appears to substitute
more meaningful standards. See, e.g., Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621,
92 Stat. 3350 (1978).
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will understand the factual and analytical predicates for their decisions,
the focus of efforts to improve the quality of results should be on mech-
anisms for exposing to public scrutiny and criticism the information
and analysis relied upon by the agency.
Expanding the Concepts of Notice and Record in Informal Rulemaking
In several recent decisions, Judge Leventhal of the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit has forced agencies to expose the detailed factual and
analytical bases for their proposed actions to affected members of the
public in a manner that permits meaningful criticism, and to respond to
any such criticisms that appear to have a factual and scientific founda-
tion.2°4 The results of this sequence then form the basis for court re-
view of the agency's action. A good example is Portland Cement
Association v. Ruckelshaus,205 in which the EPA proposed a stationary
source standard for new and modified Portland Cement plants. In the
material made available to the public contemporaneously with its no-
tice of proposed rulemaking, the EPA stated only that its proposal was
"based on stationary source testing conducted by the Environmental
Protection Agency and/or contractors .... ,,26 The details of the tests
and methodology employed were not revealed by the EPA until after
the time for submitting comments on the proposal had passed, and the
proposed standard was adopted by the agency over the objections of
the industry. When the description of testing methodology finally was
made available to affected members of the cement industry, a consult-
ing engineer retained by the industry concluded in a detailed critique
of the EPA's testing methodology that the results were "grossly errone-
ous" due to serious deficiencies in sampling techniques. 207 Because the
rule already had been promulgated by the agency, the engineer's analy-
sis and conclusions were submitted to the reviewing court rather than
to the agency. The court remanded to the EPA for response to the
engineer's criticism, but the agency chose only to reaffirm the original
rule and add the engineer's comments to the record for review. The
court reversed and remanded, holding:
We find a critical defect in the decisionmaking process in arriving at
the standard under review in the initial inability of petitioners to ob-
tain-in timely fashion-the test results and procedures used on ex-
204. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Interna-
tional Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also United States
v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
205. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
206. Id at 392.
207. Id at 393.
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isting plants which formed a partial basis for the emission control
level adopted, and in the subsequent seeming refusal of the agency to
respond to what seem to be legitimate problems with the methodol-
ogy of these tests. 20 8
Significantly, the court stated the basis for its action in terms of a broad
principle of general applicability: "It is not consonant with the purpose
of a rule-making proceeding to promulgate rules on the basis of inade-
quate data, or on data that, [to a] critical degree, is known only to the
agency.''20 9 The stated rationale for this principle was the requirement
of APA section 4 that an agency engaged in informal rulemaking pro-
vide notice of the basis for its proposal prior to providing an opportu-
nity for comment.210 Although, as discussed below, Judge Leventhal's
expansive reading of section 4 arguably is inconsistent with Justice
Rehnquist's subsequent narrow interpretation in Vermont Yankee Nu-
clear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council,211 it is as-
sumed for purposes of analyzing the effectiveness of Judge Leventhal's
expanded notice concept that where an agency's proposed rule is based
upon factual and scientific considerations, appellate courts have the
power to impose requirements of the type imposed in Portland Cement.
Several types of information are indispensable to any effort to crit-
icize or review the adequacy of an agency proposal predicated upon
scientific analysis of facts. First, of course, are the results of any stud-
ies, experiments, mathematical models, or other analyses on which the
agency based its proposal. In cases exemplified by the facts in Portland
Cement, even this information is not made available before the time for
filing comments expires. Even when obtained, the results in themselves
are not sufficient to permit meaningful evaluation and scrutiny. Other
essential information includes the names and qualifications of the indi-
viduals who performed the work for the agency, a description of the
methodology used, identification of the sources of input data, a descrip-
tion of the statistical validity and reliability of the results of any calcu-
lations, 2' 2 and sensitivity data showing the extent to which the results
208. Id at 392.
209. Id. at 393.
210. Id at 393 n.67.
211. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
212. The validity and reliability of the results of virtually any form of statistical analysis
or mathematical calculation can be expressed with reference to a few well-known and gener-
ally accepted parameters. For instance, the reliability of the results of linear regression anal-
ysis is commonly expressed in the form of the standard error of the estimated coefficient, the
t statistic, confidence intervals, and the coefficient of determination. See D. SJOQUIST, L.
SCHROEDER & P. STEPHAN, INTERPRETING LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS: A HEURISTIC
APPROACH (1974).
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of the calculations would change with various changes in input data.
Depending upon the nature of the agency's methodology, reference to
computer programs, mathematical formulae, and other calculational
aids used by the agency staff also may be necessary.
2 13
Before Portland Cement, such data, although in theory readily ac-
cessible within the agency, rarely was made available to the public, re-
viewing courts, or even the responsible agency officials at the time a
rule was proposed. Requiring that this data be made public in a timely
manner in informal rulemaking proceedings could work marked im-
provements in the quality of agency decisionmaking with very little re-
duction in efficiency. Indeed, conceivably the quality of agency
decisionmaking in polycentric disputes could exceed that of cumber-
some adjudicatory proceedings, hampered as they are by unwieldly
records, buried evidence, tangentially related material, and lengthy de-
bates between witnesses and counsel. 2
14
Significantly, the preceding analysis does not address the issue of
how courts should review the record compiled through the expo-
sure/criticism/response process required in Portland Cement. At this
point, Judge Bazelon's complaint that courts lack the technical exper-
tise required to review in depth the substance of many regulatory deci-
sions seems persuasive. 215 Short of in depth judicial scrutiny, Judge
213. For a more comprehensive discussion of the record required for meaningful review
of agency action taken through informal rulemaking, see Pederson, Formal Records and In-
formal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38 (1975).
214. A recent interchange between two scholars illustrates by analogy both the dangers
of permitting agencies to act on the basis of undisclosed data and methodology and how
agency decisionmakers and reviewing courts may be educated by timely public disclosure of
methodology and sources of data. In 1971, Massachusetts Institute of Teclmology professor
of engineering, Dr. Jay Forrester, published a book in which the author, using a computer
simulation, predicted essentially that the world was doomed to an irreversible state of con-
stantly declining economic and social well-being unless drastic changes were made in almost
all aspects of life, specifically including a 40% reduction in gross investment and a 20%
reduction in food production. J. FORRESTER, WORLD DYNAMICS (1971). To readers with-
out a sophisticated understanding of mathematical models, a category including most
agency decisionmakers, the Forrester work appeared impressive and sufficiently persuasive
to evoke significant policy actions. However, Yale professor of economics William
Nordhaus published a detailed critique of Forrester's methodology in which he demon-
strated, among other serious methodological flaws, that Forrester's assumptions concerning
the way in which population responds to other variables, if applied to recent past periods in
history, would have predicted an increase in population in the United States and Great
Britain during a period in which population actually declined, and 5% annual decline in the
population of India during a period when the population of that country increased rapidly.
Nordhaus, World Dynamics: Measurement Without Data, 1973 EcoN. J. 1156, 1161.
215. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650-53 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (Bazelon, J., concurring).
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Leventhal's requirement that the agency respond to comments and crit-
icisms in a manner indicating the agency has taken a "hard look" at
those criticisms 2 6 at least would assure that responsible agency person-
nel considered serious public criticisms. In many circumstances, the
court may have to be content with responses such as: the criticism of
methodology is valid but the agency is aware of no better way of con-
ducting the analysis in the time available for decision; the data used by
the agency is indeed suspect, but no better data exists; or alternative
methods of analysis or sources of data suggested in criticisms have
drawbacks at least as serious as those attributed to the agency methods
and sources. In most such cases, the court should defer to the agency
and affirm, in recognition of the fact that most complex regulatory deci-
sions must be based upon imperfect methodology and uncertain factual
predicates. The reviewing court will have accomplished a great deal
simply by forcing the agency to expose publicly the facts and method-
ology it proposes to rely upon, and to respond to well-supported criti-
cisms.
Hybrid Procedures
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC217 (Mobil If), the District of Columbia
circuit court compelled an agency not otherwise required by statute to
render decisions through adjudicatory procedures to "'realistically tai-
lor the proceedings to fit the issues before it, the formation it needs to
illuminate those issues and the manner of presentation .... ' ",218 Spe-
cifically, the court held that although the FPC was not required by stat-
ute to act through adjudicatory proceedings, the policy questions before
the agency were so "inextricably bound up with relatively specific fac-
tual issues" 219 that "some sort of adversary, adjudicative-type proce-
dures" were essential.220 To meet the additional procedural
requirements imposed, the court suggested selective cross-examination
on certain issues 22 as well as other permissible means of providing
"some mechanism whereby adverse parties can test, criticize and illu-
minate the flaws in the evidentiary basis being advanced regarding a
particular point. ' 222 Because almost all major agency policy decisions
216. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
217. 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
218. Id at 1252 (quoting City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731 (1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1074 (1972)).
219. Id at 1253.
220. Id at 1259.
221. Id. at 1263.
222. Id at 1262-63.
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are predicated upon "relatively specific facts," the potential applicabil-
ity of Mobil II was broad in scope.
Despite its potential impact, the "flexible approach" to choosing
agency procedures and the hybrid procedures mandated by Mobil II
were short-lived. The decision was the subject of considerable criti-
cism, 223 rejected by other circuits,224 implicitly repudiated by the
Supreme Court,225 and ultimately even abandoned by the court in
which it originated.226 The most telling criticism was the practical con-
cern that agencies would not be able to predict in advance the proce-
dures a reviewing court would find most appropriate in a particular
case and thus consistently would use adjudication to avoid reversal on
procedural grounds.2 27 Although this criticism seems well-founded in
instances in which procedures are imposed after the fact by appellate
courts, it would be unfortunate if the denouement of the Mobil II con-
troversy marked the abandonment of efforts by Congress 228 and vari-
ous agencies to improve the quality of regulatory decisionmaking by
prospective adoption of hybrid procedures. Indeed, many recent stat-
utes require the use of hybrid procedures, 229 and several agencies have
adopted them voluntarily.230 The FPC's establishment of two nation-
wide rates for new domestically produced gas illustrates the advantages
of hybrid procedures. 23'
After attempting for twenty years to establish natural gas producer
prices through adjudicatory proceedings,232 the FPC abandoned the
223. See, e.g., Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial
Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375 (1974).
224. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 520 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. deniedsub nom.
California Co. v. FPC, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 476 F.2d 842
(10th Cir. 1973).
225. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519 (1978).
226. American Public Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 567 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
227. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 546-47 (1978).
228. Congress has enacted numerous statutes in recent years which compel agencies to
use a wide variety of hybrid procedures. See Fuchs, Development and Diversification in 4d-
ministrative Rulemaking, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 83 (1977).
229. Id
230. See REGULATORY DELAY, supra note 7, at 37-38.
231. See American Public Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 567 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Shell Oil
Co. v. FPC, 520 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. deniedsub nom. California Co. v. FPC, 426
U.S. 941 (1976).
232. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954), the Court established
the Commission's obligation to regulate the wellhead price of natural gas sold in interstate
commerce. Initially the Commission attempted to perform that task through adjudication of
separate rates for each producer. However, it was forced to abandon this method of pro-
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adjudicatory approach in this area of regulation. Rather than adopting
pure informal rulemaking of the type used by the FEA to establish
analogous ceilings on the price of crude oil and petroleum products, the
FPC opted for hybrid procedures that publicly disclosed its staff's
methodology and data, encouraged the submission of both data and
criticisms from affected parties, and provided for methods through
which private parties could test and respond to the data and criticisms
submitted by other private parties.
The Commission initiated national wellhead rate proceedings by
notices announcing its intention to establish nationwide gas producer
rates and inviting all interested members of the public to submit com-
ments and data suggesting appropriate rates.233 The Commission pro-
posed no specific rate in its notices, but stated that its staff would
submit comments supporting one or more rate ceilings. 234 The com-
ments submitted included recommendations from two elements of the
FPC staff, supported by detailed descriptions of the manner in which
the recommended rate ceilings were calculated, the methodology and
assumptions underlying the staff recommendations, and the sources of
all data relied upon.2 35 All parties were given an opportunity to re-
spond to both the staff submissions and the initial comments of other
parties. 236 Because the bases for the staff proposals were set forth in
detail, many of the responsive comments included expert affidavits dis-
puting staff data and methodology. Supplemental reply comments
were allowed to permit criticism of any additional data or views pro-
vided in the reply comments, and the parties were notified of and given
a specific opportunity to respond to all additional data brought to the
Commission's attention as a potential source for its decision. 237 Thus,
with the exception of one important source of data kept private pursu-
ant to the terms of a court order,238 every aspect of the factual and
ceeding because its first ten proceedings required six years to complete and its backlog of
applications for producer rates had grown to 2,900. See S. BREYER & P. MACAVOY, EN-
ERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION 68 (1974). See also Permian
Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 758 (1968). The Commission's next venture into pro-
ducer ratemaking consisted of establishing producer rates through adjudicatory procedures
for each of several geographical areas. However, its first area rate proceeding required eight
years to complete and produced a rate in the late 1960s which was based upon average costs
of the early 1960s. See Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
233. American Public Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 567 F.2d 1016, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
234. Id
235. Id at 1027 n.8 & 1064.
236. Id
237. Id at 1027 n.8.
238. Id. at 1027 n.9 (reserve estimates not disclosed).
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analytical basis for the agency's proposed action was made available to
the public in time to permit meaningful analysis and criticism. As a
result, in less than two years the Commission was able to establish na-
tionwide wellhead rates for natural gas, whereas past efforts had re-
quired close to a decade in each of several adjudicatory proceedings.
Moreover, a comparison of the court and Commission opinions in the
two nationwide rulemaking proceedings with those in the various adju-
dicatory proceedings makes apparent that the quality of factual and
policy analysis did not suffer due to the transition from adjudication to
hybrid rulemaking. Hybrid rulemaking had the significant added ad-
vantage that, because of the shorter time span, the facts relied upon in
the rulemaking proceedings were much more current than those in the
record of the protracted adjudicatory proceedings.239 Furthermore, the
record available for substantive review by the courts was at least as
helpful for that purpose as the record of an adjudicatory proceeding.
In affirming the decisions, the courts could see exactly what the agency
did, the rationale for its action, and why it accepted or rejected each
significant public criticism of its data or methodology.
Hybrid procedures of the type used by the FPC in its national rate
cases and the various forms of hybrid procedures suggested by the
court in Mobil I1 appear to offer a great deal of promise for balancing
efficiency versus effectiveness in the modem regulatory process; how-
ever, a few additional procedural safeguards should be added to the
FPC's approach to maximize the quality of decisionmaking. First, par-
ties should be told that any factual data or analytical material requiring
nonlegal expertise will be given serious consideration only if submitted
in the form of an affidavit in which the qualifications of the affiant and
the source of the data relied upon are set forth. Second, the parties
should be informed that the results of calculations will be considered
only if the methodology employed is described in detail. Third, parties
should be invited to submit requests to cross-examine any affiant, ac-
companied by statements as to what information cross-examination
may be expected to elicit and the importance of that information.
Fourth, the agency should make clear its intention to permit cross-ex-
amination of any affiant when it believes that the circumstances war-
rant such a procedure. While the first two requirements merely permit
criticism of data and analysis analogous to that made available in Port-
land Cement, the last two requirements add a new factor.
239. Compare American Public Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 567 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1977) with
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
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As noted previously, 240 cross-examination can be extraordinarily
inefficient and costly. In contrast, the foreknowledge that a witness
might be required to undergo cross-examination, especially when the
agency seriously considers relying upon the evidence provided by that
witness and an opposing party indicates an expectation of eliciting
damaging facts on cross of the witness, could have a prophylactic effect
with little reduction in efficiency. The agency could use its residual
discretion to permit cross-examination rarely, while simultaneously in-
ducing staff members, parties, and outside affiants to take care in
presenting their cases accurately.
Accordingly, although the courts are wise to retreat from imposing
flexible procedural requirements in retrospect, Congress and agencies
should be encouraged to continue exploring new methods of combining
the beneficial characteristics of adjudication with those of informal
rulemaking.
Collection and Verification of Facts Required to Implement Policy Decisions
Regardless of the method used to develop and test the facts relied
upon in promulgating a policy, the significant problem of gathering
and verifying the facts required to implement the policy selected re-
mains. One possible method is illustrated by FPC efforts to implement
curtailment policy. The end use data required to implement curtail-
ment policy is gathered and tested through cross-examination in the
same multiparty adjudicatory proceeding in which the facts relevant to
the formulation of that policy are assessed. There are two theoretical
advantages associated with this method of proceeding. First, the facts
required for implementation also may be of assistance in policy formu-
lation. Second, cross-examination is available as a means of testing the
accuracy of the implementation data. The disadvantages of this ap-
proach, however, also are apparent. Combining hundreds of contested
facts relevant to policy formulation issues with thousands of facts nec-
essary for implementation greatly protracts the proceedings. Moreover,
the right to test these facts through cross-examination in the context of
such a proceeding is largely illusory; this factor is especially significant
given the res judicata effect of the resultant findings that inhibits efforts
to correct subsequently discovered factual misrepresentations.
Gathering detailed implementation facts through informal
rulemaking does not seem adequate. Except in the case of the few very
large gas consumers on a pipeline system, no individual party would
240. See notes 152-56 & accompanying text supra.
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have sufficient incentive to study, for example, the purported character-
istics of combustion equipment used by another party to justify a
meaningful effort to analyze and criticize the written classification re-
quests submitted by each of thousands of consumers. Yet the economic
and moral costs of relying entirely upon the representations of consum-
ers who have strong incentives to misrepresent could be very large.241
This presents a true dilemma in selecting appropriate procedures.
One possible solution to the problem of developing reliable spe-
cific facts for policy implementation is to devise policies requiring little
or no fact finding for their effectuation. For instance, the distinctions
between various industrial uses of natural gas in curtailment plans
could be eliminated. A less drastic variation would be to substitute
more objective and easily ascertainable factual distinctions for those
that are subjective and more difficult to determine. 242 Easily imple-
mented policies that avoid difficult factual determinations, however,
often can be adopted only at a high cost. For instance, the FPC was
presented with evidence suggesting that failure to distinguish between
industrial uses of gas that can and cannot be converted to alternate
fuels would result in unnecessarily incurring billions of dollars of eco-
nomic costs in the replacement of combustion equipment rendered
worthless by lack of access to a gaseous fuel.243 This and similar cir-
cumstances indicate that optimum policymaking usually will depend
upon accurate determination of specific implementation facts, notwith-
standing the difficulty and high cost of devising an effective system for
making such factual distinctions.
One alternative offering considerable promise as a means of ob-
taining reliable implementation data is a data collection/selective au-
241. See text accompanying notes 157-64 supra.
242. For instance, the Commission's ambiguous and highly subjective standard for proc-
ess gas, "gas use for which alternative fuels are not technically feasible," 18 C.F.R.
§ 2.78(c)(8) (1978), could be replaced with a more objective standard, such as, "gas use in
which alternate fuels cannot be used without complete replacement of existing combustion
equipment."
In the evidentiary exhibit which has been most heavily relied upon by the Commission
in establishing end use curtailment plans, the Commission was cautioned not to attempt to
identify all high priority uses of gas because of the extreme administrative difficulty of such
an undertaking. Rather, the Commission was urged to identify a few very large volume low
priority uses, placing all other industrial uses in a residual high priority classification. See J.
Jensen & T. Stauffer, Implications of Natural Gas Consumption Patterns for the Implemen-
tation of End-Use Priority Programs 9-10 (1971). The Commission ignored this sound ad-
vice and devised a priority system which requires it to distinguish between thousands of
types of combustion units.
243. See J. Jensen & T. Stauffer, mplications of Natural Gas Consumption Patterns for
the Implementation of End-Use Priority Programs 8-10 (1971).
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dit/sanction system similar to that employed by the Internal Revenue
Service. Taking end use curtailment data as an example, each affected
consumer could be required to make its own initial classification deci-
sion and to supply the information supporting that determination to
regulatory authorities in a standardized format. The Commission then
could establish an audit staff with responsibility to apply a few
mechanical checks on the supporting data provided and to select,
through appropriate audit criteria, a sample of supporting submissions
for intensive audit. To be effective, such a system would have to be
used in conjunction with sanctions.
In contrast, the present system of theoretical reliance upon adjudi-
catory procedures presents a combination of the worst of all possibili-
ties. Argumentative cross-examination of countless implementation
facts prolongs policymaking proceedings and obscures considerations
more important to policy formulation issues while contributing little to
testing the implementation facts asserted. Simultaneously, efforts to
correct previous erroneous "findings" of implementation facts are met
with arguments that the prior findings are res judicata or, at the least,
that the Commission can only change its findings prospectively. 244 The
present system might be analogized aptly to attempting to insure accu-
rate submission of income tax data by inviting all taxpayers in a given
geographical area to participate in a hearing in which each would have
the right to cross-examine all others concerning the accuracy of their
returns.
Legal Constraints Upon Agency Choice of Decisionmaking
Procedures
The above discussion has approached the selection of decision-
making procedures almost entirely from the perspective of the immedi-
ate concerns of the participants, attempting to impart efficiency while
maintaining and improving upon quality. But such selection does not
occur in a vacuum. Administrative agencies must select appropriate
procedures from within a framework of statutory and constitutional
constraints. Three potential sources of such constraints require our at-
244. See, e.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., No. RP 72-99 (July 10, 1978) (Or-
der Requiring Additional Information), which recognized that principles of res judicata or
collateral estoppel may preclude correction of a previous end use classification, but expres-
sing frustration at "a conflict in testimony of such magnitude, that, for the undersigned to
presently ignore it, on one estoppel theory or another, would be contrary to the letter and
spirit of pertinent Commission pronouncements in Docket No. RP 72-99."
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tention: due process, the Administrative Procedure Act,245 and agen-
cies' organic acts. These constraints form what the District of
Columbia circuit court aptly has termed a "baroque structure," 246 de-
void of classical precision and capable of generating considerable con-
fusion. Nevertheless, an analysis of the present limitations upon
agency procedural options reveals the structural changes necessary for
effective and efficient decisionmaking.
The Due Process Clause
General Contours
Although the general contours of due process are discernable with
relative ease, the specific requirements applicable in any given situa-
tion, as noted by the Supreme Court, "are undefinable, and [the] con-
tent varies according to specific factual contexts."247 The Court has
emphasized the malleability of this protection, stating that "due process
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands. ' 248 The law, however, is settled that once potential
deprivation of a significant life, liberty, or property interest is at stake,
the affected party must be given an opportunity to be heard,249 and that
opportunity must be at "a meaningful time and in a meaningful man-
ner. '"250 Upon concluding that a particular interest calls for due process
protection,251 analysis focuses upon a "determination of the precise na-
ture of the government function involved as well as of the private inter-
est that has been affected by governmental action. '252 The Supreme
Court currently subscribes to the test recently restated in Mathews v.
Eldridge,253 comprised of three distinct factors that must be balanced:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's in-
terest, including the function involved and the fiscal and the adminis-
trative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
245. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553, 555, 557-58, 701-706 (1976); 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552, 554, 556, 559
(West 1977 & Supp. 1979).
246. Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
247. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
248. Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
249. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1970); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385,
394 (1914).
250. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
251. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
252. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
253. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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requirement would entail.254
In attaching the proper weight to the private interests affected by gov-
ernment actions, the degree of deprivation2 55 and the length of the dep-
rivation 256 are significant. The agency's procedures for entertaining
complaints are important257 in predicting the probability of an errone-
ous determination. Finally, although financial cost is not necessarily
decisive in the Court's equation, "[a]t some point the benefit of an addi-
tional safeguard to the individual affected by administrative action and
to society in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be
outweighed by the cost. '258
In assessing the restraining effect of the due process clause on
agency procedure-selection, the central issue is determining those cir-
cumstances in which an oral hearing, including the right to cross-ex-
amine adverse witnesses, is compelled by the constitution. As has been
shown, the requirement of some form of quasi-judicial hearing has the
greatest potential for impairing regulatory agency efficiency by pro-
tracting the decisional process. 259 The significance of this procedural
safeguard in regulatory reform propels into the foreground the
Supreme Court's seminal decisions in Londoner v. Denver26° and Bi-
Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization .261
Both cases concerned property tax assessments in the city of Den-
ver. In Londoner, the Court considered whether due process was de-
nied to property owners who were refused a hearing at which they
could challenge a special assessment and apportionment of taxes for
street paving. The Court concluded that due process did in fact require
an opportunity to be heard:
[W]here the legislature of a State, instead of fixing the tax itself, com-
mits to some subordinate body the duty of determining whether, in
what amount, and upon whom it shall be levied, and of making its
assessment and apportionment, due process of law requires that at
some stage of the proceedings before the tax becomes irrevocably
fixed, the taxpayer shall have an opportunity to be heard .... 262
Notably, the exact nature of the required hearing was not specified, the
Court stating only that "[h]ere a hearing in its very essence demands
254. Id at 335.
255. Id at 341.
256. Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975).
257. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 18 (1978).
258. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
259. See text accompanying notes 18-135 supra.
260. 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
261. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
262. 210 U.S. 373 at 385.
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that he who is entitled to it shall have the right to support his allega-
tions by argument however brief, and, if need be, by proof, however
informal. ' '263
Delineation of when such a hearing would be required was to
some extent supplied in Bi-Metallic, in which the petitioner challenged
an across-the-board forty percent upward revaluation of all taxable
real property in Denver, on the ground that the absence of an opportu-
nity to be heard meant that his property would be taken without due
process of law.264 Speaking for the Court, Justice Holmes held that due
process was not violated. Londoner was distinguished on the ground
that, in that case, "[a] relatively small number of persons was con-
cerned, who were exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual
grounds. ' 2 65 With regard to situations such as that presented in Bi-
Metallic, Justice Holmes observed:
Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is im-
practicable that every one should have a direct voice in its adoption.
The Constitution does not require all public acts to be done in town
meeting [sic] or an assembly of the whole. General statutes within
the state power are passed that affect the person or property of indi-
viduals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance
to be heard .... There must be a limit to individual argument in
such matters if government is to go on.266
The dichotomy posed by Londoner and Bi-Metallic has had a sub-
stantial impact in both regulatory and nonregulatory contexts. Al-
though the Supreme Court has appeared upon occasion to move in
divergent directions when considering the application of due process to
these two broadly defined areas, examination of the leading decisions
reveals no fundamental inconsistency.
Application in the Regulatory Context
The crucial distinction between Londoner and Bi-Metallic as ap-
plied in the regulatory context can be debated. For instance, in Air Line
Pilots Association International v. Quesada,2 67 an appellate court relied
upon Bi-Metallic for the proposition that due process does not require
an opportunity for each individual to be heard if the sheer number of
parties poses grave administrative burdens.2 68 Yet in O'Donnel v. Shaf-
263. Id at 386.
264. 239 U.S. at 444.
265. Id at 446.
266. Id at 445.
267. 276 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 962 (1961).
268. Id at 896.
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fer,269 a judicial review of an agency's refusal to order an oral adjudi-
catory hearing on the same rule considered in Quesada, the focus
moved from the pragmatic effect of conducting a multiparty hearing to
the fact that the agency action did not "single out any particular [party]
for special consideration based on its own peculiar circumstances. 27
0
This latter approach reflects Professor Davis' view that Bi-Metallic and
Londoner "should not be interpreted as supporting the proposition that
the requirement of a hearing should depend upon the number of par-
ties. The emphasis should be upon the 'individual grounds.' The true
test is whether the facts are general or concern individuals."' 27' Profes-
sor Davis defines the distinction as the difference between "adjudica-
tive" and "legislative" facts:
Adjudicative facts are the facts about the parties and their activities,
businesses, and properties. Adjudicative facts usually answer the
questions of who did what, where, when, how, why, with what mo-
tive or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly the kind of facts that go
to a jury in a jury case. Legislative facts do not usually concern the
immediate parties but are general facts which help the tribunal de-
cide questions of law and policy and discretion. 272
From Professor Davis' standpoint, the Londoner Court's concern cen-
tered on how the city council decided whether, in what amount, and
upon whom the assessment should be levied, classic examples of "adju-
dicative" facts. In contrast, B-Metallic examined the constitutionality
of a policy decision to increase all property valuations by forty percent,
a decision analogous to legislative determinations. Because cross-ex-
amination in an adjudicatory hearing presumably could contribute lit-
tle to the development of "legislative" facts, due process did not require
such a hearing; but because in Londoner the property owners were the
parties most likely to know the value of the new street to their proper-
ties and to be able to test the city's contentions concerning such adjudi-
cative facts, due process required an opportunity for them to be
heard.2 73
Thus, two very different principles can be derived from Londoner
and Bi-Metallic. One interpretation suggests that an agency may not be
required to hold judicial-type hearings when such a requirement would
significantly impair the agency's ability to carry out a substantively per-
missible regulatory program. A second view holds that an agency may
269. 491 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
270. Id at 62.
271. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.05, at 378 (1958).
272. Id § 7.02, at 413.
273. Id
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not be required to hold an adversarial hearing when the factual issues
in dispute are legislative, rather than adjudicative.
Two significant opinions suggest that the second interpretation is
preferred. In ICC v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad,274 decided before
Bi-Metallic, a party complained to the ICC that a railroad's through-
rates were higher than the sum of the local rates between the same
stations. The railroad appealed the ICC's order lowering the through-
rates, and the Court stated: "[Ilt has been distinctly recognized that
administrative orders, quasi-judicial in character, are void if a hearing
was denied .... "275 The Court held that "[a]l parties must be fully
apprised of the evidence submitted or to be considered, and must be
given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, to inspect documents
and to offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal. ' 276 Similarly, in Ohio
Bell-Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,277 the Court declared
that the right to a fair and open hearing had been denied the petitioner
when the defendant Commission fixed rates chargeable by Ohio Bell
Telephone on the basis of evidentiary facts not disclosed in the rec-
ord.278 In both Louisville & Nashville Railroad and Ohio Bell Tele-
phone, the Court emphasized that the agencies' tasks consisted of
"quasi-judicial" determinations in that they were based upon facts re-
lating solely to a single party and directly affecting the party on indi-
vidual grounds.27 9
A novel third approach to the application of the due process clause
in regulatory proceedings emerged in the District of Columbia Circuit
in the mid-1960s. 280 In American Airlines Inc. v. CAB,28' the court de-
clared "its readiness to lay down procedural requirements deemed in-
herent in the very concept of fair hearing for certain classes of cases,
even though no such requirements had been specified by Congress. '282
Since that decision, the court repeatedly has demonstrated its willing-
274. 227 U.S. 88 (1913).
275. Id. at 91.
276. Id at 93.
277. 301 U.S. 292 (1936).
278. Id at 300. See also Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
279. ICC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 301 U.S. 292,300-03 (1936); Ohio Bell Tel. Co.
v. PUC, 227 U.S. 88, 91 (1913).
280. It is at least arguable that the District of Columbia Circuit's nonstatutory require-
ments for adjudicatory hearings were predicated upon a nonconstitutional common law ju-
dicial power, rather than the due process clause. See J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL,
INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 325-27
(1975).
281. 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
282. Id at 632.
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ness to require procedures beyond those mandated by statute.283 The
court imposed its ad hoc procedural requirements in two related situa-
tions: first, when "critical issues" could not be pursued adequately
without cross-examination; and, second, when agency actions consisted
of highly technical decisions affecting the natural environment.
The "critical issues" test, as applied by the circuit court, referred to
factual disputes that arise in the context of regulatory actions. The test
focused not on the relation of the dispute to the particular circum-
stances of any parties, but on the importance that certain issues in-
volved in the dispute hold for the action the agency eventually takes.284
Judge Bazelon was the most outspoken proponent of increased
procedural requirements in the second circumstance. His thesis was
that the public's stake, as opposed to private interests, in agency deci-
sions affecting the environment required greater protection than that
ordinarily accorded purely economic interests. 285 Writing in Interna-
tional Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus286 and Friends of the Earth v.
AEC,287 Judge Bazelon argued that because judges are ill-equipped to
undertake substantive review of mathematical and scientific evidence,
the best way to prevent unreasonable or erroneous administrative deci-
sions would be to promote debate between informed parties and "to
establish a decision-making process which assures a reasoned decision
that can be held up to the scrutiny of the scientific community and the
public. '28 8 Judge Bazelon concluded that "[t]hese complex questions
should be resolved in the crucible of debate through the clash of in-
formed but opposing scientific and technological viewpoints. ' 289
283. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir.
1976); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
284. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Such issues must "involve factual components of such relative importance that a greater
assurance of accuracy is required than that which accompanies notice and comment proce-
dures." Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
285. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Judge Bazelon's approach relied upon an expanded notion of procedural due process that
relates not to additional process due private parties whose interests are jeopardized, but to
the process due the public at large: "This 'new era' does not mean that courts will dig deeper
into the technical intricacies of an agency decision. It means intead that courts will go fur-
ther in requiring the agency to establish a decision-making process adequate to protect the
interests of all 'consumers' of the natural environment. In some situations, traditional rules
of 'fairness'-designed only to protect the interests of specific parties to a proceeding-will
be inadequate to protect these broader interests." d.
286. 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
287. 485 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
288. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
289. Id. These opinions are in sharp contrast to the views expressed by Judge Bazelon
two years earlier in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C.
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Although the District of Columbia circuit court split on the appli-
cation of the "critical issues" test,290 there was at least general agree-
ment that special circumstances in which the normal procedure proved
inadequate may require more stringent procedures. Speaking for the
majority in International Harvester, Judge Leventhal suggested that "a
right of cross-examination, consistent with time limitations, might well
extend to particular cases of need, on critical points where the general
procedure proved inadequate to probe 'soft' and sensitive subjects and
witnesses. ' 291 With specific regard to technical agency decisions affect-
ing the environment, however, Judges Bazelon and Levanthal disagree
on the appropriate procedural approach. In a concurring opinion in
Friends of the Earth, Judge Levanthal criticized what he perceived to
be Judge Bazelon's procedural overreaching:
Judge Bazelon's underlying approach, voiced in his separate opinion
in InternationalHarvester, seems to be pointed toward distending the
procedural requirements for rule-making. He seems to be trying to
chart a course whereby cross-examination will become routine in
rule-making proceedings, subject to exceptions for unusual or emer-
gency circumstances. The view developed in the majority opinion in
International Harvester, is that oral presentations in rule making,
however desirable, are not generally required, and that such require-
ments as may be evolving apply to critical issues where alternative
procedures are not adequate. 292
This dispute was rendered moot by the Supreme Court's recent opinion
in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,293 which dealt a
fatal blow to both of the District of Columbia circuit court's novel tests
for requiring oral procedures in the regulatory context. Because the
trilogy of cases culminating with Vermont Yankee also provides in-
sights into the Court's current thinking on the more traditional due
process tests, the entire sequence of decisions will be described briefly.
In the first of the three cases, United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum
Steel Corp. ,294 an Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) rule requir-
Cir. 197 1), where he took the position that administrators should articulate better the factors
on which they base their decisions in order to facilitate a more probing substantive review by
the court.
290. See Wright, The Courts and the Rule Making Process: The Limits of Judicial Re-
view, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 384 (1974).
291. 478 F.2d at 63 1. Compare Judge Bazelon's observation in O'Donnel v. Shaffer, 491
F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir. 1974), that "[t]his Court has long recognized that basic considerations of
fairness may dictate procedural requirements not specified by Congress. Oral submissions
may be required even in legislative-type proceedings, and cross-examination may be neces-
sary if critical issues cannot be otherwise resolved." Id. at 62.
292. 485 F.2d at 1035.
293. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
294. 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
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ing empty freight cars to be returned in the directions of their owners'
tracks was attacked on grounds that the agency unlawfully had refused
to grant a request for an adjudicatory hearing before promulgating the
rule. The Court affirmed the agency action, holding that the require-
ment of a "hearing" in the agency's organic act did not necessitate a
judicial-type hearing.
In the second case, United States v. Florida East Coast Railway
Co. ,295 an ICC rule establishing incentive per diem rates to be paid by
a railroad using a boxcar to the railroad owning the car was challenged
on the ground that the agency unlawfully denied a request for adjudi-
cative hearings. Although this rule was promulgated under a different
provision of the ICC's organic act, the Supreme Court found the rule
valid, holding that the "after hearing" language of the statutory provi-
sion also did not refer to an adjudicatory hearing. Two justices dis-
sented, arguing that the per diem rate rule imposed a financial liability
on the contesting railroads based upon evidentiary facts not subject to
cross-examination. 296 Although the dissent's thesis has some support in
the prior opinions of the Court,297 the majority responded to the dissent
by distinguishing Louisville & Nashville and Ohio Bell Telephone,298
emphasizing that the incentive payments at issue in Florida East Coast
were applicable to all railroads: "No effort was made to single out any
particular railroad for special consideration based on its own peculiar
circumstances. '299 Thus, while Florida East Coast superficially reaf-
firms the continuing viability of the adjudicative-legislative fact distinc-
tion, it also narrows the principle; under Florida East Coast, the
requirement of a trial-type hearing applies only when a protected inter-
est is at stake, the case turns upon the resolution of adjudicative facts,
and the agency action singles out a particular party for special treat-
ment based upon its findings with respect to those facts.
Finally, in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,3°° the
Court firmly established the restrictive view of the relation between due
process and administrative procedure hinted at in Allegheny-Ludlum
and Florida East Coast. Vermont Yankee reversed a District of Colum-
bia Circuit Court of Appeals decision invalidating licensing for opera-
295. 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
296. Id at 247 (Douglas & Stewart, J.J., dissenting).
297. The information relied upon by the ICC as the basis for its rule comprised "adjudi-
cative facts concerning the parties and their activities, businesses and properties." I K. DA-
vis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.02, at 413 (1958).
298. 410 U.S. at 245.
299. Id. at 246.
300. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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tion of a nuclear power plant, on the ground that the informal, non-
adjudicatory rule-making procedure used by the Atomic Energy Com-
mission did not satisfy due process requirements despite its full compli-
ance with section 4 of the APA. The Supreme Court ruled that section
4, which requires only that an agency give public notice of a proposed
ruling with an opportunity to comment thereon, establishes the "maxi-
mum procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have the
courts impose upon agencies in conducting rule-making."' 30 ' In consid-
ering the interface between due process and the APA, the Court stated
that proceedings categorized as "rule-making" do not require adjudica-
tory-type decisionmaking procedures previously considered mandated
by due process; the sole, "extremely rare"30 2 exception occurs only
"when an agency is making a 'quasi-judicial' determination by which a
very small number of persons are 'exceptionally affected, in each case
upon individual grounds.' "303 This due process criterion, first enunci-
ated in Bi-Metallic, and found again in Florida East Coast, limits the
requirement of adjudicatory procedures to those situations in which a
rule "singles out" a particular party "for special consideration based on
its own peculiar circumstances. ''3°4
Consequently, while the Vermont Yankee opinion speaks prima-
rily in terms of statutory interpretation, it definitively extinguishes any
arguably constitutional basis for the District of Columbia circuit court's
"technical environmental issues" and "critical issues" tests for requir-
ing procedural safeguards beyond those mandated by the APA.
Beyond this conclusion, however, there is little else that can be
described as definitively settled by Vermont Yankee. Read together,
Florida East Coast and Vermont Yankee raise at least three significant
questions: What is a rulemaking? When is the product of a rulemak-
ing an action exceptionally affecting a very small number of persons
upon individual grounds? Does the APA or due process compel the
use of procedural safeguards short of adjudicatory hearings, such as
Judge Leventhals expanded notice concept,305 when an agency em-
ploys rulemaking that otherwise would leave the factual predicates of
its action undisclosed and untested? Answers to these questions are
suggested after a brief evaluation of relevant cases interpreting the due
301. Id at 524.
302. Id
303. Id at 542.
304. United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 246 (1973).
305. See text accompanying notes 204-16 supra.
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process clause in nonregulatory contexts and of the statutory con-
straints upon agency procedural choices.
Application in Nonregulatory Contexts
Recent due process decisions by the Supreme Court in nonregu-
latory areas show a willingness to expand procedural safeguards when
an administrative agency confronts an individual citizen. The trend of
decisions, from Sniadach v. Famiy Finance Corp. 306 to Memphis Light,
Gas & Water Division v. Craft,3 0 7 appears to contrast with the Court's
reduction of procedural constraints on agencies in classic regulatory
proceedings. According to the District of Columbia circuit court, there
exists "a tension between the permissive procedural rulings in the infor-
mal rulemaking context and the strict procedural requirements that at-
tach when individual deprivations of liberty or property are at
stake." 30 8 It would be a mistake, however, to view the simultaneous
constriction and expansion of administrative procedural requirements
as a conflict the Court eventually must address. Indeed, the Court cur-
rently may be applying the basic due process test more rigidly in regu-
latory than in nonregulatory contexts. Goldberg v. Kel , 3 0 9 the only
case of this type in which the Court has held that a hearing closely
approximating a judicial trial is necessary, possesses features that sug-
gest several significant contextual differences underlying the trends;
consequently, those seeking to streamline regulatory procedures need
not look over their shoulders for fear of unexpected due process at-
tacks.
In Goldberg, the Court addressed the constitutional adequacy of
procedures for terminating aid under the federally assisted program of
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and under New
York State's general Home Relief program. The Court was concerned
with "the narrow (issue of] whether the Due Process Clause requires
that the recipient be afforded an evidentiary hearing before the termi-
nation of benefits. '310 Balancing private and government interests, the
Court determined that, in the welfare context, such a hearing was re-
quired. The "crucial factor" mandating a hearing was the possibility
that an eligible recipient might be denied "the very means by which to
live" during the interim between benefit cut-off and final disposition in
306. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
307. 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
308. Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 543 F.2d 240, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
309. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
310. .d at 260.
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a post-termination hearing.3 "1
Arguably, Goldberg appeared to focus on the essential nature of
the individual interest at stake. The opinion stressed the "grievous"
character of the loss and the "immediately desperate" situation that
termination could precipitate. But, in Fuentes v. Shevin 312 the Court
denied this to be the emphasis in Goldberg,313 and held that some kind
of fair hearing was required prior to the deprivation of general house-
hold property. Moreover, in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc.,314 Justice White, speaking for the Court, reiterated the Court's
refusal to distinguish between different kinds of property:315 "Al-
though the length of severity of a deprivation of use or possession
would be another factor to weigh in determining the appropriate form
of hearing it was not deemed [in Fuentes] to be determinative of the
right to a hearing of some sort."316
More recently, however, the Court has stated, in Mathews v. El-
dridge:317 "Goldberg illustrates the degree of potential deprivation that
may be created by a particular decision is a factor to be considered in
assessing the validity of any administrative decisionmaking process. '318
Thus, Mathews appears to represent a return to the emphasis placed by
Goldberg on the extent of the "grievous loss," and an implicit rejection
of Fuentes on this point. Reversing lower court decisions mandating a
hearing prior to termination of Social Security disability benefits, Ma-
thews distinguished Goldberg on the grounds that "the disabled
worker's need is likely to be less than that of a welfare recipient." 319
Consequently, Court holdings in the mass justice area can be distin-
guished from the contrary trend in the regulatory context because regu-
latory actions rarely place affected parties in a "desperate" situation.
Another distinguishable factor also appears to have contributed to
the form of the hearings required in Goldberg. Written submissions
were not considered adequate in the welfare context because most re-
cipients lacked the "educational attainment" to present their arguments
311. Id at 264.
312. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
313. Id at 89.
314. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
315. Id at 608.
316. Id at 606.
317. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
318. Id at 341.
319. Id at 342. The Court's comparison of the relative needs of Aid for Dependent
Children recipients and disabled workers appears questionable at best, but the general prin-
ciple that the significance of the property interest affected by government action should play
a major role in determining how much process is due appears logically unassailable.
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effectively in writing:320 "The opportunity to be heard must be tailored
to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard."' 32' In
contrast, the attorneys, accountants, and other hired experts represent-
ing parties before regulatory agencies presumably possess substantial
facility with the written word. Thus, Goldberg cannot be read to man-
date oral presentations in proceedings like those normally before such
agencies as the NRC, the FERC and the ERA. The Supreme Court
recognized in Mathews that physicians "are likely to be able to commu-
nicate more effectively through written documents than are welfare re-
cipients or the lay witnesses supporting their cause." 322 The analogy is
obvious.
Mathews also demonstrates in one other respect that existing due
process requirements in the regulatory context may in fact be more
stringent than in the nonregulatory area. The opinion casts considera-
ble doubt on the continuing vitality of the legislative-adjudicative fact
dichotomy, in contrast to the Court's apparent acceptance of a modified
form of this distinction in the dicta in Florida East Coast and Vermont
Yankee. The issue in Mathews-the physical condition of the disabil-
ity benefit recipient-seems to fit a classic definition of adjudicative
facts. Nonetheless, the Court declined to require an adjudicatory hear-
ing, largely because of its belief that the less cumbersome written pro-
cedures employed were sufficiently effective in the circumstances to
permit the government to avoid the added expense of oral proceed-
ings.3
2 3
Administrative Procedure Act
Analysis of the APA can assist in identifying constraints on agency
choice of procedures in two ways. Because Congress can require proce-
dures more stringent than those compelled by due process, the first
question is whether Congress has in fact done so in the APA. Second,
interpretation of "rulemaking" as the term is used in the APA can en-
hance understanding of the constitutional test established in Vermont
Yankee, which appears to require a preliminary determination that an
agency action is rulemaking.
As to the first question, Congress clearly has not demanded greater
use of adjudicative procedures than is required by due process. The
APA itself requires an adjudicatory hearing only in the case of removal
320. 397 U.S. at 269.
321. Id at 268-69.
322. 424 U.S. at 345.
323. Id at 344-46.
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of an administrative law judge. Although proceedings are divided be-
tween rulemaking and adjudication, only rulemakings and adjudica-
tions required by some other statute to be conducted "on the record"
trigger the APA's requirements for adjudicatory hearings.324 Thus, the
distinction between rulemaking and adjudication is important in deter-
mining whether an adjudicatory hearing is required only to the extent
that Justice Rehmquist has incorporated that distinction into the due
process formulation announced in Florida East Coast and Vermont
Yankee.325
The APA definition of rulemaking is an "agency process for for-
mulating, amending, or repealing a rule," 326 a rule being "the whole or
a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and
future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or pol-
icy." 327 Because the Act defines "adjudication" residually as an agency
process for formulating a final disposition "other than rule making but
including licensing," 328 the APA's definition of rule represents the op-
erative core of the Act.
Early in this century, the Supreme Court articulated the basic dif-
ferences between the legislative and judicial processes which in the reg-
ulatory setting are termed rulemaking and adjudication:
A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as
they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already
to exist. That is its purpose and end. Legislation on the other hand
looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new
rule to be applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its
power.329
324. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976); 5 U.S.C.A. § 554(a) (West Supp. 1979). See Law Motor
Freight, Inc. v. CAB, 364 F.2d 139, 143-44 (Ist Cir. 1966); J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, IN-
TRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 326 (1976).
325. Of course, once it is concluded that a proceeding must be conducted "on the rec-
ord," the APA will often trigger more elaborate detailed procedural rights than the mini-
mum required by due process. However, in most regulatory contexts, this difference in effect
of due process and the APA disappears. In Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33
(1950), the Court held, unfortunately rather obliquely, that if due process requires adjudica-
tory procedures for an action subject to the APA, the full panoply of statutory procedures
required for hearings "on the record" must be provided. Id at 49-50.
326. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (1976).
327. Id § 551(4).
328. Id § 551(6), (7).
329. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908). The Attorney Gen-
eral's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act provides a more detailed summary of
the differences between the two processes: "Rulemaking is an agency action which regulates
the future conduct of either groups of persons or a single person; it is essentially legislative in
nature, not only because it operates in the future but also because it is primarily concerned
with policy considerations. The object of the rulemaking proceeding is the implementation
or prescription of law or policy for the future, rather than the evaluation of a respondent's
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This authoritative distinction between rulemaking and adjudica-
tion, and others, unfortunately offer limited utility in resolving the clas-
sification issue as it arises in the regulatory arena. Most regulatory
proceedings both establish future policy and resolve specific factual,
"adjudication" issues. Judicial attempts to determine whether factual
or policy issues predominate in a given case largely are frustrated, in
that policy and factual components cannot be neatly extricated from
one another.
For example, reconciling the apparent exception to the Florida
East Coast holding, applicable when agency action "singlefs] out any
particular railroad for special consideration based on its own special
circumstances," 330 with the inclusion of rules of "particular applicabil-
ity" in the APA definition of rulemaking331 is particularly challenging.
How does a rule of particular applicability differ from an action that
singles out individuals based upon their particular circumstances? Ar-
guably, such an agency action still would be considered a rule under
the APA, but its promulgation might require adjudicatory procedures
under the due process clause. Likewise, the Court's distinction in Ver-
mont Yankee between rulemaking and adjuciation as a partial basis for
determining whether an oral hearing is required is of little assistance,
as it leads to a test that has defied rational application for decades. Not
surprisingly, this confusion has led many commentators to suggest that,
with the exception of the "future effect" requirement, the APA's defini-
tion of rulemaking is such little help that the step of attempting to dis-
tinguish "rulemaking" from "adjudication" simply should be omitted
in applying the APA to a particular regulatory action.332
These difficulties aside, following a conclusion that an agency ac-
tion constitutes "rulemaking," the APA requires only minimal proce-
past conduct. Typically, the issues relate not to evidentiary facts, as to which the veracity
and demeanor of witnesses would often be important, but rather to the policy-making con-
clusion to be drawn from the facts. Conversely, adjudication is concerned with the determi-
nation of past and present rights and liabilities. Normally, there is involved a decision as to
whether past conduct was unlawful, so that the proceeding is characterized by an accusatory
flavor and may result in disciplinary action. Or, it may involve the determination of a per-
son's right to benefits under existing law so that the issues relate to whether he is within the
established category of persons entitled to such benefits. In such proceedings, the issues of
fact are often sharply controverted." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MAN-
UAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 14-15 (1947) (citation omitted).
330. 410 U.S. at 246.
331. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1976).
332. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 123 (1972); J. MASHAW & R.
MERRILL, INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 281 (1975).
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dural safeguards unless the statute under which the agency purports to
act requires a decision "on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing 333 or Congress otherwise has indicated such an intent.334 An
agency must only: (1) publish notice of proposed rulemaking in the
Federal Register; (2) provide interested parties an opportunity to par-
ticipate in the rulemaking through written submittals; and (3) incorpo-
rate within the rules adopted "a concise general statement of their basis
and purpose. '335
The notice itself must disclose: (1) the time, place, and nature of
the public rulemaking procedures; (2) the legal authority under which
the rule is proposed; and (3) either the terms or substance of the pro-
posed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.336 One
of the critical issues the Supreme Court must soon address is whether
"notice" requires more than this bare framework.337 While the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the APA in Vermont Yankee indi-
cates a more literal approach is probable, the Court has had no oppor-
tunity to pass upon the District of Columbia Circuit's expanded notice
requirement.338
Agency Organic Acts
The final potential constraints upon agency choice of procedures
are the statutes governing the agency's substantive authority to act. Or-
ganic acts can constrain agency discretion either by requiring specific
procedures or by interaction with APA procedures applicable to adju-
dication on the record, or "formal rulemaking." Of course, the pleth-
ora of organic acts governing energy agency actions precludes analysis
in this Article of the statutory procedures required by each.339 This
333. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976).
334. See, e.g., Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 516 F.2d 1206, 1212-14 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
335. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976).
336. Id § 553(b).
337. See text accompanying notes 400-07 infra.
338. In Vermont Yankee, for instance, the agency provided detailed information con-
cerning the factual predicates and methodology underlying its proposal in ample time to
permit critical comments.
339. In particular, Congress recently passed five statutes significantly expanding and
modifying the authority of both the FERC and the ERA. Each contains numerous procedu-
ral provisions which could be interpreted to require additional procedures in some cases.
See Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (1978); Power Plant
and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (1978); National
Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206 (1978); Energy Tax Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (1978); Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978). There is also, of course, the very complex
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Article focuses instead on those under which the Federal Energy Regu-
latory Commission and the Economic Regulatory Administration act
in most cases: the Natural Gas Act,340 the Federal Power Act, 34 I and
the Department of Energy Organization Act.342
Constraints upon agency procedural choices under the Natural
Gas Act and Federal Power Act are minimal.343 With the District of
Columbia circuit court's opinion in American Public Gas Association v.
FPC, 344 the federal appellate courts finally reached a consensus con-
cerning the procedural requirements imposed by these Acts: neither
the "after a hearing" nor the "substantial evidence" requirements com-
pel procedures more rigorous than those prescribed by the APA for
informal rulemaking.
The DOE Act appears not to require adjudicatory procedures in
any cases, but nonetheless makes significant changes in the procedures
ERA must follow in regulating the petroleum industry. The earlier
Federal Energy Administration Act 345 and the Economic Stabilization
Act 346 reflected the crisis-oriented environment in which they were en-
acted. Compliance even with some APA requirements for informal
rulemaking was excused, with the agency merely required to provide
ten days notice prior to adopting a rule.347 Even that requirement
could be waived whenever the agency found it necessary to do So. 34 s
As a result, the principal procedural dispute during the first years of
petroleum industry regulation was whether any notice was required.3 49
The DOE Act subjects ERA's actions to the APA's procedures for in-
statutory scheme under which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission operates. See Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 525-27
(1978).
340. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 717-717z (West 1976 & Supp. 1979).
341. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 791a-828c (West 1976 & Supp. 1979).
342. Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.A.).
343. Since the procedural provisions of these two statutes are identical, a court interpre-
tation of one inevitably carries over to the other.
344. 567 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1977). But see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 33 (1947).
345. Pub. L. No. 93-275, 88 Stat. 96 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
346. Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 796 (1970), as amended by Pub. L. No. 92-210, 85 Stat.
743 (1971), and as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-28, 87 Stat. 27 (1973) (codified in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
347. 15 U.S.C. § 766(i)(1)(B) (1976) (repealed 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 709(a)(2)(C),
91 Stat. 565 (1977)).
348. Id.
349. See, e.g., National Helium Corp. v. FEA, 569 F.2d 1137 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1977); Nader v. Sawhill, 514 F.2d 1064 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975); Reeves v. Simon, 507
F.2d 455 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975).
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formal rulemaking,350 thereby making the District of Columbia circuit
court's expanded notice concept applicable for the first time to agency
actions regulating the petroleum industry, 351 assuming the concept sur-
vives predictable post- Vermont Yankee attacks.352
The Major Questions Left Open by Vermont Yankee
The empirical analysis in the first part of this Article provides
strong support for the Supreme Court's efforts in Allegheny-Ludlum,
Florida East Coast, and Vermont Yankee to alleviate the burden of
conforming to a judicial paradigm in what the Court has described as
"rulemaking procedures in their most pristine sense. ' 353 Now, how-
ever, the Court may be confronted with the question of whether the
trend toward minimizing judicially imposed procedural constraints
should be extended in one or both of two directions. First, the Court
may extend Vermont Yankee to eliminate mandatory use of adjudica-
tory procedures in individual rate, licensing, and allocation proceed-
ings similar to those in Louisville & Nash'ille and Ohio Bell
Telephone-cases consistently distinguished by the Court as "quasi-ju-
dicial." Second, the Court may further relax the procedural require-
ments imposed on agency rulemaking, thereby eliminating the District
of Columbia circuit court's expanded notice concept. Considering the
advantages and disadvantages of each of the alternatives, the Court
should adopt the former and not the latter. Unfortunately, however,
language used by the Court in its recent trilogy suggests an inclination
toward the opposite conclusions.
When Does the "Extremely Rare" Exception Require an Agency to Use
Adjudication?
The Court still appears to be attempting to apply the legislative-
adjudicative distinction in determining the procedures required in reg-
ulatory proceedings either by due process or by the APA. Continued
350. 42 U.S.C. § 7191(a) (Supp. 1 1977).
351. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See
also Wright, Rulemaking and Judicial Review, 30 AD. L. REv. 461 (1978).
352. Even if the Court ultimately holds the expanded notice concept to be unsupported
by the APA, the DOE Act provides ample support for the requirement in the context of
actions by the ERA and FERC, as the Act requires notices of rulemaking to be accompanied
by "a statement of the research, analysis, and other available information in support of, the
need for, and the probable effect of, any such proposed rule." 42 U.S.C. § 7191(b)(1) (Supp.
1 1977).
353. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 524 n.l (1978).
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reliance on this distinction certainly will lead to holdings that are poor
on policy grounds and unpredictable in their future application.
Significant flaws in the legislative-adjudicative fact test render it both
inappropriate and virtually useless.
Weaknesses in the Legislative-Adjudicative Fact Test
The legislative-adjudicative fact test serves a valid function only to
the extent that it is a good surrogate for the three-part balancing test
generally used to determine the requirements of due process. To be
such, it must reflect the values underlying that test, while enhancing
ease of administration and predictability. In fact, it does neither.
Distinguishing between legislative and adjudicative facts is ex-
tremely difficult in many regulatory proceedings. For instance, re-
turning to some of the examples used earlier,354 the net economic
benefits of alternative projects, the existence or nonexistence of an ac-
tive seismic fault, the ability of steel pipe of a given specification to
withstand extreme ambient temperatures, and the degree of carcino-
genic potential of a pesticide are typical of the significant factual issues
that arise routinely in regulatory proceedings. Yet a group of agency
administrators, ALJs, and appellate judges asked to categorize each
item of this list would be likely to produce inconsistent results.
The adjudicative-legislative fact test is an even less satisfactory re-
flection of the three values that must be balanced in determining what
process is due. The test provides a surrogate for only one, and even
with respect to that one, it is a poor surrogate. The test has no relation-
ship to the nature or importance of "the private interest that will be
affected by the official action. ' '355 Once any protected interest is found,
the test would appear to require the same degree of procedural protec-
tion notwithstanding the existence of large qualitative or quantitative
differences among the interests at stake. Nor does the test reflect "the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail. '356 Upon determination that any protected
interest of any party will be affected by the resolution of one or more
adjudicative facts, the legislative-adjudicative fact test apparently
would require an oral adjudicatory hearing no matter how much cost is
involved. The folly of this omission becomes evident upon considera-
tion of the extraordinary cost to the economy resulting from the use of
354. See notes 185-89 & accompanying text supra.
355. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
356. Id
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adjudicatory procedures to resolve combination fact/policy disputes
where the interests of literally thousands of parties are affected by the
resolution of innumerable specific facts unique to each party.357
The only due process value even remotely represented by the legis-
lative-adjudicative distinction is "the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. ' 358 The test ar-
guably satisfies this value because, as many courts have stated, resolu-
tion of adjudicative fact disputes is greatly aided by adjudicatory
procedures, which are, however, much less helpful in finding legislative
facts.359 This generalization has validity only insofar as reviewing
courts classify facts as adjudicative or legislative based upon a determi-
nation that the fact is or is not susceptible to meaningful testing
through oral adversary procedures. Of course, this approach simply
reduces the test to a circular argument.
In any event, the shortcomings of this argument are manifold.
Anyone who has cross-examined an articulate witness with a convinc-
ing demeanor in an effort to expose an intentional or inadvertent mis-
statement of specific fact must recognize the extreme limits of
confrontation and cross-examination as means of ferreting out "truth."
Moreover, the abstract notion that "adjudicative" facts can be tested
effectively only through oral procedures ignores two further practical
considerations. First, alternate procedures such as early and complete
disclosure of the basis for an agency's anticipated findings of fact may
protect the truth-seeking function at least as well as the right of live
cross-examination.3 60 Second, even assuming the efficacy of well pre-
pared cross-examination, it does not follow that oral procedures will be
of significant value in a polycentric regulatory proceeding where thor-
ough preparation of cross-examination with respect to most specific
facts is not practicable.361
The converse also holds. The accuracy of findings concerning is-
sues of "legislative fact," such as the effect of a particular proposed rate
design on the future marketability of natural gas, may be enhanced
357. See text accompanying notes 18-135 supra.
358. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
359. See, e.g., American Bancorp. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 509
F.2d 29 (8th Cir. 1974); Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 420
F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1969); SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968); Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Vincent, 375 F.2d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 1967); American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 633
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
360. See text accompanying notes 204-44 supra.
361. See text accompanying notes 132-34 supra.
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greatly through cross-examination concerning the underlying data base
and methodology. 362 Indeed, considering the relative importance of
such "legislative" facts in most regulatory proceedings, the practical
benefit derived from permitting allegations of legislative fact to be
tested through cross-examination is much greater than the practical
value of permitting cross-examination concerning facts specific to the
parties. Of course, as in the case of adjudicative facts, more efficient
alternatives to oral adjudication may provide an acceptable means of
testing the accuracy of this type of factual or predictive assertion.
363
The Alternative to Standardization. Regulating on a Case-by-Case Basis
The first major issue that requires resolution after Vermont Yankee
is the extent to which agencies are free to use notice and comment pro-
cedures in determining and applying policy to a particular supplier or
project. Arguably, Louisville & Nashville and Ohio Bell Telephone re-
solved this precise question in favor of requiring an oral evidentiary
hearing, and the recent dicta citing and distinguishing these decisions
with apparent approval indicates their continuing vitality. Also argua-
ble is that Justice Rehnquist's "extremely rare" exception applies and
requires an agency to conduct an oral hearing when a rulemaking ac-
tion resolves specific facts initially applicable to only one supplier. In
most such cases, the supplier, its customers, and often even ultimate
consumers are each "single[d] out . . . for special consideration based
on its own peculiar circumstances. ' 364
Preliminarily, consideration should be given to whether the ques-
tion is now moot given Vermont Yankee's apparent creation of an effi-
cient procedural vehicle for resolving most regulatory issues. The
agency can avoid providing an oral evidentiary hearing simply by
promulgating a rule that applies in the same way to all parties falling
within a defined class. This procedural approach also has a superficial
equitable appeal, reducing the potential for disguised favoritism in the
application of principles in cases involving different parties. Thus,
standardization would seem to be a short route to procedural efficiency
and "fairness '365 to all affected parties.
362. See text accompanying notes 184-90 supra.
363. See text accompanying notes 204-44 supra.
364. United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 246 (1973).
365. It is a peculiar brand of "fairness," however, that suggests uniform regulation in the
face of widely varying circumstances. For instance, in the ratemaking context, it does not
necessarily serve fairness to apply the same price ceiling to suppliers with widely varying
costs. Of course, other values may be served by this approach.
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But standardization of substantive regulatory actions has disad-
vantages as well. Although standardized results substantively are pref-
erable on certain issues, with reference to many other issues varying
agency actions depending upon the particular circumstances in which
the issue arises is far preferable. For example, standardized pricing for
all suppliers and customers falling within generally defined categories
has been adopted for natural gas producers. 366 A good argument can
be made, however, that applying standard cost pricing to producers of
electricity and their customers would require inordinate sacrifices in the
substantive effectiveness of regulation. There may be good reasons for
applying different principles, or at least for reaching different results, in
determining the rates charged by utilities with different cost structures,
base-load fuels, construction plans, and customer characteristics.367
Thus, it is irrational for the courts, in effect, to dictate standardized
substantive regulation by permitting agencies to use low-cost, efficient
procedures when they choose this approach, while requiring them to
adopt extraordinarily expensive and time-consuming procedures when
taking a more individualized approach to regulation. The agency's
choice should be based principally upon the substantive merits of the
alternatives available. Yet, if Vermont Yankee is followed by a deci-
sion reaffirming the vitality of Louisville & Nashville and Ohio Bell Tel-
ephone, the choice of substantive approaches to regulation will turn
almost entirely upon the general category of the issue. Standard cost
pricing, uniform rate designs, and standardized facility designs,
adopted as abstractions without any consideration of the individual cir-
cumstances, would be an inevitable long-term consequence.3 68
366. See American Public Gas Ass'n v. FPC, 567 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See also
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (1978).
367. See generally Kahn, Can an Economist Find Happiness Setting Public Utility Rates?,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 5, 1978, at 11, 14-15. Total reliance upon standardized facilities
designs devised in generalized rulemaking proceedings also could produce markedly subop-
timal results. Certainly, there are many design features that are susceptible to standardiza-
tion, but there are also a great many features whose appropriateness depends critically upon
the nature of the environment surrounding the facility. For instance, the design for a pipe-
line and the construction techniques used to install it depend largely upon the nature of the
surface geology and terrain. Design and installation criteria appropriate for the permafrost
of Alaska would be totally inappropriate and wastefully expensive for use across the plains
states of the United States. There are many design features of this type, and adoption of
standardized criteria necessarily would yield an inadequate level of environmental protec-
tion in some circumstances and unjustified additional costs in others.
368. It might be argued that generally applicable rules are always a viable option since
the agency can subdivide its regulatees or proposed projects into subgroups which share
characteristics relevant to the issue confronting the agency. In many cases, however, the
number and possible combination of relevant characteristics is so great that the subdivision
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A Proposed Test
The entering thesis underlying the following applications of the
accepted due process three-part test is that direct application of the test,
at least with respect to energy regulatory proceedings, dictates that ad-
judicatory hearings should not be required in large classes of cases ap-
parently falling within Vermont Yankee's exception for actions that
"single out any particular [party] for special consideration based on its
own peculiar circumstances." 369 In short, Justice Rehnquist's "ex-
tremely rare" exception to the rule should be more rare than even he
apparently envisioned. This thesis can be tested by applying each of
the three parts of the due process balancing test to four generic types of
energy regulatory proceedings: allocation; rate design; rate level; and
facilities licensing.
The Private Interests Affected
The first value to be balanced is "the private interest that will be
affected by the official actions. ' 370 The initial point to bear emphasis is
this standard's reference solely to "private interests," a point over-
looked by the District of Columbia circuit court in its now defunct ef-
forts to invoke due process on behalf of the public at large. 37l The due
process clause protects individuals from the potential excesses of the
public acting through its elected representatives. If the public's own
interests require greater procedural safeguards, Congress should im-
pose them.
Beginning with allocation proceedings, the private interests at
stake consist principally of the interests of each direct and indirect cus-
tomer in continuing to receive a given quantity of energy. The supplier
also may have a more indirect interest in the outcome, as the choice of
allocation schemes may affect its profitability, the marketability of its
product, administrative costs, and customer and public relations. As-
suming arguendo that these economic interests are protected by the due
process takes the agency back to essentially a case-by-case approach. For instance, it is
common for EPA rulemakings to encompass only one facility even though the rule is stated
as being generally applicable to all facilities sharing stated characteristics. Even though
there is no meaningful difference between rulemaking and adjudication in this situation,
reviewing courts have been willing to permit the agency to use informal rulemaking proce-
dures to issue such a rule. See Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301, 1306 (10th Cir.
1973). See also South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 661 (1st Cir. 1974).
369. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 246 (1973).
370. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
371. See text accompanying notes 280-93 supra.
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process clause, 372 they must be considered relatively substantial. Still,
the position of a consumer harmed by an adverse allocation decision is
by no means as "desperate" as the position of the AFDC recipient
whose benefits were terminated in Goldberg.
The analysis of interests affected by rate design decisions is virtu-
ally identical. Again, the impact on the supplier, while potentially sub-
stantial, is indirect.373 The interest of the affected consumers is in
obtaining access to the fuel at the lowest possible rate. Of necessity, the
pecuniary interest of the consumer in a rate design proceeding is no
more than in an allocation proceeding, because the consumer always
has the option of switching to another form of energy if the rate design
adopted makes such substitution appealing.3 74 Once again, the inter-
ests must be considered substantial, but the aggrieved party's situation
scarcely can be characterized as "desperate."
Rate level cases implicate comparable consumer interests, but
much greater interests on the part of suppliers. However, even the sup-
plier's interest in a reasonable rate of return cannot be likened to that
of the welfare recipient's interest in means for survival. Moreover, the
public interest in seeing energy suppliers remain in business and ex-
pand to meet increasing demand is sufficient to make it unlikely that
revenues would be constrained below the zone of reasonableness for a
sustained period of time.375 Thus, the long-term threat to suppliers'
interests is more illusory than real.
The private interests at stake in a licensing proceeding include
those of the applicant, consumers dependent upon the applicant, and
residents of the potentially affected area who might be exposed to dan-
ger, a less pleasant environment, or reduced property values. Again
assuming that the interests of the supplier and its customers are pro-
tected by due process, the availability of alternative sites and alterna-
tive designs, albeit at higher costs, nonetheless render those interests
substantially protected. The residents of the affected area have perhaps
the most compelling cluster of interests, particularly with respect to al-
372. Throughout the discussion of interests affected by agency action, it is assumed that
all of those interests are protected under the due process clause. It is also assumed that the
government's involvement in any deprivation is sufficient to invoke due process constraints
of some type. Of course, if these assumptions do not apply, no due process constraint on
agency procedure exists.
373. A change in rate design may materially affect the marketability of a product, which,
in turn, increases the supplier's risk of incurring a loss. See Pierce, Natural Gas Rate Design:
A Neglected Issue, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1089 (1978).
374. See note 126 supra.
375. See Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 790-92 (1968).
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leged safety hazards, but again their situation is hardly "desperate."
Moreover, Vermont Yankee teaches that an agency actually can expose
the residents in the vicinity of a new facility to alleged safety hazards
simply by resolving safety issues in generally applicable rulemaking
proceedings, thereby precluding submission of evidence on those issues
in a subsequent licensing proceeding. There seems to be little reason to
require the agency to give these same interests a higher level of protec-
tion when it attempts to reach the same result through a slightly differ-
ent approach.
The Risk of an Erroneous Determination
The three-part due process test next assesses "the risk of an errone-
ous determination of such interest through the procedure used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safe-
guards." 376 There are actually two components to this factor: the risk
of an inaccurate determination of a material fact, and the extent to
which the risk can be reduced by adding or substituting oral adjudica-
tory procedures. A relatively high risk of error may be assumed in
making one or more material factual findings in any of the four types
of proceedings. At least this is the case if the baseline for comparison is
notice and comment rulemaking of the type employed routinely before
Judge Levanthal's opinion in Portland Cement. If, however, an agency
provides timely notice of the essential methodology and facts upon
which it proposes to rely, as Portland Cement requires, adjudicatory
proceedings become much less significant in reducing the risk of er-
ror.377 Indeed, if the agency employs more elaborate written proce-
dures designed to permit parties to probe the factual allegations of
agency staff and other parties, 378 the substitution of oral evidentiary
procedures actually might increase the chance of error.
Cost of Additional Procedures
The third factor in the due process test is "the Government's inter-
est, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail. ' 379 This description of procedural costs encompasses not only
direct costs to the government, but the total economic costs of the pro-
376. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
377. See notes 204-16 & accompanying text supra.
378. See text accompanying notes 217-39 supra.
379. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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cedures required.380 If the former only was intended, to permit a
proper balance to be struck this factor should be interpreted to include
all costs, direct or indirect, irrespective of the party initially incurring
the costs. With this broad definition of costs in mind, the empirical
analysis of the FPC's attempts to implement natural gas curtailment
policies becomes directly relevant to the efficiency portion of the due
process test.381 As this analysis demonstrates, the aggregate costs of
using oral evidentiary procedures to formulate and apply energy allo-
cation policies to individual suppliers is staggering. Given the avail-
able alternatives of rulemaking under the expanded notice concept and
a variety of hybrid decisionmaking procedures, the due process balanc-
ing test could not conceivably require oral evidentiary hearings. What
remains is to determine the extent to which the factors causing the high
costs of oral adjudication in energy allocation proceedings also exist in
the other types of cases.
The factors that cause the exceedingly high cost of adjudication in
allocation proceedings include: (1) a large number of substantially af-
fected parties; (2) a large number of factual, policy, and legal issues; (3)
the incentive for many different positions to be taken because of com-
plex interrelation of issues; and (4) issues of a type where delay in final
resolution has the potential to interfere significantly with the operation
of the economy. The first three factors are, of course, interrelated, and
where the number of parties is high, the other factors typically are pres-
ent as well. When only the first three coincide, resolution of the issues
using oral adjudication predictably will be extremely time-consuming.
This indicates the direct costs of using adjudicatory proceedings. When
the fourth factor is also present, as is almost always true in energy regu-
latory proceedings, significant indirect economic costs are also predict-
able.38 2 The aggregate costs of using trial-type procedures will then be
so enormous that only a protected private interest of a very great mag-
nitude, combined with a very high potential for enhanced accuracy of
decisionmaking, should tip the balance in favor of a constitutional re-
quirement for oral hearings.
Rate design proceedings share all of these same high cost charac-
teristics with allocation proceedings. A natural gas pipeline rate design
proceeding, for example, is virtually identical to a curtailment proceed-
380. Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (Ist Cir. 1973) (Kaufman, J.). See Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
381. See text accompanying notes 18-126 supra.
382. See text accompanying notes 108-26 supra.
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ing.38 3 The parties potentially affected include all distribution custom-
ers of the pipeline (typically eighty to one hundred), all customers who
receive gas directly or indirectly from the pipeline (typically numbering
in the thousands), the pipeline itself, and, in many cases, suppliers of
the pipeline, as well as purchasers of gas who compete with the pipeline
for access to supplies. In a proceeding involving high dollar stakes,
many of these parties will choose to participate. The issues will extend
from broad policy issues to facts specific to individual parties. Repre-
sentative issues include the basic ratemaking standard, the rate or rates
yielded by applying the standard to the pipeline's specific cost struc-
ture, the means and extent of adjustments when the revenues generated
through use of the preferred standard exceed the revenues the pipeline
is entitled to receive under the end result test, the elasticities of demand
applicable to each class of customers, and which distributors and ulti-
mate consumers have consumption characteristics appropriate to their
placement in a particular rate class. Given the number of issues and
the widely varying incentives of the affected parties, the possible per-
mutations are infinite.
Finally, the potential effect of delay and uncertainty on the econ-
omy is closely analogous to that associated with curtailment or alloca-
tion issues. Until the rate design issues are resolved, the future price at
which the form of energy involved can be purchased will be uncertain
within a wide range of possible outcomes. 384 Consequently, oral evi-
dentiary hearings can be expected to result in very high total economic
costs. 385 Again, the interests at stake, while substantial, do not justify
the drain on the economy, particularly when the marginal utility of oral
proceedings is low in contrast to available written procedures for test-
ing factual allegations.
Rate level proceedings present a somewhat different situation. A
major distinction is that, with the exception of a very few issues such as
383. For descriptions of the types of issues raised in natural gas rate design proceedings,
see TRANSMISSION, DISTRIBUTION AND STORAGE TECHNICAL ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON
RATE DESIGN, FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION NATIONAL GAS SURVEY, REPORT TO THE
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION (1977); FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION OFFICE OF EcONOM-
ICS, INCREMENTAL PRICING OF SUPPLEMENTAL SUPPLIES (1976); Pierce, Natural Gas Rate
Design- A Neglected Issue, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1089 (1978). For descriptions of issues raised
in electricity rate design proceedings, see Aman & Howard, Natural Gas and Electric Utility
Rate Reform: Taxation Through Ratemaking?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1085 (1977); Cudahy &
Malko, Electric Peak-Load Pricing. Madison Gas and Beyond, 1976 WiS. L. REV. 477.
384. See, e.g., Trunkline LNG Co., [1977] UTIL. L. REP. (CCH) 11,924 (industrial
consumers would pay varying rates depending on rate design employed).
385. See text accompanying notes 108-26 supra.
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the treatment of construction work in progress, 3 6 all potentially af-
fected parties other than the supplier have the same interest: a willing-
ness to see the supplier obtain enough revenue to induce it to continue
providing high quality service, but no more. The supplier's goal is, of
course, to maximize long-term profits, which in the context of most rate
level proceedings dictates a strategy designed to maximize short-term
rates. Because of the limited number of positions that can be taken and
the identity of interests among the customers, ultimate consumers, and
the Commission staff, few parties can be expected to participate. Those
that do are likely to coordinate their efforts, or at least to take positions
at variance with one another only rarely. The limited number of par-
ties and positions, and the limited rate of participation, make the pro-
ceeding much more manageable for the presiding ALT and the ultimate
decisionmaker.
Moreover, given that rate level increases typically are permitted to
go into effect subject to refund after the conclusion of hearings, 387 the
indirect cost of delay and uncertainty is much less,388 at least with re-
spect to that sector of the industry with high fixed costs in which the
basic rationale supporting limitations on supplier revenue is the per-
ceived existence of monopoly power. In the case of those parts of the
industry where the rationale for the regulation is principally concern
about windfall profits attributable to the peculiar temporal cost charac-
teristics of extractive industries, delay and uncertainty concerning fu-
ture rate levels may cost the economy dearly by reducing or eliminating
the incentive to produce at all.389 Thus, application of the cost-benefit
analysis inherent in the three-part due process test to rate level pro-
ceedings yields a clouded result. Although the costs of using oral adju-
dication to resolve rate level issues seem tolerable, especially given the
interests of both suppliers and consumers in obtaining accurate results,
even here a good argument can be made against the use of oral hear-
386. Present ratepayers usually oppose including construction work in rate base, while
potential future ratepayers typically support its inclusion. See Order No. 555, [1976] UTIL.
L. REP. 5,617 (CCH).
387. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1976).
388. Even with the agency's limited powers to suspend a new rate there are some indi-
rect economic costs associated with delay in rate level proceedings involving public utilities.
Since investors discount the value of revenues received subject to refund, the supplier may
experience greater difficulty obtaining financing as long as a significant portion of its rates
are subject to refund. In addition, even a suspension of only a few months sometimes can
create significant cash flow problems that impair a supplier's ability to obtain needed financ-
ing.
389. See generally S. BREYER & P. MACAVOY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL
POWER CoMMissioN 66-87 (1974).
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ings, as less costly written procedures may prove equally capable of
reducing error. For rate level proceedings involving suppliers engaged
in extractive activities, the due process calculus should reject any
mandatory use of oral evidentiary hearings. Without predictable fu-
ture price levels, suppliers engaged in extractive activities have no way
to gauge whether to mine or drill, due to their inability to calculate an
anticipated rate of return.
The final area is licensing cases. Historically, licensing cases, if
contested at all, were classic bipolar proceedings. This may explain
their specific inclusion in the APA's definition of adjudication. 390
When opposition occurred, the issues generally were identical regard-
less of the number or motivation of the parties. Complications pro-
tracting the decisionmaking process arose only in the occasional
comparative hearings initiated under Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCCF91
when competing applications were filed.
Simplicity in licensing proceedings disappeared as the duty to ex-
plore alternatives was imposed upon agencies, first by scattered court
decisions interpreting agency organic acts 392 and then, comprehen-
sively, by the National Environmental Policy Act. 393 While providing
a needed framework for more rational agency decisionmaking, 394 this
development has transformed all major licensing proceedings into a
classic polycentric mold. Large numbers of project opponents now par-
ticipate actively in licensing proceedings, each with different motiva-
tions and litigation strategies. The agencies' obligation to consider
alternatives opens an almost infinite range of potential issues, including
the need for the facility, and the possible alternative types, designs, and
locations. As alternatives are suggested by the initial group of oppo-
nents, new parties unaffected by the original proposal but opposed to a
suggested alternative emerge and suggest other reasonable alternatives,
all of which must be considered by the agency before it can act. Explo-
ration of each alternative, in turn, requires resolution of hundreds of
390. The APA's inclusion of licensing as adjudication may also be explained by a pre-
APA case that seemed to require adjudicatory procedures for all licensing cases. Goldsmith
v. United States, 270 U.S. 117 (1926). Of course, classification of licensing as adjudication
does not alone mandate an adjudicatory hearing. See text accompanying notes 323-28
supra.
391. 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
392. E.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965);
City of Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
393. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976). See generally Pierce, Obtaining Agency Considera-
tion of a Competing Proposal- Alternatives to Ashbacker, 26 KAN. L. REV. 185 (1978).
394. See generally McGarity, The Courts, the Agencies and NEPA Threshold Issues, 55
TEX. L. REV. 801 (1977).
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facts. The list of issues raised by any major proposal is interminable,
and consequently so are the proceedings convened in an effort to re-
solve them.395
The direct costs associated with the use of oral evidentiary hear-
ings in major licensing proceedings in themselves are staggering. For
example, litigation costs incurred by the three competing applicants in
the first phase of the proceeding to determine which pipeline project, if
any, should be authorized to bring Prudhoe Bay gas to the lower forty-
eight states396 exceeded $200 million, with substantial costs yet to be
incurred. A strong case can be made that the direct costs alone of using
oral adjudication to resolve major licensing proceedings far outweigh
any arguable benefits from enhanced accuracy. When the indirect eco-
nomic costs associated with delay and uncertainty in licensing decisions
are factored in, the result of the analysis under the three-part due pro-
cess test becomes all too clear.
Analysis of the economic impact of delay in licensing decisions
must first be considered from the supplier's perspective. Decisions to
apply for a license to construct a generating plant, gas pipeline, electric-
ity transmission line, or coal gasification plant are made primarily as a
result of the supplier's projections of future demand for the product or
service the facility will supply. Initially the supplier has available a
wide range of alternative means of meeting projected future demand,
but the high cost of investigating and supporting the desirability of the
supplier's ultimate choice of a particular facility or site forces selection
of a specific combination of site and design at a relatively early stage.
Beyond this point, the supplier is deterred from supporting any alterna-
tive unless and until it becomes reasonably certain that its initial choice
will not prevail. To do otherwise would mean both incurring addi-
tional costs to investigate and support the alternative and detracting
from the credibility of the initial selection. If the application is granted
in a relatively prompt manner, of course, the supplier's preferred pro-
ject is usually built and the anticipated future demand is met; if denied
promptly, the supplier can turn to a functional alternative and, with
some delay and additional cost, apply to build the alternative. This
395. See REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES, THE NEW NATIONAL LIQUIFIED NATURAL GAS IMPORT POLICY REQUIRES FUR-
THER IMPROVEMENTS 14-15 (1977); AMERICAN GAS ASS'N, LNG FACT BOOK 30-31 (1977);
REPORT TO THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REDUCING NUCLEAR
POWER PLANT LEADTIMES: MANY OBSTACLES REMAIN (1977).
396. See generally SENATE COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DECISION
AND REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ALASKA NATURAL GAS TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
(1977).
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process continues until a project is approved. Thus, prompt decisions
to deny applications impose only modest additional costs in terms of
pre-application investigation and the licensing process itself.397 Nor is
a serious shortage of the energy form affected by the decision likely as a
result of a six-month or year delay. In contrast, when reliance upon
oral adjudication places the agency's decision on a project in limbo for
several years, as is currently the case for most major energy projects, 398
the prospect of a serious future shortage of the affected form of energy
emerges. Uncertainty concerning the future availability of forms of en-
ergy then retards general business investment through the decision-
making process described in detail earlier in this Article. 399
As with prolonged uncertainty concerning allocation or pricing
policies, measuring accurately the costs of lengthy delays in licensing
decisions in terms of reduced aggregate business investment is impossi-
ble, although these costs certainly are substantial. Over the last few
years, most major corporations have added studies by energy consul-
tants projecting the future availability of specific forms of energy as a
significant factor in their investment decisionmaking process. In most
cases, these reports indicate considerable uncertainty concerning such
availability induced in large part by the facilities licensing process.
This, in turn, limits decisions to expand existing plants or to build new
plants because of the general investor aversion to risk. Thus, the aggre-
gate costs, direct and indirect, of using adjudicatory procedures in the
licensing process are damaging. Given the availability of less time-con-
suming written procedures, application of the three-part due process
test should find that the constitution does not compel oral evidentiary
procedures.
Applying the Test
The preceding analysis is only illustrative of the way in which the
due process calculus can be applied to energy regulatory proceedings.
Many important cases do not fall within any of the four general catego-
ries discussed. Application of the accepted three-part test to the four
397. This assumes, of course, that there is some project the agency is willing to approve.
California regulatory agencies recently issued a sequence of decisions in which they appear
to have rejected virtually all of the available alternatives for creating additional electric
generating capacity in the state. See California PUC Advises San Diego Gas and Electric as
to Sundesert Proposal, 20 NAT'L A. REGULATORY UTIL. COMM'R BULL. 13 (May 15, 1978)
(Sturgeon, Comm'r, concurring; Symons, Comm'r, dissenting).
398. See note 395 supra.
399. See text accompanying notes 108-26 supra.
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types of cases selected for illustrative analysis, however, suggests sev-
eral important conclusions relevant to many other types of proceedings.
If the issue before the agency is of a type whose resolution will
affect business investment decisions substantially, the costs of delay in
resolving the issue will be very large. Written and hybrid procedures
exist that can substitute effectively for trial-type procedures as means of
decreasing the risks of inaccurate agency decisions. Applying these
generalizations to most energy regulatory proceedings will show very
high costs of requiring adjudicatory procedures with little benefit to the
accuracy of the decisional process. This leaves only the importance of
the protected private interest as a factor, which in these circumstances
must be of great importance to justify constitutionally imposed adjudi-
catory procedures. This analysis makes clear that the number of en-
ergy regulatory proceedings involving individual suppliers or specific
projects in which due process should require trial-type hearings is in-
deed extremely small.
Distinguishing or Overrling Prior Holdings
Of course, to adopt this approach to due process in the regulatory
context, the Court must either distinguish or overrule portions of prior
cases such as Louisville & Nashville and Ohio Bell Telephone. Consis-
tent with its practice of the last several decades, the Court probably
would choose to distinguish these cases, thereby narrowing their hold-
ings by implication. Although several bases for such an approach ex-
ist,4°° the preferable approach by far would be to overrule expressly
portions of these prior holdings. These decisions may well have made
good law at the time they were decided; in the early part of this century
the due process test probably should have yielded holdings requiring
trial-type procedures in most regulatory proceedings. Earlier regula-
tory proceedings had fewer issues and fewer parties, permitting adjudi-
400. For instance, in Louisville & Nashville, the holding involved only the requirement
that an agency decision be based upon substantial evidence. The statements in the opinion
concerning procedures required in administrative proceedings must be considered mere
dicta, since the agency in fact employed full adjudicatory procedures. 227 U.S. 89, 90
(1913).
In Ohio Bell Telephone, the holding undoubtedly was influenced by the fact that the
company was not apprised of the factual basis for the agency's decision through any means.
301 U.S. 292, 300 (1936). Thus, it may properly stand for the proposition that a party must
be put on notice of the factual basis for an agency's proposed action, rather than mandating
the specific procedures that must be used by the agency to make those facts known. This
interpretation of Ohio Bell Telephone would render it entirely consistent with the expanded
notice doctrine announced in Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
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cation to be used at significantly lower cost. Moreover, only in recent
years have institutionalized nonadjudicatory procedures emerged to
provide effective and less expensive substitutes for trial-type hearings.
Thus, the much greater complexity of modem regulatory proceedings
and the wide spectrum of sophisticated nonadjudicatory procedures
now available to agencies call for a different result through application
of the due process balancing test.
Will the Expanded Notice Concept Survive After Vermont Yankee?
Language in Vermont Yankee suggests that opinion to be a precur-
sor to decisions in which the Court will dismantle all or most of the
procedural protections imposed upon informal rulemaking by the Dis-
trict of Columbia circuit court during recent years,40' including
nonadjudicatory procedures mandated in Portland Cement.40 2 Such an
extension of Vermont Yankee would be unnecessary and unfortunate.
The expanded notice concept differs materially in several respects from
the requirement that agencies adopt some form of oral evidentiary
hearing. The expanded notice concept is statutorily based, and does
not significantly increase the costs of informal rulemaking. Its contin-
ued vitality is consistent with the desire to avoid rigidifying procedural
requirements through constitutionalization.
The Basis for the Concept
The basis for the District of Columbia circuit court's imposition of
adjudicatory procedures in some types of rulemaking proceedings was
never entirely clear. However, because the court explicitly denied reli-
ance on statutes, the only conceivable source of judicial power was the
Constitution. Because the constitutional analysis leading to imposition
of adjudicatory requirements was flawed significantly, the court prop-
erly eliminated the requirements. The expanded notice concept, on the
other hand, is based entirely upon statutory interpretation.
Reasoning from the APA's requirement that agency action taken
through rulemaking must be accompanied by "a concise general state-
ment of . . . basis and purpose, '40 3 the court concluded that an
agency's failure to respond to well-supported comments rendered the
action arbitrary and capricious. The purported basis for a proposed
rule cannot be criticized effectively without knowing the basis well in
401. 435 U.S. 519, 524-25 (1978).
402. For the requirements imposed in Portland Cement see text accompanying notes
204-16 supra.
403. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976).
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advance of the date on which comments are due; hence, logically the
agency must include the basis for its proposal as part of its "notice" of
proposed rulemaking. Thus, the expanded notice concept is defensible
purely as an interpretation of the APA. In the context of actions by the
FERC and the ERA, this concept also is amply supported by the agen-
cies' organic acts.4 °4
Expanded Notice Does Not Substantially Increase Decisionmaking Costs
In striking down the District of Columbia circuit court's selective
requirement for adjudicatory procedures, the Court emphasized its be-
lief that the inevitable effect of these requirements would be to force all
agencies "to adopt full adjudicatory procedures in every instance. '40 5
With this result, "all the inherent advantages of informal rulemaking
would be totally lost."'40 6 Unfortunately, the Court appeared to stress
the nature of the dispute and the controverted facts, 407 thereby leaving
the impression that its decision was based at least in part upon Profes-
sor Davis' theory that "legislative facts" are not amenable to testing
through cross-examination or comparable procedures. But if the prop-
osition is accepted that as many "legislative facts" are subject to and in
need of testing as "adjudicative facts," the sole reason for eliminating
the selective requirement for oral adjudication becomes the efficiency
of rulemaking. In this regard, the Court's position that selective post
hoc adjudicatory requirements would eliminate that efficiency was well
taken. However, expanded notice does not suffer from this shortcom-
ing. Certainly, expanding the notice requirement and the corollary that
the agency respond to responsible criticisms will increase the costs of
decisionmaking. Even though the necessary documentation already
should be available within the agency, assembling and making avail-
able that documentation to the public is not without cost. Moreover, a
rulemaking conducted under the expanded notice doctrine obviously
will take longer to conclude than a typical pre-Portland Cement
rulemaking. The increased cost associated with this procedural safe-
guard, however, is nowhere near the same order of magnitude as the
404. For example, the Department of Energy Organization Act requires both FERC and
ERA to provide detailed statements of the basis for their proposed actions. 42 U.S.C.
§ 719 1(b)(1) (Supp. 1 1977).
405. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 546-47 (1978).
406. Id at 547.
407. Id at 524 n.l. See also United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224,
245 (1973).
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costs incurred through substitution of full adjudicatory procedures. 40 8
Expanded Notice Is Consistent With Constitutional Restraint
Yet another reason for leaving intact the expanded notice require-
ment is avoidance of what otherwise would be a very difficult constitu-
tional issue. Due process is not an all-or-nothing proposition; its
requirements are flexible. Due process may require expanded notice in
many rulemaking proceedings where adoption of adjudicatory proce-
dures is not mandated. The result of applying the due process test
when considering whether an opportunity for the affected parties to
criticize the factual basis for an agency "rule" affecting substantial pri-
vate interests prior to its adoption might be to mandate expanded no-
tice as a matter of constitutional law. The nature of the protected
interest remains the same, of course, but the other factors are very dif-
ferent. The potential for material factual error is much greater when
informal rulemaking without expanded notice is relied upon. The mar-
ginal benefits to accuracy resulting from requiring additional proce-
dures are greater. The costs of requiring additional nonadjudicatory
procedures are much less.
This is not an argument in support of constitutionalizing the ex-
panded notice requirement. Rather, it is an argument for avoiding the
need to confront such a difficult constitutional law issue by interpreting
the APA and organic acts in a manner that continues to avoid the con-
stitutional issue. This leaves Congress free to change the procedural
requirements over time to reflect changing conditions. The Court need
resolve the issue in the future only if Congress amends the APA in a
manner explicitly eliminating the expanded notice requirement; in that
case, the analysis of the amendment would take place in the context of
the realities of administrative proceedings as they exist at the time of
such an amendment.
Implications for Congress and Agencies
Most of the foregoing discussion speaks to future court interpreta-
tions of the due process clause, APA, and existing organic acts sug-
gested by an analysis of the empirical data gathered for this Article.
There remain the critical questions of the extent to which Congress
should restrict agency discretion to select procedures and how agencies
should exercise the procedural discretion granted them.
The empirical data suggests, at least in the context of major energy
408. See text accompanying notes 18-135 supra.
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regulatory decisions, that statutes rarely should require full adjudica-
tory procedures, even when the agency chooses to regulate on a case-
by-case basis. There undoubtedly are exceptions to this generalization
where interests affected by the outcome of the proceeding are so impor-
tant that extraordinarily inefficient procedures are justified,40 9 or where
the bipolar nature of a class of controversies renders oral evidentiary
hearings possible at tolerable costs. Congress, however, should recog-
nize that in most situations imposing a statutory requirement that an
agency use full adjudicatory procedures is tantamount to a requirement
that the agency not select or implement any policy in the area.
Agencies either should be given discretion to select procedures
from the spectrum available under the due process clause and the APA,
or should be required by their organic acts to use a carefully devised
hybrid procedure. The choice here, of course, depends upon the extent
to which Congress trusts the agency to exercise its discretion wisely ver-
sus the extent to which Congress has confidence in its own ability to
devise appropriate procedures that will retain validity over time in a
variety of applications. Giving the agency substantial procedural dis-
cretion must be considered the preferred choice.
Energy regulation agencies should avoid full adjudicatory proce-
dures except in those very rare instances in which they are required by
due process or applicable statutes. The only situation in which volun-
tary selection of full adjudicatory procedures to resolve major issues
will further agency interests is when the agency seeks to present a
facade of active policy implementation in an area in which it actually
409. Of course, Congress must consider the public interests potentially affected by
agency actions, rather than confining its concern to the private interests affected. Thus, it is
not only possible, but likely, that Congress would require more elaborate procedural safe-
guards in some types of proceedings than the minimum compelled by due process. How-
ever, the cost of using adjudication to resolve issues affecting large numbers of parties and
influencing the nature and level of investment is so extraordinarily high that it is a very rare
cluster of public and private interests that justifies statutorily mandated trial-type hearings.
Since the effect of requiring adjudicatory proceedings prior to formulating or implementing
regulatory policy often is to preclude the agency from acting in the area at all, Congress
should turn its attention to nonadjudicatory procedures or to highly selective and narrowly
defined adjudicatory procedures if it believes that the interests affected justify procedural
safeguards greater than those required by due process. If Congress believes that the risks of
going forward with a particular policy are so great that it wants to preclude the agency from
acting in the area until the nature and extent of the risks are better known, as is arguably the
case with nuclear power plant design, it should simply impose a statutory moratorium on
agency actions. The clear message of such a moratorium would be to ignore the nuclear
option as an immediately viable means of meeting additional demand for electricity and to
pursue available alternatives instead. This course of action would be far preferable to the
investment-retarding uncertainty created by telling the agency to develop a policy and then
requiring it to use procedures that make it impossible to develop and implement any policy.
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wants to avoid taking any action. An agency sincerely trying to make
and apply policy efficiently and effectively should search for appropri-
ate procedures somewhere between informal rulemaking with full no-
tice of basis and full adjudication. The procedures adopted by the FPC
in its gas producer rate proceedings, with the additional procedural
safeguards suggested earlier in this Article, 410 provide a basic frame-
work that offers considerable promise for many types of regulatory
decisionmaking.
410. See text accompanying notes 217-39 supra.
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